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ABSTRACT 
 How do the psychological characteristics of world leaders affect civil wars? Multiple 
studies have investigated how the personalities and beliefs of world leaders affect foreign policy 
preferences and outcomes. However, this research has yet to be applied to the intrastate context, 
which is problematic, given the growing importance of civil wars in the conflict-studies 
literature.  This dissertation project utilizes at-a-distance profiling methods to investigate how 
leaders and their psychological characteristics can affect the likelihood, severity, and duration of 
civil conflicts. The findings of this research provide further support for the general hypothesis 
that leaders can, and often do, matter when trying to explain policy outcomes. More importantly, 
the findings demonstrate that leaders can influence the likelihood of civil war onset, the severity 
of civil wars, and their duration. Additionally, this project investigates the effect that civil war 
severity has on the psychological characteristics of leaders.  Contrary to some previous research, 
however, the findings here indicate that leaders’ psychology may not be sensitive to civil conflict 
severity.
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CHAPTER 1: LEADERS AND CIVIL WAR BEHAVIOR 
Introduction 
How does the psychology of political elites affect civil war behavior? Since 
approximately 2003, it became clear that internal conflict had captured the attention of conflict 
studies scholars (Walter 2017). Furthermore, civil wars have resulted in a number of combat-
related deaths that is almost double that of casualties associated with interstate war (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, 75). As a result, there has been a great deal of research that has explored the sources 
of civil war onset, duration, severity, and termination. However, much of this research has 
focused on structural factors relevant to the state and how those factors make civil war more 
likely or more severe. As a result, the vast majority of the civil war literature ignores leaders 
entirely. This issue is particularly important because many of the key theories that attempt to 
explain civil war make explicit psychological arguments without ever directly measuring or 
testing those psychological processes. A key example of this is research based on the concept of 
relative deprivation (Gurr 1970). The theory of relative deprivation argues that people who are 
struggling economically or politically - relative to people they see on a regular basis - are more 
likely to have grievances that lead them to rebel against the state (Gurr 1970). This is said to be 
true regardless of the presence or absence of absolute deprivation – which should hinder the 
ability of people to rebel. Unfortunately, too often state-level variables, such as economic 
inequality (i.e. Acemoglu and Robinson 2005) or political inequality (Cederman, Weidman, and 
Gleditsch 2011) are used as proxies for individual motivations for revolt. This type oversight in 
the literature is what I seek to address in this project. To correct this shortcoming, I explore how 
 2  
 
the psychology of elites (i.e. presidents, prime ministers, etc.) can affect civil war behavior (i.e. 
civil war initiation, duration, and severity) and how civil wars can affect the psychology of elites 
(i.e. do events within the conflict cause leaders to adapt their psychological predispositions to the 
situation?). 
 We understand that individual leaders can shape foreign policy outcomes (Hermann and 
Hagan 1998). Furthermore, many scholars have considered leadership psychology as necessary 
for exploring foreign policy behavior (Ethridge 1971; Foster and Keller 2014; Keller 2005; 
Schafer and Walker 2006). If civil wars are more common and have resulted in more casualties 
than interstate wars, then it stands to reason that effective studies of the correlates of civil 
conflict should include measures of leadership psychology. A casual glance at the differing 
responses to the Arab Spring protests show how leaders can affect the dynamics of civil conflict. 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya responded to peaceful protests with 
disproportionate violence, while other leaders like King Abdullah II in Jordan and Mohammed 
IV Morocco granted concessions to the protesters’ demands. All four states were economically 
and politically similar; however, all four governments responded very differently to peaceful 
opposition. In Syria and Libya, the government’s response resulted in destructive and bloody 
civil wars1. 
This casual glance at a recent and relevant series of events demonstrates that, while 
structural factors help us understand civil conflict behavior, leaders play an important role in the 
outbreak and/or conduct of intrastate conflicts. Far too many studies emphasize the situational 
                                                 
1 Syria’s conflict continues as of the writing of this dissertation and Libya continues to be plagued by extreme 
regime instability (i.e. high rates of regime turnover and dubious internal sovereignty). 
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variables present within a state that make civil wars more likely, but there are no studies that 
consider the role that individual leaders can play in shaping civil war behavior. Therefore, I 
attempt to address this shortcoming by exploring the role that individuals can play in shaping a 
variety of civil war behaviors. 
Literature Review 
 While there has been a lot of research produced by conflict studies scholars, the vast 
majority of that research has relied on exogenous situational variables. For example, the research 
investigating civil war onset has found that structural factors like the presence of natural 
resources (Coller and Hoeffler 2004; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Miodownik and 
Bhavnani 2011) or economic or political grievances (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1970; 
Braithwait, Dasandi, and Hudson 2016; Holterman 2012; Vreeland 2008) are factors that 
increase the likelihood of civil war onset. Similarly, researchers studying the duration of civil 
wars tend to focus heavily on the role of structural factors. Similar to studies of civil war onset, 
researchers tend to find that two broad factors affect the duration of civil wars: economic factors 
and political grievances. Research has consistently demonstrated that factors such as high levels 
of income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are related to longer civil wars (Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Most recently, researchers have 
begun to include the effect of individual leaders on civil war duration by finding that the longer a 
head of state is in power, the longer the civil war tends to be (Uzonyi and Wells 2016). 
A similar lean toward structural or situational variables can be seen in the literature on 
civil war severity. Scholars have found that higher income countries experience less severe civil 
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wars (Chaudoin, Pskowitz, and Stanton Forthcoming), while countries that are heavily dependent 
on natural resources are more likely to experience more severe civil wars (Gawande, Kapur, and 
Satyanath Forthcoming). Additionally, like many other studies of civil war behavior, there is 
reason to believe that political institutions can shape certain civil war behaviors. A good deal of 
research finds that there is a negative relationship between democratic political institutions and 
the severity of civil wars (Lacina 2006)2. 
What is made clear in this very brief review of the civil war behavior literature is that 
there is an emphasis on structural or situational factors. These variables are often meant to serve 
as proxies for concepts such as individual grievance or individual greed. Such an approach 
homogenizes individual factors such as preferences, decision-making abilities, motivations, and 
predispositions to violence. However, there has been other fruitful research that has explored the 
role that individual leaders can play in shaping policy outcomes. Much of this research has 
focused on how the psychology of elites can affect foreign policy outcomes in particular. 
Because my project considers variables from leadership trait analysis and operational code 
analysis, this preliminary literature review will explore some of the key findings from these 
research agendas. 
Leadership trait analysis has provided some very useful insights about how the 
psychological characteristics of leaders can affect their foreign policy preferences. Hermann 
(1980) investigated the effects of seven characteristics on aggressive foreign policy tendencies. 
She finds that characteristics of particular importance are: distrust, nationalism, need for power, 
                                                 
2 The specifics of these various findings will be explored in the literature reviews of each respective chapter. 
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and conceptual complexity (Hermann 1980). This research indicates that higher levels of distrust, 
nationalism, and need for power correlate with a more aggressive foreign policy orientation, 
while a higher level of conceptual complexity correlates with a less aggressive foreign policy 
orientation (Hermann 1980). 
 Later research has emphasized how the psychology of leaders can affect different types 
of conflict. For example, Foster and Keller (2010) explore the effects that a leader’s level of in-
group bias has on the willingness to use diversionary force. They find that, in the context of 
economic hardship, leaders with higher levels of in-group bias are less likely to use diversionary 
force (Foster and Keller 2010). In a later research project considering the use of diversionary 
force, Foster and Keller (2014) find that higher levels of distrust and lower levels of conceptual 
complexity increase the likelihood that a leader will choose to use diversionary force. Finally, 
more recent research has explored how the psychology of leaders can help scholars better 
understand the democratic peace. Keller (2005), using an aggregated measure that combines 
need for power with a belief in ability to control events, demonstrates that a leader who is more 
likely to challenge constraints will be more likely to initiate militarized disputes regardless of 
whether he or she is operating in a democratic system. 
 Operational code analysis has also provided many insights into the foreign policy 
behaviors of a variety of world leaders. The operational code system focuses on a leader’s 
political beliefs (George 1969). It is argued that these political beliefs should inform the types of 
foreign policy behaviors that leaders exhibit. The earlier operational code research has provided 
rich insights into the foreign policy behaviors of individual leaders and advisers. For example, 
McLellan (1971) explores how Dean Acheson’s worldview affected his policy recommendations 
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during the Truman administration. However, many early studies relied on subjective, qualitative 
methods for identifying the operational codes of leaders. 
 Eventually, more systematic procedures were developed to quantify the political beliefs 
of leaders (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). Once scholars developed a way to quantify these 
beliefs, it became easier to systematically identify patterns of behavior. For example, Walker, 
Schafer, and Young (1999) explored the conflict management behaviors of George H.W. Bush 
and Bill Clinton in the Post-Cold War Era. Despite some similarities, the authors find that 
Clinton relied more on speech patterns labeled rewards while Bush relied more on promises. 
Furthermore, Bush was less flexible in his choices between the two. This leads the authors to 
conclude that, not only was Bush more conflictual, but he was also less flexible in his operational 
code than Bill Clinton (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999, 618-619). The authors then explore 
how each president was likely to respond to moves made by foreign policy opponents. Bush was 
more likely to respond in a similar fashion if the move made by the opponent was cooperative or 
conflictual, while Clinton showed a less cooperative tactical choice when the opponent’s move 
was conflictual (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999, 622). 
  The more systematic approach has also been applied to deepening our understanding of 
the democratic peace. Schafer and Walker (2006) investigate the operational codes of Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair to determine if there is any difference in the two leaders’ beliefs about 
democratic and non-democratic states. The authors find that both leaders believe that 
democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies (Schafer and Walker 2006, 578). 
Additionally, both leaders are more optimistic about achieving their political goals with 
democratic states than with non-democratic states (Schafer and Walker 2006, 578). However, 
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there are interesting differences between the two leaders in their instrumental beliefs. On average 
Clinton is more cooperative toward non-democracies than Tony Blair (Schafer and Walker 2006, 
573). This finding is supported by considering the different foreign policy behaviors each leader 
uses when dealing with non-democracies. Schafer and Walker find that Tony Blair tends to be 
much more “dogmatic” when dealing with non-democratic states, while Bill Clinton tends be 
more flexible when dealing with either regime type (2006, 578-579). This finding is particularly 
interesting because the authors expected Tony Blair, who was operating under greater 
institutional constraints, would select a more pragmatic and flexible approach to foreign policy 
(Schafer and Walker 2006, 578). 
 What do these findings about foreign policy behavior have to do with civil war? It is clear 
there is a lack of research applying at-a-distance methods to the study of civil war behavior. 
Therefore, research applying these methods must build theories based upon the findings in the 
foreign policy literature. These findings lend themselves well to the study of civil war because 
many of them speak explicitly to the issue of preferences for aggressive tactics. It stands to 
reason that these psychological characteristics can be applied to a leader’s conduct during 
difficult domestic negotiations over contentious political issues. This project, therefore, 
addresses shortcomings in both the civil war and political psychology literature. While the 
traditional civil war literature assumes away the effects of individual idiosyncrasies, the at-a-
distance political psychology literature fails to apply these methods to the study of intrastate 
violence and civil war. 
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Layout of the Project 
 This research project seeks to address the fact that the psychology of heads of state has 
not been applied to the study of broader civil war behavior. Therefore, this project proceeds to 
address each of these questions in separate chapters. In chapter two, I build a theory of how 
heads of state can influence the bargaining process. I argue that certain psychological 
characteristics of heads of state can increase or decrease the likelihood of bargaining failure by 
making bargaining problems, identified by James Fearon (1995), more likely. In chapter two, I 
investigate how heads of state and their individual characteristics can affect the conduct of civil 
war once it has begun. I argue that key psychological characteristics can influence a leader’s 
decision to apply more violent strategies or tactics in the conduct of civil war and, therefore, 
increase the number of battle-related deaths in a given year. 
 In chapter three, I consider how heads of state can affect the termination of civil wars. 
Because my theories argue that political leaders have a key effect on civil war behavior, I focus 
on whether a civil war terminated with a negotiated settlement. Integrating a theory based on 
information provided by an ongoing conflict and how leaders perceive that information, I argue 
that certain leaders with certain characteristics are more likely to accept a negotiated end to a 
civil war rather than continue the costly fight. In chapter four, I reverse the independent and 
dependent variables in order to address a question that is often asked by political psychologists, 
but seldom receives attention in cross-national studies. I investigate what effect, if any, the 
events that take place within a civil war can cause meaningful and lasting changes in the 
psychology of world leaders. In chapter five, I discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from 
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this project about how leaders can influence policies that may lead to civil wars and can affect 
the conduct of the civil war once it has begun. 
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CHAPTER 2: CIVIL WAR ONSET 
Introduction 
 How can the psychological characteristics of political elites help explain civil war onset? 
The majority of research investigating the correlates of civil conflict onset focus on the role of 
structural or situational variables. Furthermore, there is an implicit – and sometimes explicit – 
reliance on the rational actor approach to understanding the incentives and/or opportunities for 
civil war. However, the rational actor approach assumes away the effect that individuals can 
have on the likelihood of civil war onset. There is a robust research agenda in political 
psychology and behavioral economics that indicates that individuals may face many barriers to 
the rational calculation of costs and benefits (discussed in more detail below).  
 Given that the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual heads of state can – and often do 
– affect policy preferences and outcomes, it is imperative that these characteristics and their 
effects on civil war behavior be investigated. While no political psychologist would ever argue 
that structural and situational variables do not have an effect on policy preferences and decisions, 
many argue that the unique psychological characteristics of political elites act as a lens through 
which these situations and structures are viewed (Levy 2013). Factors such as state capacity can 
provide – or limit – a state’s ability to respond to armed or unarmed opposition groups, but state 
capacity tells us only about the ability of the state to repress and nothing about the willingness of 
leaders to utilize this capacity against its citizenry. Different regime dynamics do indeed provide 
different incentives or constraints on a leader’s willingness to respond to demands with force, but 
the presence or absence of these constraints tells us nothing about how leaders perceive such 
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constraints. Are they simply a minor obstacle? Or, are they actually binding constraints that may 
stop a leader from using force when an opposition group makes a demand? Costs and benefits 
can indeed be calculated by heads of state when considering compromise with an opposition 
group. However, given the same structural or situational constraints, leaders can – and often do – 
perceive costs and benefits very very differently (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986). 
 In order to grapple with and challenge the assumptions made about how individual 
leaders calculate the costs and benefits of compromise or civil violence, we must take a closer 
look at leaders themselves. With advances in content-analysis software and a wider availability 
of speech transcripts, it is becoming much easier to investigate the psychological characteristics 
of world leaders at-a-distance. In early research, many political psychologists studying elite 
psychology’s effect on policy preferences relied on small sample sizes or comparative case 
studies. Now, with the technological advancements just discussed, it is becoming possible for 
leadership analysts to apply these at-a-distance measures to more widely accepted large-n cross-
sectional time-series models and increase the visibility of these findings in the broader conflict 
studies literature. 
 The factors affecting the onset of civil war have been of particular interest since the early 
2000s because of their violence. However, no scholar to date has considered how the psychology 
of political executives that have been associated with conflict can affect the likelihood of civil 
war onset when controlling for key situational and structural variables. I try to fill this gap in the 
civil war literature by constructing a theory of civil war onset that focuses on how the 
psychological characteristics of political leaders can affect the bargaining behavior of that leader 
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in the context of contentious domestic politics and how that behavior can make civil war more or 
less likely. I argue that different psychological characteristics can cause a head of state to fall 
into different potential problems laid out by Fearon (1995) within the bargaining process. My 
findings indicate that, when controlling for key structural and situational variables, the 
psychological characteristics of heads of state can indeed influence the likelihood of civil war 
onset as well as the onset of lower-level armed domestic conflict. These findings reinforce the 
intuitive appeal of applying leader psychology in studies of civil war, while also presenting 
avenues for future research. 
Structural Explanations for Civil War Onset 
 In the introductory chapter, I presented the at-a-distance political psychology literature 
and what the findings of these research projects mean for understanding leaders and their conflict 
behaviors. In this section, I report the findings related to structural variables and their effect on 
the likelihood of civil war onset. The majority of research investigating the onset of civil wars 
frame the effect of structural variables from the rational actor perspective (Mason 2009, 74). 
Many of these studies argue that certain structural variables can, in different ways, help to 
mitigate the collective action problem (Olson 1965) for potential rebels or provide opportunities 
for the state to respond with force to demands made by opposition actors. 
 One of the most consistent findings in the civil war literature is the effect of overall 
economic development on the likelihood of civil war onset. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that 
GDP per capita – serving as a proxy for national development – is a robust predictor of civil war 
onset across several models. The more underdeveloped a state is, the more likely it is that the 
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state will experience a civil war because the population is frustrated with their lower standard of 
living and general economic deprivation. Additionally, others have found that lower per capita 
national income and a lower proportion of the population receiving secondary education is linked 
to a higher likelihood of civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 568). Instead of arguing that 
lower national income and education rates create a heightened sense of deprivation, Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) argue that these economic factors actually capture the opportunity costs 
associated with participating in a rebellion. Moreover, Sambanis (2004) finds that only the 
population of a state3 and GDP per capita are significantly related to civil war onset across 
multiple data and model specifications. 
 Other scholars have argued that certain economic indicators can serve as a proxy for the 
so-called “greed” hypothesis of civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) hypothesize that access to natural resources and their rents can help potential rebel leaders 
provide incentives to potential rebel recruits. However, the effect of natural resources on the 
likelihood of civil war onset has been contested (Fearon 2005). Some of the scholars challenging 
this finding have argued that rent-seeking behavior often associated with the presence of natural 
resources leads to weaker government institutions and a weaker capacity for counter-insurgency 
operations (Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2005), while others have argued 
that there may be economic grievances associated with price-shocks and unequal distribution of 
benefits derived from natural resource rents (Ross 2004). Others have found that the type of 
resource within a country can also affect the likelihood of civil war onset. For example, several 
                                                 
3 This finding is driven by the fact that a country that is more populous is more likely to reach the necessary battle-
death threshold because there are a greater number of people available to fight (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006).  
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scholars have found that oil and gas can have a strong effect on the likelihood of civil war onset 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Lujala 2010; Ross 2006). 
 Moving beyond the effect of economic variables on the likelihood of civil war onset, 
other scholars have focused on explicitly “state-centric” models of civil war. These scholars 
argue that regime dynamics can have a notable impact on whether or not a state experiences a 
civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that states with politically, economically, or 
organizationally weak central governments are more likely to experience civil wars because they 
are less able to engage in effective counter-insurgency processes (75-76). However, state-
capacity is not the only way to consider the regime-civil conflict hypothesis. Goodwin (2001) 
argues that there is a strong case to be made for the civil democratic peace. Goodwin even asserts 
that no consolidated democracy was ever overthrown by a popular revolutionary movement 
(2001, 276). However, other scholars have investigated a more nuanced approach to the effect of 
regime dynamics on civil war by exploring the effect of “anocratic” governments on civil war 
onset. Research into the effect of regime type on civil conflict propensities has largely relied on 
the Polity measure of democracy (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). The polity measure is an 
index of a variety of structural and political factors that combine to create a score ranging from -
10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). While for democratic states, civil war may be 
unnecessary, and for fully autocratic states civil war is extremely difficult (see Hegre et al. 2001; 
Henderson and Singer 2000; Krain and Meyers 1997), some have argued that we should be 
focused on those regimes that fall in between these poles. The focus on those regimes that fall in 
between democracy or autocracy (usually measured as greater than -7 or less than +7 – referred 
to as anocracies) was driven by the idea that these states may be moving toward becoming 
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democracies, but there were several factors about the state that made civil war possible. One key 
example is that these transitioning states may provide for greater political participation but are 
averse to allowing public demonstrations against the government (Vreeland 2008). This belief 
has led many scholars to re-test empirical models that investigate the effect of anocracy on civil 
war onset (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001). However, James Vreeland (2008) 
points out that flaws in the Polity measure, which includes political violence in its index, can 
explain the findings linking anocracy to an increased likelihood of civil war onset. Once the 
political violence aspect of the measure was removed, the correlation between anocracy and civil 
war disappears (Vreeland 2008). 
 Another application of the effect of regime dynamics on the onset of civil conflict can be 
borrowed from interstate conflict research. Studies of interstate conflict have investigated how 
authoritarian regime dynamics can affect the likelihood of interstate conflict initiation. Rather 
than aggregating measures of regime type into a continuous scale, some scholars have created 
unique measures of different types of authoritarian regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). 
This approach captures the variation in regime types within the authoritarian spectrum and 
creates binary measures of personalist, party, military, monarchical, and hybrid dictatorships 
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Jessica Weeks (2012) builds a theory of how different 
authoritarian regimes produce different incentives or constraints on their respective leaders as 
they relate to the initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MID). Weeks (2012) argues that 
different types of authoritarian regimes present leaders with varying potential audience costs 
when they consider the use of force. In strong party dictatorships, where a leader is beholden to a 
civilian governing body, the political cost of choosing force is much higher than in a situation 
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where there is an unconstrained personalist dictator or a military dictatorship (Weeks 2012). She 
finds that strong civilian constraints on a dictator in a party dictatorship can make an autocratic 
state just as peaceful as a democratic one, while regimes lacking those constraints may serve to 
explain violence in mixed-regime dyads (Weeks 2012). 
While this approach to studying the effect of regime type on conflict is a relatively new 
one, there is ample room in the civil war literature for its application as an explanatory or control 
variable. It is very likely that when faced with opposition demands, a personalist dictator is more 
likely to see the potential costs of using force to dispel the opposition as very low. Conversely, 
the same would not be true of a dictator facing the constraints of a party that is responsible for 
his or her tenure in office. Therefore, this particular regime dynamic is worthy of exploration in 
this project. 
What is evident in the most predominate research into civil war onset is that scholars 
believe that situational or structural variables are the key to understanding why some states 
experience civil wars. These situations or structures arguably influence the incentives to rebel, 
the potential costs of rebellion, the ability of the state to effectively respond to rebellion, and/or 
the ability of the population to rebel. However, many of these variables serve as proxies for 
inherently psychological arguments about the causes of civil war. For example, economic 
underdevelopment is meant to serve as a proxy variable for grievances or counter-insurgent 
capabilities and the presence of natural resources is supposed to serve as a proxy for “greed” 
motivations. However, almost all of these theories and their empirical implications are based on 
the assumptions that either the state or the potential rebels are rational actors. For decades 
behavioral economists and political psychologists have argued that an individual’s ability to 
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accurately calculate costs and benefits is either hindered or enhanced by that individual’s 
psychological characteristics (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Simon 1972; Thaler 2015; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1986). 
Given the role of individual cognitive and psychological limitations to rational 
calculation, it is perplexing that conflict studies scholars pay such scant attention to these 
limitations in their attempts to understand conflict behavior. Such an omission is especially 
perplexing given the findings relating the psychological characteristics of political elites to 
interstate conflict preferences and behavior (see discussions of Foster and Keller 2010, 2014; 
Hermann 1980; Keller 2005; Keller and Foster 2012, 2016 in the previous section). Furthermore, 
given the inherent psychological assumptions of many of the approaches to the study of civil 
war, there is a need to test whether or not the psychological characteristics of principal actors can 
affect civil war onset when controlling for these important structural factors. No individual can 
be expected to behave in the same ways as another individual in the same political or economic 
structure or given the same political constraints. Individuals bargaining over opposition demands 
perceive different costs to compromise, they perceive different threats and opportunities, they 
believe different things about the other actor making demands, and they are motivated by 
different things. Understanding how these idiosyncrasies affect the likelihood of civil war onset 
is essential for a more complete understanding of intrastate conflict. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
 At the most basic level, civil wars involve two key actors: the state and an opposition 
group4. One or both actors have some sort of political claim that the other actor may respond to. 
The actors may choose to do nothing (maintain the status quo), negotiate some sort of settlement 
to avoid violence, or they may choose to abandon negotiation and engage in armed civil conflict. 
As with interstate conflict, the road to civil war is the result of a bargaining process that typically 
begins with instances of non-violent contentious politics (for a discussion of war as a bargaining 
process see Powell 2002). Furthermore, political leaders are instrumental in tracing the 
breakdown of negotiations. Therefore, a theory of how heads of state can affect the likelihood of 
civil war onset should be framed in relation to the bargaining theory of war. More importantly, a 
strong theory of civil war onset should explore what factors may cause bargaining to break down 
and make a civil war more likely. 
James Fearon (1995) sought to explain why actors would choose to abandon the 
bargaining process and choose the costlier option of fighting. He argues that bargaining should 
always be the preferred option because the costs of fighting can offset the gains that may be 
achieved by the fighting; therefore, the breakdown in bargaining cannot be rational (Fearon 
1995). As a result, he explores possible explanations for why normally rational actors would 
abandon the bargaining process and engage in armed conflict. 
                                                 
4 This does not mean that there may not be multiple opposition groups, but for simplicity of explanation this 
theoretical frame focuses on a two-player bargaining model as its base.  
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 Fearon (1995) argues that normally rational leaders can choose the seemingly irrational 
option to fight instead of bargain for two overarching reasons: asymmetric information and 
commitment problems. In the first condition, one or both actors do not have complete 
information about the capabilities of the other actor they are bargaining with. Therefore, an actor 
may be overconfident about his or her ability to mitigate possible costs or underestimate 
potential ex ante costs. This problem is exacerbated because both actors have an incentive to 
overstate their respective capabilities during the bargaining process. In the second condition, 
actors may be unable to credibly commit themselves to following through on an agreement 
(Fearon 1995). These two overarching bargaining problems can be magnified if heads of state 
have higher scores for certain key psychological characteristics. 
 The first psychological characteristic that can cause a head of state to abandon the 
bargaining process is his or her need for power. Leaders who are motivated by a need for power 
desire to impose their will upon other actors and are more likely to pursue positions that give 
them power or influence (Hermann 2003, 190). Furthermore, this motivation can result in a 
leader being more competitive, aggressive, and manipulative in the bargaining process (Keller 
2005, 11). Finally, leaders motivated by power tend to be more willing to use military force 
against domestic and international adversaries (McClelland 1975, 314-359; Winter 1973). 
Therefore, when a head of state motivated by a need for power and influence faces demands – 
such as regional autonomy – made by a domestic actor, he or she is more likely to experience the 
asymmetrical information bargaining problem. This is because these types of leaders – motivated 
to be aggressive and manipulative during bargaining – will underestimate the strength of the 
group making the demands. Additionally, they will be motivated by a desire to not feel or appear 
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weak by capitulating to the demands of opposition actors. Finally, leaders with a high need for 
power – driven by their desire to assert their dominance – will be far less likely to make the 
necessary concessions that could prevent an opposition actor from abandoning the bargaining 
process and engage an armed conflict. 
H1: A head of state motivated by a need for power will increase the likelihood that the 
state will experience a civil war. 
Another psychological characteristic that can increase the likelihood of bargaining 
problems is a leader’s level of distrust. Distrust is a general wariness about the reliability or 
intentions of other actors (Hermann 2003, 202). Particularly, distrustful leaders tend to believe 
that the other actor is not negotiating in good faith and that any concession the state may offer 
will not be met with honest and equitable concessions by the other actor. The effect of distrust on 
the bargaining process can be viewed through the lens of the commitment problem. If a head of 
state is distrustful, he or she is likely to approach the bargaining process with a baseline wariness 
that is higher than a more trusting leader. Once bargaining begins, the distrustful leader should 
be more likely to believe that the actor making the demands will not honor their side of the 
agreement or that the other actor may increase their demands even if they are given a concession, 
thus leading to a stalemate or an escalation that makes a civil war more likely. 
H2: A more distrustful head of state increases the likelihood that the state will experience 
a civil war. 
 Another characteristic that can affect the likelihood of civil war onset is a leader’s belief 
about his or her ability to shape events and outcomes5. A leader who has a higher belief in his or 
                                                 
5 This characteristic appears in Leadership Trait Analysis (as Belief in Ability to Control Events) and Operational 
Code Analysis (as Philosophical Belief 4, Control over Historical Development). These two variables are 
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her ability to control events believes that he or she is able to navigate political situations and 
shape the future of his or her country (Hermann 2003). This characteristic generates two 
competing hypotheses. It may be that leaders who have a higher belief in their ability to control 
events are more likely to believe that they can achieve their political goals through negotiation 
because they see themselves as being able to directly influence the outcome of contentious 
political negotiations. From this perspective, they should be less likely to experience asymmetric 
information problems and therefore be more likely to continue negotiations over political 
demands made by an opposing actor. This is the case because the leader should be less likely to 
feel the need to misrepresent his or her capabilities. Additionally, they may be less susceptible to 
the fear of the other actor reneging on their commitment. This theoretical possibility is driven by 
the fundamental belief that, even if the other actor reneges, the leader will be able to overcome 
that obstacle and resolve the problem by returning to the negotiating table. The certainty about 
one’s ability to navigate political obstacles should decrease the likelihood that a leader will 
abandon the bargaining process. Moreover, leaders who score low for a belief in an ability to 
control events may feel uncertain about their ability to navigate the potentially tenuous 
negotiating process. Furthermore, these individuals are more likely to become easily frustrated 
with the negotiating process and become aggressive because they consistently feel that they have 
no control over their political environment or the negotiating process. 
However, it is possible that a high belief in ability to control events can make civil wars 
more likely. Leaders who have a strong belief in their ability to control events may be more 
                                                 
operationalized differently, but they are conceptually very similar. Therefore, the discussion of this portion of the 
theory will discuss both interchangeably. 
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impulsive and willing to challenge perceived constraints (Hermann 2003). The impulsivity could 
lead them to abandon the bargaining process with a domestic actor. Further, the willingness to 
challenge constraints may cause the leader to rely more upon using the military as a tool for 
domestic repression and spark an armed rebellion, actual domestic political constraints 
notwithstanding. 
 H3a: A leader with a greater sense of control decreases the likelihood of civil war onset. 
 H3b: A leader with a greater sense of control increases the likelihood of civil war onset. 
 Additionally, a leader’s self-confidence can affect the likelihood of civil war onset. Self-
confidence refers to a leader’s sense about his or her ability to overcome political obstacles and 
cope with objects and actors in the political environment (Hermann 2003, 194). In this case, the 
various stimuli from the political environment are filtered through a leader’s beliefs about 
himself or herself (Hermann 2003, 194). A greater sense of self-confidence has been linked a 
greater willingness of individual actors to engage in various forms of collective action (Zomeren, 
Spars, and Postmes 2008). Additionally, leaders with high-levels of self-confidence tend to be 
less open to contextual information generated by the political environment (Hermann 2003, 194). 
This is because they are confident in their own assessment of the information. This can cause a 
breakdown in the bargaining process in a variety of ways. 
 Self-confident leaders may experience problems of asymmetric information for two key 
reasons. The first is that they are less open to contextual information. The self-confident leader is 
more likely to believe that they are stronger than they are relative to the other actor despite 
potential incoming information to the contrary. Additionally, the self-confident leader will likely 
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underestimate the other actor’s level of resolve and commitment to achieving their political 
goals. Therefore, they may be less flexible in their willingness to make compromises that may 
avert conflict. However, higher self-confidence may also theoretically lead to a decrease in the 
likelihood of civil war onset. For example, if a leader is more self-confident, he or she may 
believe that he or she can successfully meet the demands of the opposition through negotiation or 
be less fearful of making concessions because they believe they can cope with any potential 
political fallout. Considering both of these possibilities, two rival hypotheses can be generated. 
 H4a: A self-confident leader will be less likely to experience the onset of a civil war. 
 H4b: A self-confident leader will be more likely to experience the onset of a civil war. 
 The next relevant psychological characteristic is a leader’s conceptual complexity. 
Conceptual complexity refers to the degree to which a leader sees people, places, and events in 
shades of grey rather than black and white (Hermann 2003, 195). Leaders who are less complex 
in their thinking are more likely to perceive themselves as having fewer options when faced with 
demands from other political actors (Foster and Keller 2014; Hermann 2003). Equally important, 
less complex leaders are going to be more likely to see the other as good or bad rather than an 
actor responding to their own respective constraints. Conversely, more complex thinking leaders 
will be more likely to see themselves as having more options at their disposal in pursuit of their 
goals. Finally, more complex leaders tend to be better able to interpret the meaning of incoming 
contextual information than a less complex leader. 
 In the bargaining situation, the less complex leader is more likely to experience problems 
of asymmetric information than a leader whose thinking is more complex. When an opponent 
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signals resolve to achieve his or her goals in the bargaining process, the less conceptually complex 
leader is more likely to ignore these signals because they are more closed to information. 
Additionally, less conceptually complex leader is more likely to see the bargaining process as win 
or lose (i.e. zero-sum) rather than a process through which the bargaining parties can come to a 
compromise. Moreover, the less complex leader is going to be more likely to see the opening offer 
as take-it-or-leave-it. Therefore, this type of leader will be less likely to propose a counter-offer 
and more likely to abandon bargaining all together after the rejection of the first offer. These 
factors all lead to an increased likelihood of bargaining breakdown and therefore increased 
likelihood of civil war. 
 H5: A less complex leader is more likely to experience a civil war onset. 
 Another leader-specific variable that can cause the bargaining process to breakdown is 
the level of in-group bias. In-group bias refers to a leader’s emphasis on the supremacy or 
advancement of his or her in-group. More precisely, leaders who score high on in-group bias 
believe that their group is the most important actor in the political universe (Hermann 2003, 
201). This characteristic creates a strong attachment to the group or nation. In-group bias can 
increase the likelihood of bargaining failure because of the effect it can have on the concept of 
issue indivisibility (Fearon 1995, 382). Issues that are especially salient to an actor can be 
considered by the actor to be indivisible, and a high score for in-group bias likely makes 
demands related to a state’s unity or the actor’s group remaining in control of the government 
especially salient. Therefore, when a leader perceives his or her in-group as the state (akin more 
to nationalism than to other in-group identities), demands made by another group for regional 
autonomy or secession appear as an existential threat to his or her group. This results in the 
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leader refusing the demands of the opposition group and abandoning the bargaining process. 
Such abandonment makes conflict more likely. Additionally, when a leader perceives his or her 
in-group as the ethnic, religious, or political group he or she identifies with and he or she relies 
on that group for power bargaining is more likely to breakdown. This is particularly true when an 
opposition group makes demands for more meaningful representation in a governing coalition or 
broader political rights. A breakdown in this case too makes civil war more likely. 
 H6: A leader with high in-group bias is more likely to experience a civil war onset. 
 An additional characteristic that can affect the likelihood of civil war onset is a leader’s 
belief about the fundamental nature of the political universe (P-1). Individuals can believe that 
the political universe is inherently one of conflict or one of cooperation (George 1969; Schafer, 
Walker, and Young 2003, 226-227). When a leader believes that the nature of the political 
universe is inherently conflictual, the bargaining process can breakdown in a few key ways. 
First, these leaders are likely to perceive the utility of negotiating at all as being quite low. This 
is because the leader believes that conflict is natural and that attempts to avoid it will be futile.  
Moreover, they will also believe that other actors in the political universe may see the world in 
the same way leading them to believe that the opposition sees conflict as being inevitable as 
well. In the context of bargaining problems, a conflictual worldview can make problems of 
asymmetric information and commitment problems more acute. First, if a leader believes the 
political universe is inherently conflictual, he or she will likely not believe that the opposition 
will take negotiation seriously, even if there are credible signals that an opposition group is 
making its demands peacefully. This may be driven by the way the conflict-oriented leader filters 
information about threats and intentions of an opposition group through his or her beliefs about 
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the political universe. Moreover, these individuals are likely to discount or ignore the 
information about the potential costs of abandoning bargaining, thereby increasing the possibility 
of conflict. Second, the conflict-oriented leader may be more susceptible to perceived 
commitment problems. This is because the conflict-oriented leader is likely to believe that, even 
if he or she did negotiate with the opposition and reach a settlement, that the settlement will not 
be a lasting one. The conflict-oriented leader is likely to believe that once he or she makes a 
concession, that the opposition group may choose to escalate their demands and resort to conflict 
to achieve them. This belief is driven by the belief that the political universe and the actors 
within it are inherently conflict-oriented and that conflict is a natural part of the political 
universe. Therefore, the conflict-oriented leader is likely to abandon bargaining in order to skip 
the time-consuming bargaining process altogether and get straight to the fighting. 
H7: A belief that the political universe is conflictual increases the likelihood of civil war 
onset. 
 A final psychological characteristic that can reasonably affect the bargaining process is a 
leader’s belief about whether conflict or cooperation is the most effective way to achieve 
political goals (I-1). While P-1 reflects a leader’s belief about other actors and the political 
universe, I-1 reflects a leader’s belief about himself or herself. More importantly, I-1 reflects 
whether or not a leader believes that he or she should pursue political goals using strategies of 
conflict or cooperation. An actor who believes that he or she achieves political goals more 
effectively with conflict is far more likely to see the bargaining process as a waste of time. For 
the conflict-oriented leader, cooperative strategies are inefficient and sitting down with a 
potentially hostile actors runs counter to how the leader thinks about himself or herself. This 
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refusal to meaningfully bargain will make the breakdown of bargaining more likely and therefore 
increase the likelihood of civil war. 
H8: A belief that conflict is the best way to achieve goals increases the likelihood of civil 
war onset. 
 The bargaining process applied in this theory assumes more than one actor is involved in 
the process. However, modelling such a process using at-a-distance psychological methods is not 
an easy task. Therefore, I wish to expand the discussion of a key assumption I make in this 
model of civil war onset. While either actor (the opposition or the state) can exacerbate 
bargaining problems, I am most interested in capturing how the head of state’s behavior 
contributes to the onset of civil war. Both sides can choose to abandon bargaining, but that 
choice is not exclusively informed by one side’s decision to give up bargaining. Eventually, it is 
the behavior of one of the actors that can lead the other party to abandon bargaining. 
In the case of intrastate bargaining over political demands, it is the government that holds 
the majority of the leverage in negotiations. The government makes and enforces laws; this 
makes the bargaining behavior of the head of state important. Choosing to consider the monadic 
effects is desirable because the state can choose to leave the bargaining table, or they can drive 
the opposition away from it. This process is driven by the way the leader behaves and that 
behavior is informed by the characteristics outlined above. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
process is an inherently dyadic one, I am interested in observing a set of monadic variables at the 
level of the state. The leader in this case is an instrument of the state, though not its exclusive 
decision-maker; they are the final decision-maker in matters of policy (i.e. they approve 
negotiated settlements, sign laws, etc.). Since this is the case, it is also important to think about 
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the bargaining failure process as being centrally related to the state’s failure to make 
concessions, and that failure inevitably rests with the leader. 
Research Design 
Sampling Criteria and Unit of Analysis 
 The potential population of cases will be every state in the international system in a given 
year. This is appropriate because every state in the system is at risk of experiencing a civil war in 
a given year. Though many states never experience a civil war, there is a non-zero probability of 
experiencing one in every year. The population will be sampled from 1939 – 2010. This time-
period is appropriate because of the clear uptick in civil wars in the international system in the 
post-World War II (WWII) era driven by the independence of former colonies and, later, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
 My unit of analysis is the state-year. Because I am interested in the ways in which the 
psychological characteristics of national leaders can affect the likelihood that a country will 
experience a civil war, I assume that the national leader is an important extension of the state. 
When a domestic opposition group makes a political demand against the government, it is very 
likely the national leader who will be the principal negotiator. Therefore, it is the leader’s 
characteristics that are important for understanding whether the bargaining process will break 
down and result in a civil war. My sample of the population is driven by the availability of 
speech texts for a given leader in a given year6. These transcripts are taken from a variety of 
                                                 
6 This availability is driven by the depth and breadth of digitally available speech archives. 
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possible sources including: government archives, news transcripts, political party websites, and 
personal websites of the leaders in question. To accurately code a leader’s score for the 
characteristics requires between 4,000 and 5,000 spoken words. 
Variables, Sources, and Procedures 
Dependent and key independent variables 
 The dependent variable is taken from the Upsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) 
Armed Conflict Data Set (ACD). They define internal armed conflict as, “contested 
incompatibility that concerns the government or territory, or both where the use of armed force 
results in at least 25 battle-deaths in a calendar year,” (Themner and Wallensteen 2014, 541). I 
use their measure of armed conflict onset7 (25 or more battle-deaths in a calendar year) conflict 
and high-intensity conflict (1,000 or more battle-deaths in a calendar year) to test alternative 
models and demonstrate robustness. The dependent variable in each instance is binary, where 
zero indicates no new civil conflict or war in a given year and one indicates that a new civil 
conflict or war started in a given year. Additionally, I test two different ways to handle ongoing 
civil conflicts. The first approach I codes ongoing civil wars as zeroes. While this approach may 
cause states experiencing civil wars to appear more peace than they are, a state can experience 
internal conflicts with more than one group. Moreover, these conflicts may not start at the same 
time. The second approach treats ongoing civil conflicts as missing data. This approach does 
                                                 
7 This operationalization of the dependent variable considers the onset of all conflicts that reach the 25 annual battle-
related death threshold, including those conflicts that surpass the 1,000 battle-related fatality threshold. I refer to 
these conflicts simply as “armed conflicts” and I refer to the subset that reaches 1,000 battle-related fatalities in the 
first year of the conflict as “high-intensity conflicts”  
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shrink the sample but avoids the problem of making states experiencing conflicts seem more 
peaceful than they actually are. 
 The key independent variables of interest come from leadership trait analysis (Hermann 
1980) and operational code analysis (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). All scores will be 
generated using Profiler Plus content-analysis software (socialscienceautomation.net), which 
analyzes the spoken words of heads of state. The first set of psychological characteristics will 
come from the Leadership Trait Analysis program (Hermann 1980). The first psychological 
characteristic of interest is the level of distrust for a head of state. Profiler Plus focuses on the use 
of nouns and noun phrases when referring to persons other than the leader and groups other than 
the group the leader belongs to (Hermann 2003, 202). The score is the percentage of times in a 
speech or an interview response that a leader exhibits distrust toward others (Hermann 2003, 
203). The second psychological characteristic of interest is an elite’s level of self-confidence. 
Profiler Plus focuses on the leader’s use of pronouns such as, my, myself, I, me, and mine 
(Hermann 2003, 194). Again, the context is essential. Does the pronoun appear in a phrase where 
the leader is initiating an action, or arguing that he or she should be viewed as an authority figure 
(Hermann 2003, 194)? The score for self-confidence is calculated as the percentage of times in 
an interview response that pronouns are used in this context (Hermann 2003, 195). 
 The third psychological characteristic of interest is a leader’s need for power. The coding 
for need for power focuses on the use of verbs. Some conditions under which a leader may be 
signaling an attempt to establish or maintain power and influence include when the speaker: 
proposes or engages in a strong forceful action, gives advice or assistance that is not solicited, 
attempts to control the behavior of another person, tries to persuade or argue with someone else, 
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seeks to gain fame or notoriety with an action, or shows concern for his or her reputation or 
position (Hermann 2003, 190). 
 The fourth psychological concept of interest in this study is a leader’s belief in his or her 
ability to control events. As discussed above, this concept is operationalized two different ways, 
one in conjunction with Leadership Trait Analysis and one with Operational Code Analysis. The 
LTA version of belief in ability to control events refers to a leader’s perception that he or she has 
some degree of control over the situation she or he is in (Hermann 2003, 189-190). More 
precisely, these leaders believe that individuals and governments can shape outcomes (Hermann 
2003, 190). Coding focuses on verbs and action words, particularly verbs describing actions 
taken by the leader in question or the group with which the leader identifies (Hermann 2003, 
190). The score is calculated as the percentage of times the verbs indicate that a speaker has 
taken responsibility for planning or initiating an action (Hermann 2003, 190). 
An alternative measure about a leader’s sense of control comes from operational code 
analysis (P-4). This score reflects a leader’s belief about his or her own sense of control over 
historical events. The score is generated by taking the number of self-attributions as a percentage 
of the total attributions (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 228). This index measures the locus 
of control over historical events: those who attribute more actions to self, see self as more in 
control, while those who attribute more actions to others see others as more in control. This score 
is bound between zero (a very low belief of one’s control over historical events) and one (a very 
high belief in one’s control over historical events) (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 228). 
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 The fifth psychological characteristic of interest is an actor’s conceptual complexity. 
Conceptual complexity is the degree of differentiation that the leader shows in describing other 
people, policies, or things (Hermann 2003, 195). Words such as approximately, possibly, or 
trend indicate a higher degree of conceptual complexity; words such as certainly, absolutely, or 
without a doubt indicate a lower degree of conceptual complexity (Hermann 2003, 196). The 
score for this trait is the percentage of high versus low complexity words used in the verbal 
sample (Hermann 2003, 196). 
 The sixth psychological characteristic of interest is a leader’s level of in-group bias. In-
group bias is a leader’s world view in which his or her group holds center stage (Hermann 2003, 
201). This belief promotes strong emotional attachments to the group with which the leader 
identifies. When coding for this trait, the focus is on words used to describe the leader’s own 
group (Hermann 2003, 201). If the leader uses modifiers to describe his or her group as positive 
(i.e. peace-loving, great, progressive, successful, prosperous), or they use words that suggest 
strength (i.e. powerful, capable, etc.), then that leader likely has higher in-group bias (Hermann 
2003, 201). The score is the percentage of times in a speech that a leader refers to in-groups that 
use the modifiers outlined above (Hermann 2003, 201). 
 The next set of psychological characteristics are taken from the Operational Code 
Analysis research program. These characteristics focus on the political beliefs that individuals 
hold. Operational code analysis uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to generate scores for 
the beliefs of interest. The VICS method focuses on six attributes of the verb and its surrounding 
context (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 224). The six attributes are: subject, verb category, 
domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context (Walker, Schafer, and Young 
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2003, 224). The subject of the verb can be self or other (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 224). 
The verb can have a positive or negative valence8. In the event the verb is transitive, then it can 
be further categorized as cooperative or conflictual behavior that takes the form of a word or a 
deed (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 224). 
 The first philosophical belief within operational code analysis focuses on whether or a 
not an actor believes the political universe is essentially one of conflict or harmony (George 
1969; Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). It ranges between -1 and +1, with a positive score 
indicating that a leader believes that the fundamental nature of the political universe is one of 
harmony, while a negative score indicates that it is one of conflict (Walker, Schafer, Young 
2003, 227). The score for this variable is the balance between the frequencies of positive and 
negative verbs attributed to others in a leader’s public statements (Walker, Schafer, and Young 
2003, 226). 
 The next psychological variable of interest is the first instrumental belief from 
operational code analysis. This measures the extent to which a leader believes that a conflictual 
or a cooperative approach is most appropriate for achieving his or her political goals (George 
1969; Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). The score can range from -1 to +1 with a negative 
score indicating that the leader believes conflict is the most effective means of achieving a 
foreign policy goal, while a positive score indicates that a leader believes that cooperation is the 
most effective approach for pursuing foreign policy goals (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 
                                                 
8 These can be positive or negative transitive verbs.  
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227). This score is generated by taking the balance of the frequencies of positive and negative 
verbs attributed to self (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 226). 
Control variables 
 A series of relevant control variables will also be included to minimize the possibility of 
spuriousness. The first variables capture the importance of regime dynamics. It has been long-
accepted that perfectly autocratic and perfectly democratic states do not tend to experience civil 
wars (Vreeland 2008, 401). This led to a belief that so-called “Anocracy” would be related to the 
onset of civil wars (see Hegre 2001)9. However, this approach to linking regime type to civil 
wars has faced scrutiny regarding measurement (Vreeland 2008)10. Despite a lack of consistent 
findings linking the anocracy concept to the onset of civil conflicts and war, given its importance 
in the literature, I include the measure of anocracy as a control variable. 
In addition to the anocratic variable, I also control for autocratic regime dynamics. States 
ruled by autocrats can be governed by the military junta, a single-party, a monarch, or by a 
personalist dictator (i.e. Syria, Libya, or Cuba) (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz (2014) code each class of dictatorship by focusing on who controls the 
policy-making process, leader selection, and the state’s security apparatus. Therefore, if the 
military controls those decisions, a state is coded as a one for being a military dictatorship, and 
zero on other values. The same is true for the identification of a party dictatorship. To identify a 
                                                 
9 Anocracy refers to states in between democracy and autocracy on the Polity IV scale. The argument states that 
regimes that fit into this category have meaningful signs of democracy like elections, but there are few outlets for 
the population to peacefully express grievances to the government. Therefore, these states are more susceptible to 
civil wars.  
10 This is driven in part by issues with the Polity IV coding of states, particularly its inclusion of political violence as 
one of the components of the final index (see Vreeland 2008 for a thorough review of this data issue.  
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personalist dictatorship, they try to determine if the control over the various mechanisms rest in 
the hands of a very small group of people around the leader (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, 
318). Recently research has shown that the internal dynamics of an autocratic regime can affect 
the likelihood that an autocrat will initiate a militarized interstate dispute (Weeks 2012). 
Therefore, I will run models that control for the type of autocratic regime in a given year11. The 
variables are binary for each type of autocratic regime. The state is coded as a one if they fit the 
definition of one of the autocratic regime types, zero if otherwise. I expect that, consistent with 
Weeks (2012), military dictators and personalist dictators will be more likely to experience a 
civil war onset, while I expect party dictatorships to be less likely to experience an onset of 
internal conflict. 
Two final control variables are the log of the total population of a country being observed 
and GDP per capita. The overall population of a country should be positively associated with the 
likelihood of civil war onset. This stems from the greater resource pressures applied to the state 
as the population gets larger (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). GDP per 
capita captures a state’s level of economic development. If a state is well-developed, the 
population should be happier with their lot than if the state is less-developed. Therefore, there 
should be a negative relationship between GDP per capita and the likelihood of civil war onset 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wengast and Basedau 2014). 
                                                 
11 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) introduce additional categories that are not likely to be relevant to this study. 
These categories are: oligarchies, indirect-military, and hybrids of military, party, and personalist dictatorship.  
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Statistical Methods 
 Because my dependent variable is binary, I apply a variant of logistic regression model to 
test my hypothesis. The first consideration when working with time series cross-sectional (or 
panel) data is a concern about the possibility of unobserved unit heterogeneity. In the case of my 
data, I create a fixed-effect estimator to control for unobserved effects that are potentially unique 
to each state that may increase or decrease the likelihood that the state will experience a civil 
war. Another potential concern – unique to my data set – pertains to my sample size. When 
initially attempting to run models in which ongoing civil wars are treated as missing data, 
standard panel logit models fail to calculate a maximum likelihood estimator when certain 
psychological variables are present. This failure to calculate a maximum likelihood estimator is 
more common when working with smaller sample-sizes (Allison 2008, 8). Therefore, rather than 
performing a basic panel logistic regression with a fixed-effect estimator, I apply a bias-reduced 
generalized linear model (BRGLM) (Firth 1993; Kosmidis and Firth 2009). This method applies 
iterated adjustments of data in order to maximize the penalized likelihood. As a result, this 
method makes the accurate calculation of a maximum likelihood estimator more likely, 
especially when working with a sample-size of less than 20012. 
Results – Psychology and Civil War Onset 
 Before discussing the findings of the fully-specified models, it is prudent to discuss the 
motivations for model-specification choices. As with many social science models, it is 
                                                 
12 I apply the same method to the models that code ongoing civil wars as zeroes rather than missing data. Kosmidis 
and Firth (2009) argue that this method is equally effective even in the absence of small-sample bias.  
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appropriate to explore possible collinearity among the independent variables of interest. Some 
variables demonstrate moderate to high correlations (see pairwise correlation tests in Appendix 
B). Distrust is moderately correlated with P-1 and need for power is moderately correlated with 
in-group bias; while a state’s logged population is highly correlated with a state’s logged GDP 
per capita. To explore the possible effects of these correlations, I tested several different 
combinations of psychological variables in differing models (see Appendix A). Despite the 
presence of moderate correlations among the psychological variables, the findings are only 
minimally sensitive to model specification13. As a result of these minimal differences, in this 
chapter I present only the models that include all psychological variables.  Additionally, I ran 
models that exchange GDP per capita and logged population (see Appendix A). The change in 
findings only affects the significance of those control variables. Therefore, to remain consistent 
with the existing civil conflict onset literature, I present models that include both population and 
GDP per capita in the fully specified model. 
 Another specification question pertains to the treatment of ongoing conflicts. As 
discussed above, the concept of the dependent variables of interest is civil conflict onset, which 
means that when a civil conflict starts in a country year, it is coded 1 in the data (no conflict 
onset is coded 0). In the next year, the variable is coded 0 if there are no new civil conflict 
onsets. That is the case even if the original conflict is still going (see Bennett and Stam 2001). 
                                                 
13 The exception is the effect of distrust when included in armed conflict onset models along with P-1 and in-group 
bias. When ongoing conflicts are treated as zeroes, models with this combination of variables results in distrust 
losing its statistical significance.  
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Since that is the way onset is typically treated in the literature, in two of my models (columns 1 
and 3 in Table 1 below), I follow that precedent. 
However, there are at least two reasons to be concerned about that treatment of onset. 
First, an existing civil conflict may have its own independent effect on the possibility of another 
civil conflict starting: once the government is seen as engaged in one conflict, other alienated 
groups may see the moment as an opportunity to pursue their grievances. The second concern, 
and the more important one for the present research, is a theoretical one that pertains to my main 
explanatory variables. If a conflict continues into the second year with no new onset, then the 
traditional coding for that country year would be 0. But since the psychology of the leader 
probably has not changed significantly, it would now be corresponding to a 0 in the data set, and 
that problem compounds itself each year the conflict continues. It does not make much 
theoretical sense that a leader’s psychology would predict conflict onset in one year, but, because 
of coding rules, it cannot predict the same conflict in year two. Because of these concerns, I ran 
an additional model for each dependent variable (columns 2 and 4 in Table 1) where ongoing 
conflicts are simply treated as missing cases and not included in the sample. 
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Table 1 - Onset Models 
Fully-Specified Models     
VARIABLES 
Armed 
Conflict: 
Ongoing=0 
Armed 
Conflict: 
Ongoing 
Missing 
High 
Intensity: 
Ongoing=
0 
High 
Intensity: 
Ongoing 
Missing 
Distrust(t-1) -0.843 -1.093 -2.020** -1.478* 
 (0.827) (0.700) (0.682) (0.616) 
BACE(t-1) 3.019** 2.571** 2.319** 1.846* 
 (1.023) (0.887) (0.846) (0.754) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) -0.652 1.934+ 0.719 1.991+ 
 (1.340) (1.173) (1.107) (1.017) 
nPower(t-1) -2.850* -2.808** -3.464*** -2.905** 
 (1.191) (1.054) (0.984) (0.930) 
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.799 1.153 0.268 0.523 
 (1.086) (0.997) (0.897) (0.857) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) 0.438 -1.132** 0.277 -0.437 
 (0.448) (0.384) (0.370) (0.332) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.251 -0.360 -0.126 -0.270 
 (0.748) (0.667) (0.618) (0.573) 
I-1(t-1) -0.891** -0.584* -0.854** -0.745** 
 (0.319) (0.270) (0.263) (0.235) 
P-4(t-1) -2.346* -0.412 -1.248 0.185 
 (0.965) (0.861) (0.798) (0.758) 
P-1(t-1) 1.392** 0.216 0.529 -0.520 
 (0.483) (0.446) (0.399) (0.377) 
Population(log t-1) 0.0323 0.0459* 0.0414* 0.0123 
 (0.0215) (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0160) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1) -0.0526 -0.0910** -0.0517+ -0.0272 
 (0.0337) (0.0292) (0.0277) (0.0248) 
Personalist Regime -0.551 3.883*** -0.380 3.648*** 
 (0.384) (1.089) (0.317) (0.900) 
Party Regime -1.127* 0.0248 -0.979** 0.127 
 (0.453) (0.691) (0.374) (0.599) 
Military Regime -2.013**  -1.506**  
 (0.686)  (0.563)  
Anocracy 0.114 -0.409 0.0198 -0.362 
 (0.205) (0.275) (0.169) (0.222) 
Constant -2.326* -1.859* -1.727* -1.292+ 
 (0.970) (0.810) (0.801) (0.692) 
Observations 282 195 282 218 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10     
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 Model one in Table one presents the findings for the onset of armed conflicts with 25 or 
more battle-deaths and codes ongoing conflicts that do not experience a new onset of a separate 
conflict as zeroes. First, a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events significantly 
increases the likelihood of a new armed conflict onset. This finding provides initial support for 
hypothesis 3b, which asserts that a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events makes 
armed conflict onset more likely. Interestingly, need for power is statistically significant; but, 
rather than making armed conflict more likely, a leader with a higher need for power is less 
likely to experience the onset of an armed conflict. Model one also provides support for 
hypothesis eight; a leader who believes that cooperation is the most effective strategy for 
achieving political goals (I-1) is less likely to experience the onset of an armed conflict. 
Additionally, a leader with a strong belief in his or her ability to shape historical outcomes (P-4) 
is less likely to experience a new armed conflict onset14. Finally, a leader’s belief about the 
fundamental nature of the political universe (P-1) is statistically related to the onset of armed 
conflict. However, the coefficient is positive (contrary to the hypothesis). This finding signals 
that, when a leader believes that the fundamental nature of the political universe is one of 
cooperation, that leader is more likely to experience an armed conflict onset. In model one, only 
the control variables that pertain to specific regime dynamics achieve statistical significance. 
States with military and party dictatorships are less likely to experience armed conflict onsets 
than other regime types. 
                                                 
14 It is noteworthy that this finding is sensitive to model specification and is only present in model one. Therefore, 
we should be cautious about the inferences we draw about this variable. 
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 Model two presents the findings for all civil conflicts (with a minimum of 25 battle 
deaths) when ongoing conflicts are treated as missing data. This modeling choice has some effect 
on the findings. First, in-group bias approaches statistical significance at the ten-percent 
significance threshold. This model indicates that a leader with a higher-level of in-group bias is 
more likely to experience the onset of an armed conflict. Though this finding is consistent with 
my hypothesis, the relationship is rather weak, and scholars should be cautious about drawing 
inferences from this finding. Second, self-confidence achieves statistical significance and 
significantly decreases the likelihood of armed conflict onset. This finding indicates that a self-
confident leader is less likely to experience a new onset of internal armed conflict. While two 
variables become significant when ongoing conflicts are treated as missing data, two variables 
that were significant in model one fail to achieve statistical significance. P-1 and P-4 lose the 
significance exhibited in model one. Despite some differences between the two models, I-1, 
belief in ability to control events, and need for power continue to be significant and maintain the 
directional effects from model one. However, there are some noteworthy changes among the 
control variables. Population becomes statistically significant and makes an armed conflict more 
likely, while a higher GDP per capita makes armed conflict less likely15. Finally, the presence of 
a personalist dictatorship makes an armed conflict more likely than the presence of other types of 
regimes16. 
                                                 
15 Recall that GDP per capita and population are highly correlated with one another. Moreover, the significance 
GDP per capita is very sensitive to the presence of population in the models (see specifications in Appendix A). 
Therefore, we should be wary about drawing any inferences about GDP per capita from these models. 
16 Military dictatorships are excluded from models that treat ongoing conflicts as missing variables. The military 
dictatorship variable in these models becomes a perfect predictor of a non-onset in that year. 
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 Models three and four in Table one mirror models one and two but focus on the subset of 
the most intense internal conflicts. These models consider only new conflicts that reach the 1,000 
battle-death threshold in the first year of the conflict17. The findings in models three and four 
share similarities with models one and two. Need for power and I-1 make high-intensity civil 
wars less likely, while belief in ability to control events is positively related to the onset of a 
high-intensity civil war. However, when exploring the subset of high-intensity conflicts, distrust 
achieves statistical significance in models where ongoing civil wars are coded as zeroes (when 
there is no new conflict onset) and models where they are treated as missing data points. 
Moreover, distrust has a negative effect on the likelihood of civil war onset in both models. This 
finding is not only contrary to my hypothesis, but contrary to a majority of the findings in the 
literature. Therefore, I will discuss the possible explanations for this perplexing finding in the 
following section. However, as with armed conflict onset, in-group bias achieves significance at 
the ten-percent level only when ongoing conflicts are treated as missing data. Therefore, despite 
a higher score for in-group bias increasing the likelihood of civil war onset, further research is 
needed to identify the effect that in-group bias can have on civil war onset. 
 Finally, to make the interpretation of these findings easier to understand, I present the 
predicted probability graphs for variables that are consistently related to intrastate conflict. 
Additionally, I present the predicted probabilities for GDP per capita. This approach allows me 
to compare the strength of my psychological variables of interest to the strength of an oft-used 
economic control variable. Figure one shows the probability of an armed conflict onset (>25 
                                                 
17 I will use the terms “civil war” and “high-intensity conflicts” interchangeably to describe the subset conflicts that 
surpass the 1,000 battle-death threshold.  
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battle-deaths) at different levels of a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events. Figure 
one shows that belief in ability to control events greatly increases the probability of an armed 
conflict. As belief in ability to control events approaches zero, the probability of an armed 
conflict is approximately 0.25. However, at its highest-level, belief in ability to control events is 
associated with a probability of armed conflict onset of approximately 0.90. Belief in ability to 
control events is significant in every model specification presented above. Moreover, the 
substantive effect of this variable on the probability of armed conflict is substantial, with an 
increase in probability of 0.65 from the lowest-level of belief in ability to control events and the 
highest-level of the variable. 
 
Figure 1: Predictive Margins - BACE 
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 Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities for need for power. The effect of need for 
power on the probability of armed conflict onset is not as pronounced as belief in ability to 
control events. The statistical results indicate that a leader’s need for power decreases the 
likelihood of both armed conflict and high-intensity civil war onset, regardless of model 
specification. These findings are reflected in the graphical presentation of predicted probabilities. 
At the lowest-level of need for power, the probability of armed conflict is approximately 0.5; 
while at the highest-level, the probability of an armed conflict is approximately 0.1. This 
decrease in probability - of approximately 0.4 - is slightly weaker than the increase in probability 
associated with belief in ability to control events (approximately 0.6). However, as with belief in 
ability to control events, the marginal effect at each level of need for power is significantly 
associated changes in the probability of armed conflict onset. 
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Figure 2: Predictive Margins - nPower 
 Figure 3 presents the predicted probabilities for I-1. I-1 is consistently associated with a 
decreased likelihood of armed and high-intensity conflict onset regardless of model specification. 
Again, the predicted probability graphs reflects the findings of the statistical model. At the 
lowest-levels of I-1 (most conflict-oriented), the probability of experiencing an armed conflict 
onset is approximately 0.59; while the highest (most cooperative) I-1 score is associated with a 
probability of 0.3 that a state will experience an armed conflict. This signals a modest decrease in 
probability of approximately 0.3 that a state will experience an armed conflict. 
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Figure 3: Predictive Margins - I-1 
 Finally, I explore the predicted probabilities for distrust. While the previously discussed 
variables were significant for all models tested in Table 1, distrust is only significant in models 
of the high-intensity conflict subset. Therefore, the marginal predicted probabilities presented in 
Figure 4 considers the probability of high-intensity conflict onset in a given year at various levels 
of leader distrust. Figure 4 shows that distrust does indeed have a negative effect on the 
likelihood of civil war onset. Distrust is associated with a decrease in probability of civil war 
onset of approximately 0.2 (i.e. the more trusting leader has a probability of approximately 0.35 
of experiencing a civil war and a less trusting leader has a probability of 0.15). Though the 
findings show a significant and negative relationship, the effect on the probability of civil war 
onset is modest compared to some other psychological variables. 
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Figure 4: Predictive Margins - Distrust 
 Finally, for comparison, I present the predicted probabilities of GDP per capita. At the 
lowest-levels, GDP per capita is associated with a probability of approximately 0.5 that a state 
will experience an armed conflict in a given year, while the highest-level of GDP per capita is 
associated with a probability of approximately 0.28 that a state will experience an armed conflict. 
Interestingly, despite the consistent use of GDP per capita in the civil conflict literature, the 
decrease in probability from the highest to the lowest-levels of GDP per capita (approximately 
0.2) is rather modest. In fact, when compared to a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control 
events (approximately 0.6), the effect of economic development on the probability of armed 
conflict onset seems weak. Moreover, most of the significant psychological variables perform as 
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well, or better, than GDP per capita when comparing the predicted probabilities of armed 
conflict18. 
 
Figure 5: Predictive Margins - GDP Per Cap 
Conclusion and Discussion 
  This chapter began by asking how the personality characteristics and beliefs of world 
leaders can affect the likelihood of civil conflict onset. The project began by constructing a 
theory that borrowed heavily from the bargaining theory of war and constructed hypotheses 
                                                 
18 Despite the fact that the significance of GDP per capita is very sensitive to model specification in my sample, 
GDP per capita is a variable that appears frequently in the civil war onset literature. Therefore, despite the sensitivity 
in my sample and the concerns about potential multicollinearity, I compare this consistently important variable to 
my novel independent variable. 
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about the ways in which these psychological characteristics can make bargaining failure – and 
thus conflict - more likely. Across multiple model specifications, a handful of personality 
characteristics stand out as important for understanding the likelihood of conflict onset (both 
high-intensity and armed conflicts). Moreover, these findings are largely consistent – with few 
exceptions - regardless of the treatment of ongoing conflicts. Nevertheless, some of the 
relationships run contrary to expectation. 
 Before turning my attention to the findings that were contrary to expectation, I will 
discuss the implications of the findings that were consistent with my hypotheses. One variable 
that maintains a relationship consistent with my hypothesized expectations is I-1. When a leader 
believes that the most effective strategy for achieving political goals is cooperation – rather than 
conflict – he or she is less likely to experience the onset of both civil conflicts and civil wars. 
This indicates that there is support for the idea that leaders with a belief about the efficacy of 
cooperation are less likely to abandon – or create an environment where the opposition will 
abandon – negotiations over domestic political differences. This finding is consistent regardless 
of how ongoing conflicts are treated, model specification, or intensity-level of conflicts. 
 In addition to a leader’s belief about the efficacy of conflict or cooperation in the pursuit 
of political goals (I-1), a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events makes the onset of 
civil conflict significantly more likely. I began by establishing competing hypotheses for this 
variable since a belief in ability to control events could have either a positive or negative effect 
on the likelihood of conflict onset. However, the findings of every model indicate that the more a 
leader believes he or she can control political events, the more likely he or she is to experience 
the onset of a domestic armed conflict. The consistent nature of this finding indicates support for 
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the argument that leaders with a strong belief in their ability to control events are more likely to 
abandon the bargaining process or create conditions for its demise. While these findings support 
two of my hypotheses, there are also interesting implications for the variables that are 
consistently significant, but contrary to hypothesized expectation. 
 The first of these variables is distrust. Distrust is a consistently significant variable that 
decreases the likelihood of civil war onset. This finding is consistent regardless of the treatment 
of ongoing conflicts or model specification. However, the negative coefficient is contrary to not 
only my hypothesized expectations, but the literature that explores how generalized distrust can 
affect the likelihood of violent foreign policy behaviors. The interstate conflict literature 
consistently indicates that the more distrustful the individual, the more likely he or she is to 
advocate for or carry out varying degrees of violence to achieve foreign policy goals. However, 
this project is the first time that an at-a-distance measure of a leader’s distrust has been applied to 
the study of intrastate conflict. First, the domestic political environment is different than the 
international political environment. Leaders operating in the former are likely to have a firmer 
grasp on the nature of politics within their respective countries19. Therefore, in the context of 
domestic politics, distrustful leaders may perceive the threat posed by an opposition group very 
differently than potential threats posed by other states. It is possible that these leaders may be 
more distrustful of their constituencies and more sensitive to the political costs of failure to 
bargain with opposition groups. This may lead them to be more likely to capitulate to the 
demands of the opposition rather than risk a potentially unpopular civil conflict. 
                                                 
19 It is even likely that a firm grasp on the domestic political environment or domestic political support is almost a 
necessary condition of becoming a head of state.  
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 Another variable that is consistently significant and contrary to expectation is need for 
power. In the interstate conflict literature, a leader motivated by a desire to impose his or her will 
on others tends to be more violent in the conduct of foreign affairs. However, the current 
findings indicate that a leader with a higher need for power is less likely to experience the onset 
of both civil wars and armed conflicts. This finding less difficult to explain than the finding for 
distrust, however. While leaders with a higher need for power can be more aggressive, there is 
also meaningful evidence that leaders who are motivated by a desire for power are often adept 
and capable politicians who know which strategies are appropriate for achieving political goals 
(Hermann 1999, 2003; Schafer and Crichlow 2011, 192). In the context of domestic political 
bargaining, these leaders are more likely to negotiate effectively with opposition groups, thereby 
decreasing the likelihood that bargaining will break down and make civil wars less likely. 
 In addition to the statistical models, I presented predicted probabilities for the 
consistently significant psychological variables and compared the effect on probabilities to GDP 
per capita. These predicted probability graphs demonstrate that the psychological variables 
perform as well as, or better than, an oft-used economic control variable when determining the 
probability that a state will experience a civil conflict or high-intensity civil war. These findings 
indicate that the inclusion of psychological characteristics of world leaders in the study of civil 
conflict is essential to advance this research agenda. Though some of the findings run contrary to 
expectations, leaders and their characteristics have an unmistakable effect on the likelihood that a 
state will experience internal conflict. Moreover, these findings are consistent regardless of how 
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ongoing civil conflicts are coded.20 This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the directions 
for future research. 
Directions for Future Research 
 The at-a-distance study of world leaders and their personalities and beliefs has made 
several great advancements in the last two decades. The advent of software like Profiler Plus that 
can generate scores for a variety of psychological characteristics more quickly than older hand-
coding procedures has been instrumental in driving these advancements. However, we still have 
a long way to go to match the generalizability of the most common conflict studies models. 
Several questions about methodology, selection effects, endogeneity, and the interactions of 
leadership psychology with institutional constraints still need to be explored. Furthermore, we 
still face barriers regarding the availability of necessary speech texts. In more recent years, 
several countries have developed digital archives of speech transcripts for heads of state. 
However, the archives that do exist, tend to have speeches for a limited amount of time. This 
makes it difficult to create data sets of psychological characteristics that are temporally and 
cross-sectionally comparable to other studies of conflict. 
 This issue also raises the question of selection bias. Many of the countries with digitally 
available speech archives tend to fall in the category of developed countries. This means that 
less-developed countries are under-represented in not just my data set, but many data sets using 
at-a-distance profiling methods to explain interstate conflict21. Future research should explore 
                                                 
20 It is worth noting that models that drop ongoing civil conflicts have stronger Wald Chi-Square statistics and are 
therefore better fit. 
21 The issue of potential selection bias driven by missing data in traditional civil conflict models has been examined 
by scholars as well (see Lall 2016). 
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how – if at all – the over-representation of developed countries generates biased inferences. 
Additionally, the issue of the relationship between conflict and elite psychology is not well-
understood. Currently, a handful of comparative case studies demonstrate that the beliefs of 
leaders can be affected by exogenous shocks (i.e. terrorist attacks, wars, etc.) (Renshon 2009), 
but no studies to date have used broad cross-sectional time-series data to test for genuine 
endogeneity between conflict and the psychology of world leaders. The simplest approach to 
dealing with this is to simply lag the psychological characteristics22. However, future research 
should do a better job of determining if the psychological characteristics are actually affected by 
the onset or severity of conflicts or shocking events. 
 This chapter is another attempt to apply at-a-distance political psychology to the broader 
field of conflict studies. To date, those who have used the psychology of leaders to explain 
conflict preferences and behavior have been focused on the interstate dimension. However, this 
study reinforces the fact that there are several more dependent variables in the field of conflict 
studies that can be better explained by including the psychology of world leaders. Understanding 
why civil wars – hands down the most bloody and costly form of war still relatively prevalent in 
the international system – begin requires a more complete understanding of the dynamics that 
lead to the outbreak of violence in the state. While certain situational and structural variables 
indeed play an important role in explaining the onset of civil conflict, the role of leaders 
                                                 
22 While this approach is common, recent research indicates that lagging independent variables does nothing to 
alleviate problems of endogeneity; rather, the endogeneity is simply pushed back to t-1. Furthermore, research 
indicates that lagging independent variables that are actually endogenous significantly increases Type I error 
(Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky 2017). This leads some scholars to argue that, if the variables are actually 
endogenous, it is more harmful to try to resolve endogeneity using lagged versions of independent variables. 
However, this approach is still prudent if there is a theoretical reason to believe that there is time delay effect or 
scholars are testing for the presence of autoregressive processes (Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky 2017).  
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represents another piece of the puzzle that helps us see the picture more clearly and better 
understand why and how civil violence breaks out.   
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CHAPTER 3: CIVIL WAR SEVERITY 
Introduction 
 How does the psychology of leaders affect the severity of a civil war? As stated in earlier 
sections, the study of civil wars has become an important part of the conflict studies research 
agenda. The study of civil war severity, however, has been a much smaller part of this broader 
research agenda (Chaudoin, Peskowitz, and Stanton 2017, 57). Moreover, the few studies that 
have examined this question have focused on the effects of political and economic variables. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, there is good reason to believe that heads of state and their 
idiosyncratic characteristics can affect the likelihood of civil war onset. There is further reason to 
believe that heads of state and their psychological characteristics should have a more marked 
effect on the conduct of the civil war. 
 Civil wars vary widely in their severity with some resulting in very few casualties and 
others resulting in a large number of battle-related deaths. Indeed, the severity of civil wars can 
be informed by economic factors and the issue(s) over which the civil war is being fought. But, 
heads of state can exert a great deal of discretion in how the civil war is fought regardless of any 
potential political or economic constraints. Therefore, including these unique characteristics of 
world leaders in a study of civil war severity is imperative for providing a more complete 
understanding of the dynamics of a civil war. One need only look to Arab Spring to see wide 
variation in the conduct of domestic conflict given similar structural constraints. 
 This chapter explores how a variety of psychological characteristics of heads of state can 
affect the severity of civil wars. The findings indicate that the psychological characteristics of 
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world leaders can have noticeable effects on the severity of civil conflicts. This chapter proceeds 
with a brief review of the existing literature that has used political and economic variables to 
explain the severity of civil wars. I follow with a theory section that outlines how leaders and 
their individual characteristics can influence strategic preferences, thus making a civil war more 
or less severe. After discussing the method I use to test my hypotheses, I present my findings and 
discuss the implications for the study of civil conflict more broadly.  
Civil War Severity – Empirical Findings Related to Politics and Economic Variables 
Economic Development and Civil War Severity 
 There are few cross-national studies of civil war severity relative to the studies of civil 
war onset (Chaudoin, Peskowitz, and Stanton 2017, 61). Scholars who emphasize the role of 
economic factors using cross-national data build their theories on the logic applied to theories of 
civil war onset. Lacina (2006) argues that economic development may serve proxy for a state’s 
capacity to develop strong counter-insurgency abilities and thus be related to a more severe civil 
war. Instead, she finds that state capacity is unrelated to the severity of civil wars (Lacina 2006, 
287). Rather, she finds that democratic regimes are related to less severe civil wars, while foreign 
assistance (military or economic) to either rebels or the state results in more severe civil wars 
(Lacina 2006, 287).  
 Instead of focusing on narrow definitions of economic growth, Bazzi and Blattman 
(2014) explored the effect of export price shocks on civil war severity. They find that export 
price shocks are unrelated to the emergence new civil wars, but steadily rising export prices lead 
to shorter and less severe civil wars (2014). This finding indicates support for the argument that a 
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strengthening economy is often associated with the strengthening of counter-insurgency 
capabilities of a state23. Moreover, the findings challenge the assumption that an increased desire 
to take control of an economically growing state should make civil wars more severe (Bazzi and 
Blattman 2014). Similarly, using instrumental variables for a variety of indicators of economic 
development, Chaudoin and colleagues (2017) find that economic growth is negatively related to 
both the duration and severity of civil wars. 
 Others have explored factors other than economic growth when trying to explain variance 
in civil war violence. De Juan and Banks (2016) consider how the selective allocations in public 
goods can influence political violence during civil war. They argue that, when the allocation of 
electricity is selectively distributed, there will be increased political violence in certain sub-
districts during the Syrian civil war (De Juan and Banks 2016). Their theory states that an 
authoritarian government facing dissatisfaction from the broader population cannot rely on 
repression alone; rather, they need to allocate certain public goods to loyal sectors of the 
population to encourage compliance (De Juan and Banks 2015, 93-94). Using satellite data and 
geospatial methods, De Juan and Banks find that sub-districts in Syria that experienced positive 
relative and absolute changes in nighttime light distribution would be less likely to experience 
political violence during the first eighteen months of the Syrian conflict. This provides unique 
empirical support for the broader theory that the selective distribution of goods contributes to 
political stability (e.g. Gerschweski 2013; Levi 2006). 
                                                 
23 However, the counter-insurgency techniques of a state may not be adequately measured by economic development 
alone. Others have pointed out that the introduction of private military and security companies can greatly increase 
the counter-insurgency capabilities of a weak state and lead to a more severe civil war (Petersohn 2017).  
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Ethnicity and Civil War Severity 
 While most research find that ethnic divisions have a limited effect on civil war onset 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003), scholars of civil war severity have argued that the ethnic makeup of a 
country experiencing civil war can play a meaningful role in explaining the level of civil 
violence (Costalli and Moro 2012). Scholars who argue that civil war severity can be informed 
by the division of ethnic power approach the research by focusing on sub-national units of 
analysis (Costalli and Moro 2012; Slack and Doyon 2001). Investigating the variance in violence 
between municipalities during the Bosnian civil war, Costalli and Moro (2012) argue that the 
balance of ethnic groups within a municipality can explain the level of violence observed in 
them. Costalli and Moro (2012) find that when there is a high-level of ethnic polarization in a 
municipality, there were higher degrees of observed violence. Additionally, they find that ethnic 
dominance in a municipality decreases the severity of violence in the municipality (Costalli and 
Moro 2012, 807-809). 
 Other scholars have investigated how the makeup of governing coalitions influence the 
severity of ongoing civil conflicts. Heger and Salehyan (2007) argue that the size of a governing 
coalition can help to explain some of the observed variance in conflict severity. They argue that 
countries with larger governing coalitions – especially democratic ones – should be much more 
constrained in the methods that they use to fight an armed domestic opponent. When using the 
ethnic affiliation of heads of state as a proxy for coalition size, the evidence suggests that smaller 
ruling coalitions present fewer constraints for leaders, thus leading to more severe civil conflicts 
(Heger and Salehyan 2007).  
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 As with the study of civil war onset, there is a strong reliance on using structural proxy 
variables to explain variances in civil war severity. However, there is ample room for the 
inclusion of leadership psychology in the study of civil war severity. Once a civil war has begun, 
the head of state exercises a great deal of control over the strategies and tactics the state uses to 
conduct the war. The number of battle-deaths that occur during a civil war can be directly 
informed by these strategic choices made by these heads of state. Moreover, there should be a 
great deal of variation between leaders experiencing civil wars on various psychological 
characteristics that can explain the reliance on certain strategic choices. As discussed in chapter 
one, there is evidence that the psychological characteristics of leaders can affect their decisions 
to rely on violence as a policy tool, but there is a lack of such research attempting to explain civil 
conflict severity. The following section constructs a theory about how the psychology of leaders 
can make civil wars more or less severe. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 As briefly mentioned in the introduction, many of the studies of civil war severity rely on 
rational actor assumptions when constructing theories that seek to explain civil war severity. 
However, many researchers in economics and political science have been doubtful about the 
applicability of such assumptions (see Simon 1979). Individuals face cognitive limitations that 
hinder their ability to use rational processes when making decisions. These limitations are even 
more evident during periods of great uncertainty (Greenstein 1969). There are few situations that 
create greater uncertainty than the instability of civil war. Therefore, the assumption that 
individuals – regardless of individual idiosyncrasies – process information and make calculations 
in the same way seems fundamentally flawed. I argue that a variety of characteristics and beliefs 
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and can influence how leaders perceive incoming information and shape tactical preferences 
regarding the conduct of a civil conflict. 
The first expected relationship between leader psychology and civil war severity 
considers a leader’s need for power or influence. A leader’s need for power describes the extent 
to which he or she is motivated by a desire to gain, maintain, or exert power or influence in the 
political context (Hermann 2003; Winter 1973). Evidence has indicated that leaders motivated by 
a need for power tend to rely more on force in domestic and international political contexts 
(Hermann 1980; McClelland 1975; Winter 1993). Therefore, when a leader with a high power 
motive faces armed civil opposition, he or she will be more likely to bring a greater proportion of 
the state’s resources to bear in the civil war and make the civil war more severe. Moreover, these 
leaders will be more likely to view concession as a sign of weakness, rather than a tactful 
maneuver that could bring an end to the bloodshed. For these types of leaders, the perceived 
costs of capitulation or defeat are too high to merit anything less than a strong military response 
to an armed opposition. 
 H1: A leader’s need for power should be positively related to civil war severity 
 As with onset, a leader’s level of distrust should have a notable effect on civil war 
severity. Distrustful leaders view the intentions and reliability of others with wariness (Hermann 
2003, 202). Further, distrustful individuals tend to view the use of greater levels of force as an 
efficacious policy tool (Driver 1977). Once a civil war has begun, a distrustful leader is more apt 
to view demands made by the opposition as more personally threatening. Moreover, they are 
likely to view the opposition as being more likely to expand their demands and escalate the 
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conflict even if concessions are granted. Additionally, these types of leaders have a magnified 
threat perception during both peace and war (Stuart and Starr 1981). Therefore, regardless of 
whether the opposition wants control of the government or to secede from the state, the 
distrustful leader is more likely to view the opposition as a greater threat and thus respond with 
greater force during armed conflict. The three key perceptions associated with a higher-level of 
distrust – heightened threat perception, wariness of the intentions of other actors, and the belief 
about the efficacy of force – combine to drive the leader to use more aggressive tactics and make 
the civil war more severe. 
 H2: A leader’s level of distrust should be positively related to civil war severity. 
 A leader’s sense of control over political events should also be related to civil war 
severity. A leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events refers to a leader’s sense of the 
amount of control he or she has over shaping events and outcomes (Hermann 2003). Leaders 
who have a higher belief in their ability to control events tend to be impulsive and willing to 
challenge perceived or actual constraints (Hermann 2003). Therefore, any perceived constraints 
of norms prohibiting violent politics may be more easily challenged. However, belief in ability to 
control events may also decreases the severity of civil war. When a leader has a weak belief in 
his or her ability to control events, he or she may become frustrated and desperate when 
choosing tactics. This may lead them to choose more aggressive and possibly foolish tactics in 
response to armed opposition. Whether or not the tactics are “successful,” a frustration-driven 
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overreaction may result in a greater number of battle-deaths and, therefore, a more severe civil 
war24. This leads to two rival hypotheses.  
H3a: A leader’s belief in ability to control events should be negatively related to civil 
war severity. 
H3b: A leader’s belief in ability to control events should be positively related to civil war 
severity. 
 Additionally, a leader’s sense of self should be related in some way to the severity of a 
civil war. A leader’s self-confidence refers to his or her sense of his or her ability to navigate and 
overcome obstacles in the political world (Hermann 2003). This sense of self is the lens through 
which individuals view themselves and the world around them. In the context of an ongoing civil 
war, this can make a leader less likely to adequately process incoming information. A leader who 
is more self-confident is likely discount information that – to a less confident leader – may 
indicate that the conflict is not going well. More confident leaders are more likely to discount 
potentially negative information because of the belief that they can overcome the obstacles they 
face. Alternatively, less self-confident leaders may become frustrated as the conflict persists, or 
victory occurs more slowly than initially expected. These two processes, lead to the 
establishment of two competing hypotheses.  
 H4a: A leader’s self-confidence will be positively related to civil war severity 
 H4b: A leader’s self-confidence will be negatively related to civil war severity. 
                                                 
24 As with chapter two, the discussion of my expectations for belief in ability to control events also applies to the 
conceptually similar – though operationally distinct – operational code variable P-4 (a leader’s belief about how 
much control he or she has over historical developments). Therefore, P-4 is also included in the statistical models 
presented below.  
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 Another characteristic that may affect the severity of a civil war is a leader’s conceptual 
complexity. Conceptual complexity refers to an individual’s ability to see situations and people 
in shades of grey or black and white (Hermann 2003). Moreover, conceptual complexity also 
refers to an individual’s ability to process complex information and his or her ability to perceive 
how many policy options are available in a given situation (Hermann 2003; Foster and Keller 
2014). Civil conflicts – like interstate conflicts – are complex situations with a variety of factors 
that a leader needs to consider. These include: the demands of the opposition (i.e. secession, 
control of the state, etc.), the capabilities of the opposition to wage war against the state (i.e. 
outside support, types of weapons, and number of fighters), and the capabilities and resolve of 
the leader’s own government (i.e. the resolve of the state’s military, the state’s capabilities, 
support within the government for the rebels, etc.). Some leaders are better able to process and 
understand this vast amount of information. This makes a leader’s ability to see these factors in 
shades of grey important. Leaders who score lower on conceptual complexity tend to be unable 
to do this. As a result, the lack of differentiated thinking results in ignoring potentially negative 
incoming information that can result in continuing a conflict. The same could be true of 
potentially positive incoming information indicating that the government could comfortably 
settle the conflict through negotiation.  
 H5: Conceptual complexity will be negatively related to the severity of civil conflict. 
 Another potentially important characteristic is a leader’s beliefs about his or her group 
and other groups within their state. A leader’s in-group bias refers to how much importance he or 
she places on the advancement or supremacy of his or her ethnic, religious, or national identity 
(Hermann 2003, 203). Leaders who score higher on in-group bias tend to view outgroups with 
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suspicion and – sometimes – outright hostility. These leaders are also likely to engage in the 
dehumanization of an outgroup and possibly even pursue policies akin to ethnic cleansing 
(Keller and Foster 2012). During the conduct of a civil conflict, leaders with higher in-group bias 
are more likely to wage the war more aggressively because they perceive the rebels as an 
outgroup that poses an existential threat to their in-group. If the rebels are pursuing wars of 
secession, the higher in-group bias leaders are going to perceive the rebels as a threat to national 
unity that must be quashed. Alternatively, if the rebel group is seeking control of the 
government, the high in-group bias leader is likely to perceive the rebel outgroup as an 
existential threat to the leader’s group for a variety of reasons. If, as is the case in Syria, a 
minority ethnic or religious sect controls the state largely at the expense of the majority group, 
the high in-group bias leader is more likely to wage a more aggressive war because there could 
be long-term consequences for his or her group if the state loses or capitulates to the rebels. 
 H6: In-group bias will be positively related to civil war severity 
 Finally, there are three beliefs that leaders hold that can affect the severity of a civil war. 
The first is a leader’s belief about the fundamental nature of the political universe (P-1). Leaders 
can perceive the nature of the political universe as being one of conflict or harmony (Walker, 
Schafer, and Young 2003). If a leader perceives the political universe as one that is inherently 
conflictual, he or she is likely to see the civil conflict as just a normal outcome of the political 
universe. This should lead the leader to wage a more aggressive war against a rebel group. 
H7: A leader with a view that the political universe is conflictual will wage a more severe 
civil war 
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Additionally, a leader can hold beliefs about the most appropriate strategy for achieving his or 
her political goals (I-1). A leader can believe that either conflict or cooperation are more 
appropriate means to achieve political goals (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). Leaders who 
believe that conflict is the most appropriate way to achieve his or her political goals are more 
likely to choose strategies and tactics that could lead to a more severe civil conflict.  
H8: A leader who believes that conflict is the best way to achieve political goals will 
preside over a more severe civil war. 
Research Design 
Sampling Criteria and Unit of Analysis 
 Because the dependent variable – discussed in greater detail below – is the severity of a 
civil war, the appropriate unit of analysis is the civil conflict-year. This is appropriate because 
severity is often measured using annual battle-deaths and those can only occur during a civil 
conflict. Therefore, including non-civil conflict-years within the data set would create far too 
many false negatives. A state is considered to be experiencing a civil war in any year that there is 
contestation between the government and some internal group in which there are more than 25 
battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch, et al. 2002). The baseline population is all civil conflict-
years from 1989 to 2016. This creates a population of 336 conflict-years. However, the nature of 
my key independent variables greatly limits this sample. To generate scores for the psychological 
characteristics of interest I rely on open-source speech transcripts of world leaders. Furthermore, 
to generate accurate scores for world leaders I have to code 4,000 to 5,000 spoken words. 
Because of the rare nature of civil wars and the general difficulty finding speech transcripts of 
world leaders, I am limited to a sample of 31 civil conflict-years. This sample is further limited 
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by the availability of key economic control variables making my final sample-size 28 civil 
conflict-years25. Despite the small sample-size, my sample looks very similar to the civil 
conflict-year population. The states in my sample have only slightly higher GDP per capita 
(Mean: 7.87, SD: 1.66) than the population of civil conflict country-years (mean: 6.5, SD: 1.92). 
However, my sample does have a smaller range battle-related fatalities than the population26. I 
discuss the broader implications of these findings in the conclusion. 
Variables, Sources, and Procedures 
Dependent and key independent variables 
 The dependent variable for this chapter is the severity of a civil war. Severity is measured 
as the number of total battle-deaths during an active conflict-year. These battle-death counts are 
generated by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset 
(Allansson and Croicu 2017). I utilize the “best” battle-death estimate provided in the data set 
instead of the high or low estimates. My sample has an annual battle-death range between 25 and 
4,755. These numbers capture the total number of battle-deaths experienced by both actors in the 
civil conflict-year. 
Control Variables 
 The coding procedures for my psychological variables were mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Therefore, to avoid repetition, I will omit the discussion here and focus only on my key 
control variables. To control for the effects of variables other than psychological characteristics, 
                                                 
25 This sample includes 18 different leaders from 12 different countries experiencing civil conflicts.  
26 My sample ranges from 25 to 4,755 battle-related deaths, while the population ranges from 25 to 13,443. 
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I will include a variety of economic indicators in each model that have been linked to civil war 
severity. The first economic indicator of potential interest is a state’s GDP growth from the 
previous year. I utilize a logged version of GDP growth – measured in 2005 constant U.S. dollars 
– to control for the possibility that the severity of a civil war is informed by the amount of 
economic growth a state experienced. 
 Additionally, I control for GDP per capita (in constant U.S. Dollars). This variable is 
often used as a proxy for state-capacity to implement effective counter-insurgency policies. I 
expect both measures to be positively related to civil war severity. The predominate argument for 
this assertion is that an economically growing state creates incentives for rebels to pursue control 
of the state while at the same time making it easier for the state to apply effective counter-
insurgency tactics resulting in more severe civil conflicts (Bazzi and Blattman 2014; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003). Additionally, I control for a state’s dependence on fuel exports (as a percentage of 
total merchandise exports) in a given year. A state that is more dependent on fuel exports should 
experience more severe civil conflicts, because there is greater incentive, for both the opposition 
and the government, to seek to acquire or to protect the available rents generated by these 
exports (Bazzi and Blattman 2014; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
 Additionally, I control for one demographic factor and one key political variable. I 
control for a state’s (logged) population in a given year. These data are provided by the World 
Bank. I expect population to be positively related to civil conflict severity. Additionally, I 
generate a binary indicator for the presence or absence of a democratic government. To generate 
this measure, I utilize the Polity IV score (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) for each state and code 
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any state with a score of 6 or higher as a democracy; all other states are coded as non-
democracies. I expect democracy to be negative related to civil war severity. 
Statistical Method 
 Because the dependent variable is a count of the number of yearly battle-related fatalities, 
the appropriate method is some form of count modeling. This leaves two primary choices at my 
disposal: Poisson or negative binomial regression models. The choice of the appropriate method 
needs to be informed by the dispersion of the dependent variable. If the dependent variable 
exhibits signs of over-dispersion, then a negative binomial regression is the most appropriate 
model. If the mean and variance of the dependent variable in my sample are relatively similar, 
then the poisson method is appropriate. This is clearly not the case (see summary statistics in 
Appendix C). Therefore, I apply a random-effects negative binomial regression to test my 
hypotheses about leader psychology and civil war severity27. 
Findings 
 Table 2 presents the findings of the quantitative tests28. Model one presents the effects of 
only my psychological variables on the severity of civil conflicts. First, model one shows that 
there is initial support for the distrust hypothesis. More distrustful leaders tend to preside over 
more severe civil conflicts. Additionally, self-confidence approaches statistical significance and 
decreases the severity of civil conflicts. Leaders who are more self-confident tend to preside over 
less severe civil conflict than less self-confident leaders. Interestingly, conceptual complexity 
                                                 
27 The fixed-effects estimator controls for unobserved unit heterogeneity. 
28 Pairwise correlation tests for multicollinearity are presented in Appendix C. 
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seems to be positively related to civil conflict severity. Rather than decreasing the level of 
violence used during the civil conflict, more complex leaders tend to preside over bloodier civil 
conflicts. I-1, consistent with my hypothesis, is negatively related to civil conflict severity. A 
leader who believes that he or she should utilize cooperative tactics to achieve political goals will 
preside over less severe civil wars. Finally, P-4 is positively related to civil war severity. This 
indicates that a leader who believes he or she has greater control over historical development 
tends to preside over more severe civil wars in a given year. However, need for power, in-group 
bias, belief in ability to control events, and P-1 fail to achieve statistical significance in model 
one. Moreover, P-1 and in-group bias have coefficients that run contrary to the hypothesized 
direction. 
 Model one presents tentative support for some of my hypotheses regarding how leaders 
can affect the severity of civil wars. Models two and three include additional economic and 
political control variables that have been identified as important for understanding civil conflict 
severity. Model two considers the effect of leader psychology on civil conflict severity while 
controlling for a democratic regime, a logged measure of GDP growth, a logged measure of 
population, and a measure of fuel exports (as a percentage of total merchandise exports). The 
first notable fact about model two is that, largely, the findings in model one hold true, with two 
exceptions. Self-confidence and P-4 fail to approach or achieve statistical significance once 
economic and political factors are controlled for. However, distrust remains statistically 
significant and positively related to civil conflict severity. Moreover, once economic and 
political factors are controlled for, the coefficient becomes larger, indicating the effect of a 
leader’s distrust on conflict severity is even more pronounced. Conceptual complexity continues 
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to be significantly related to more severe civil conflicts and I-1 continues to significantly 
decrease the severity of civil conflicts. As with distrust, the coefficients are larger in their 
respective directions (i.e. I-1 is more negative and conceptual complexity is more positive) when 
economic and political control variables are included. However, it is noteworthy that the control 
variables fail to approach or achieve statistical significance. 
 Model three controls for GDP per capita, rather than the rate of growth from the previous 
year. Distrust and conceptual complexity remain significantly related to more severe civil 
conflicts. These two variables also have larger coefficients – reflecting a stronger effect – than 
either models one or two. Again, I-1 is consistently related to less severe civil conflicts, 
indicating that leaders who believe their most appropriate strategy is one of cooperation will 
preside over less severe civil wars. Finally, P-4 approaches statistical significance in model three. 
Once again, the direction of the relationship is positive, indicating that a leader with a belief that 
he or she has greater control over historical developments and outcomes will preside over more 
severe civil wars. In model three, the control variables approach and achieve statistical 
significance – contrary to model two. States that are more economically developed (i.e. have a 
higher GDP per capita) experience less severe civil conflicts. This indicates that, rather than 
linking GDP per capita to the ability of a government to adopt stronger counter-insurgency 
institutions (which should make civil conflicts more violent), GDP per capita appears to capture 
broader access to economic activities outside of rebel participation. Additionally, states that are 
more dependent on fuel exports tend to experience more severe civil conflicts, as anticipated. 
 All three models provide evidence that indicate preliminary support for my hypotheses 
for distrust and I-1. Moreover, all three models show that there is a relationship between 
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conceptual complexity and civil conflict severity, but that relationship is positive and contrary to 
my hypothesis. P-4 however, is rather sensitive to which economic control variable is included in 
the model; when controlling for GDP growth, P-4 does not achieve significance, but P-4 
approaches significance when controlling for GDP per capita. These findings provide promising 
preliminary support for the effect that leaders can have on the conduct of civil conflicts29.  
                                                 
29 Alternative model tests are presented in Appendix C. These additional models test the effects of my independent 
variables while correcting for potential multicollinearity. The findings remain consistent and do not merit detailed 
discussion in the body of the text.  
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Table 2 - Civil War Severity 
Civil Conflict Severity   
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Distrust  8.672** 11.85** 12.90*** 
 (2.785) (3.653) (3.724) 
Belief in Ability to Control Events -0.982 1.626 2.813 
 (4.861) (5.938) (5.437) 
In-Group Bias  -0.340 3.766 2.240 
 (5.378) (10.47) (8.195) 
Need for Power 4.761 3.037 0.469 
 (6.760) (5.797) (5.269) 
Self-Confidence -4.123+ -2.541 -2.959 
 (2.271) (5.415) (4.245) 
Conceptual Complexity 7.559* 9.910* 11.14** 
 (3.142) (3.897) (3.422) 
I-1 -4.031** -4.597* -4.895** 
 (1.438) (2.124) (1.714) 
P-1 1.328 2.275 2.666 
 (1.542) (1.756) (1.731) 
P-4 7.112* 5.666 6.252+ 
 (3.290) (4.310) (3.606) 
Democracy  0.160 0.834 
  (1.013) (0.671) 
Population(log)  -0.554 -0.839 
  (0.860) (0.780) 
GDP Growth(log)  -0.226  
  (0.305)  
Fuel Exports   0.0826 0.256+ 
  (0.158) (0.153) 
GDP Per Capita(log)   -0.516* 
   (0.256) 
Constant -4.533 2.656 10.64 
 (3.009) (16.18) (14.38) 
    
Observations 30 22 22 
Number of ccode 8 7 7 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10  
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 This chapter opened by asking how the leaders of states can influence civil conflict 
severity. As with the previous chapter exploring civil conflict onset, I argued that the strategic 
and tactical choices that are made by the leaders of a state can affect the severity of the conflict 
in noticeable ways. I then proceeded to build a theory of civil conflict severity that explained 
how the individual beliefs and psychological characteristics of world leaders affect strategic and 
tactical preferences during armed internal conflict. The findings of this chapter continue to 
strengthen the assertions made in the introduction: leaders consistently matter when we seek to 
understand both the origins and conduct of civil conflict. 
 Consistent with the international conflict literature, distrustful leaders tend to preside over 
more severe civil wars than their more trusting counterparts (see Driver 1977; Foster and Keller 
2014). Because more distrustful leaders are more apt to perceive the rebel group as a greater 
threat, they are more likely to prefer strategic and tactical choices that rely more on violence and 
overwhelming force than they are to rely on smaller-scale or (possibly) more precise tactics. 
Additionally, leaders’ beliefs about the most appropriate strategy for achieving political goals 
have a consistent effect on the severity of a civil conflict. A leader who believes that he or she 
will be more likely to achieve his or her political goals using cooperative methods will preside 
over less severe civil wars. It is also clear that conceptual complexity is consistently related to 
civil conflict severity, though not in the hypothesized direction. However, the context of a civil 
conflict may be useful in explaining this finding. 
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Conceptually complex leaders may be better at processing information generated about 
the resolve of or the threat posed by the internal opponent. Therefore, a conceptually complex 
leader may be willing to utilize tactics that are more forceful and result in a greater number of 
battle-related fatalities. Moreover, the ability of more complex leaders to process incoming 
information may cause the complex leader to see the proverbial “writing on the wall” about the 
opponents’ willingness (or lack thereof) to seek a negotiated settlement to the conflict, causing 
the leader to continue the conflict using more violent tactics to achieve a decisive end. 
Additionally, these leaders are likely to pursue a greater array of tactical and strategic choices 
than less complex leaders. Therefore, a conceptually complex leader may be more likely to 
choose strategies and tactics that are more targeted or effective against the opponent resulting in 
a greater number of battle-related deaths. Put somewhat differently, the nature of civil conflicts 
may cause some leaders to engage in the heuristic of wishful-thinking (i.e. believing that a 
domestic opponent cannot be that bad). On the other hand, a more conceptually complex leader, 
who is better at information processing, may see the real threats that are there and respond 
accordingly. Regardless, the findings about the effect of a leader’s conceptual complexity on 
internal conflict choices merits further investigation. 
The key takeaway, however, is that leaders continue to shape the trajectory of contentious 
domestic politics. Moreover, leaders continue to do so in consistent and somewhat predictable 
ways. Individual leaders tend to have their own unique approaches to the pursuit of domestic and 
foreign policy goals, and these unique approaches are often affected by personality 
characteristics and beliefs. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that leaders can affect the 
likelihood that a state will experience an onset of an armed conflict or high-intensity civil war. In 
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this chapter, I added another piece of valuable information about the way in which leaders can 
shape the trajectories of domestic civil conflict.  
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CHAPTER 4: CIVIL WAR DURATION 
Introduction 
 How do the psychological characteristics of world leaders affect the duration of civil 
wars? Many conflict studies scholars have been intrigued by the large variation in the duration of 
civil wars (Wucherpfenning et al. 2012, 79). Such variation in the duration of civil wars has led 
scholars to investigate what factors may lead to longer or shorter civil wars. However, many of 
the studies detailed below rely heavily on theories that are based upon the rational calculation of 
the costs and benefits associated with continued fighting. This common approach homogenizes 
both the information processing and cost-benefit calculation capabilities of world leaders. 
However, there is a large body of research in economics and political science that casts doubt on 
the rational actor model of decision-making (for a thorough review of the application of bounded 
rationality in political science and foreign policy analysis see Schafer and Smith 2018). 
 In previous chapters, I have presented evidence that suggests there is an interesting 
relationship between certain psychological characteristics of heads of state and the onset and 
severity of civil wars respectfully. Therefore, it seems just as appropriate to investigate the 
presence of a possible relationship between these characteristics and the duration of civil wars. 
To investigate this relationship, I build a theory that begins by emphasizing just how important 
political leaders are when negotiating or agreeing to end a civil conflict. I then create specific 
hypotheses that are based upon how these different characteristics can help or hinder a leader’s 
ability to process information that is being created by the ongoing conflict and thus make the 
decision to continue fighting or pursue an end to the conflict. This chapter continues the 
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contributions of earlier chapters by bringing at-a-distance profiling methods to the study of civil 
conflict, thus broadening the application of these methods to more conflict studies research and 
helping to better understand the duration of intrastate conflict. 
Structural Explanations for Civil War Duration 
 A sizable body of research has been generated that attempts to explore what factors can 
lead to longer or shorter civil conflicts. As with most conflict studies research, however, much of 
this research focuses on the effects of structural (i.e. political institutions, legal constraints, etc.) 
and situational (i.e. economic development, political events, etc.) variables. While this approach 
has provided useful insights into the effects of certain variables on the length of civil wars, this 
review of the existing literature will demonstrate that there is indeed room to include the 
psychological characteristics of world leaders in the study of civil war duration. 
  A large proportion of the literature tends to investigate the question of conflict duration 
by considering the bargaining theory of war. In particular, there is a strong emphasis on the 
effects of information asymmetry and commitment problems (e.g. DeRouen and Sobek 2004; 
Fearon 2004; Hultquist 2013; Porok 2016; Thyne 2017). The primary goal of much of this 
literature is to explain how certain political or economic factors can generate information about 
the likelihood of victory or defeat for both the government and opposition. Theoretically, as 
more information becomes available, it is more likely that both actors will better understand the 
war fighting capability and the bargaining range of the other and thus come a negotiated 
settlement (Blainey 1988; Filson and Werner 2002; Smith and Stam 2002). 
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 A key concept to understanding what political factors can affect civil war duration is the 
concept of “veto players.” Veto players are individuals who hinder or block negotiated 
settlements with rebel groups. Cunningham (2006) argues that the presence of these veto players 
inside a government can make civil conflicts more difficult to settle for a few key reasons. First, 
as the number of veto players operating within a government increases, there are more parties 
present with different interests and/or goals who can block or hinder the acceptance or 
implementation of a negotiated settlement. This makes it more challenging for the government to 
send clear signals to the opposition about the range of acceptable agreements. Therefore, an 
increased number of veto players worsens the information asymmetry problem associated with 
bargaining. Second, a larger number of potential veto players can make it more difficult for the 
government to credibly commit to enacting any potential agreement. This is because, even if a 
tentative agreement is reached, these veto players have the ability to reject the settlement. 
Cunningham’s (2006) empirical tests indicate that an increased number of veto players do indeed 
lead to longer civil wars. Cunningham later finds that a similar process is at work when 
considering third party interveners as additional veto players (2010). These findings have led 
subsequent scholars to explore additional factors about governments that can help to alleviate the 
problems created by an excess of veto players. 
 One such example is Thyne’s (2012) work that investigates how the structures of 
governments can affect the duration of civil wars. Thyne (2012) expands on Cunningham’s 
(2006) argument that the number of veto players can exacerbate the information asymmetry and 
credibility problems by linking factors such as institutional constraints, government polarization, 
power-sharing with opposition parties, types of governments, and the ruler’s tenure in office, to 
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civil war duration. He demonstrates that there are four key factors that can lead to shorter civil 
wars. The first is the presence of a presidential style of government. This effect is driven by the 
fact that presidential systems tend to be more predictable than their parliamentary counterparts. 
The second key finding is that executives with broad institutional powers tend to preside over 
shorter civil wars. Leaders who have broad autonomy can more credibly negotiate with an 
opposition without the fear of any potential agreement being overridden by a third-party. Finally, 
governments that are stable and those made up of leaders with longer tenures (parties or 
executives) tend to have shorter internal conflicts (Thyne 2012, 319). Overall, the key takeaway 
from both Cunningham (2006) and Thyne (2012) is that civil wars will tend to be shorter when 
rebels have the opportunity to negotiate with a predictable adversary, thereby lessening fears of 
the government reneging and increasing the amount of information available to them. 
 More recently, Thyne (2017) has demonstrated that other factors can contribute to 
shortening civil wars in ways most scholars would not expect. Thyne (2017) explores how coups 
d’état that take place during a civil conflict can affect the duration of that conflict. He points out 
that, while traditional wisdom would expect coups to make an already unstable situation worse 
(i.e. Geddes 1999; Onwumechil 1998), there is a good reason to believe that coups can actually 
help to resolve either the commitment problems, information asymmetry, or both by sending 
useful signals to the opposing actors (Thyne 2017). Thyne argues that coups during civil wars 
can resolve the commitment problem by consolidating government powers and constraining 
potential veto players, while also signaling to the opposition that they will be negotiating with a 
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government that prefers settlement to continued fighting (2017)30. The empirical findings of this 
research indicate that coups during civil wars tend to decrease the duration of civil wars. 
Moreover, the findings lend support for the idea that coups tend to lessen the commitment 
problem rather than problems of information asymmetry (2017). While there is support for the 
argument that structures of governments play an important role in explaining the duration of civil 
conflicts, recent research also investigates the effects of punishment on the incentives of leaders 
to pursue settlements. 
 In addition to general information about the prospects of victory or defeat that is 
generated by the ongoing war, a similar area of research explores what actions can be taken to 
shorten the duration of civil wars by increasing the costs of continued conflict or by tampering 
with the perceived balance of power between rebels and the government. For example, some 
scholars have investigated the effect of economic sanctions on the duration of civil conflicts. The 
primary theoretical mechanism through which sanctions can affect civil war duration is the effect 
on actors’ perceptions of the conflict situation. For example, Strandow (2006) constructs a 
bargaining model that shows that economic sanctions can alter the perceptions of the balance of 
dyadic power during a civil conflict and can thus influence the decision to pursue a resolution to 
the conflict. However, this finding is largely dependent on the consistent and fair application of 
these sanctions. Strandow’s (2006) findings are consistent with other research that shows that 
economic and/or military sanctions lengthen civil wars by making it more difficult for both 
actors to truly diagnose the balance of power and likelihood of success or defeat (Balch-Lindsay 
                                                 
30 The information that is generated by the coup is often conveyed by the military junta because coup actors often 
seize control of media outlets and announce the motivation for their seizure of power. 
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and Enterline 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbam 2004; Regan 2000; Regan and Aydin 2006). 
Others have found, however, that the method of sanction implementation can affect the duration 
of civil wars. For example, Escriba-Falch (2010) finds that unilateral sanctions are more likely to 
result one in side achieving a military victory, while multilateral sanctions are more likely to 
encourage parties to come to a negotiated settlement. This finding is largely reinforced by 
Lektzian and Regan (2016). 
 Beyond these structural factors, there has been limited attention paid to the ways in which 
leaders decide to end a civil conflict. Prorok (2016) represents a notable exception. She argues 
that the willingness of leaders to pursue negotiated settlements to civil conflict can be shaped by 
whether or not that leader is in power at the start of a civil conflict (Prorok 2016). Prorok points 
out that both rebel and state leaders are beholden to some domestic audience that has the ability 
to punish them for incompetence (2016). She theorizes that leaders who are in power at the 
outset of a civil conflict are more likely to be perceived as responsible for the conflict. 
Additionally, she theorizes that leaders who are perceived as “responsible” for the onset of civil 
conflict are more likely to be perceived as incompetent when the conflict begins to go poorly 
(Prorok 2016)31. Prorok argues that leaders who are perceived as being incompetent have a 
perverse incentive to avoid negotiated settlements because they failed to achieve the goals they 
implicitly promised to achieve by choosing violence over negotiation (2016). Her results indicate 
that leaders who are in power at the start of the conflict are more likely to experience more 
                                                 
31 A conflict can be considered to be going poorly if the leader’s group (the state or the rebel group) begins suffering 
losses that indicate a substantially decreased likelihood of victory.  
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severe outcomes (i.e. total victory or total defeat) and less likely to make concessions that are 
central to the leader’s war aims (Prorok 2016). 
 This review of the existing literature demonstrates that there are two broad ideas used to 
explain the duration of civil wars: resolving information asymmetry and/or commitment 
problems and making fighting costlier than reaching a negotiated settlement. The key assumption 
of both approaches to the study of civil war development is that the assessment of costs or 
assessment of incoming information is uniform across all individuals in the civil war. However, 
as alluded to in the introduction, there is a lack of convincing empirical evidence that this kind of 
rational calculation is common among most people. Therefore, studying how potential costs 
and/or incoming information can affect civil war duration requires the inclusion of variables that 
can influence the perceptions of what constitutes a cost and the ability of the chief executive to 
process incoming information. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 I follow the existing literature by utilizing the bargaining approach to explain variance in 
the duration of civil wars. I contribute to the civil war duration literature by including how 
personality characteristics of chief executives can affect the perception of costs and the 
processing of information generated by results from the battlefield32. The first key difference 
between my theory and the existing literature is the rejection of the assumptions of the rational 
actor model. Actors – heads of state or rebel leaders - involved in civil wars do not process 
                                                 
32 The theoretical mechanism used to explain why heads of state choose to pursue negotiation to end fighting will 
broadly mirror the theoretical process described in Chapter 2. Therefore, the discussion of the theoretical mechanism 
here will be much briefer and focus on the differences between the period before the outbreak of war and the period 
of ongoing civil conflict. 
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information in the same way, nor do they perceive costs in the same way. Therefore, it is 
impractical to assume that simply increasing costs of continued fighting or upsetting the balance 
of power between actors should make all actors more willing to pursue negotiation and shorten 
civil wars. 
 Therefore, while interventions – be they military interventions or economic sanctions – 
may indeed make continued fighting costlier or alter ex ante expectations of victory, we can 
expect individuals to perceive these effects differently. These differing perceptions are driven by 
two key processes. First, individual personality characteristics and beliefs can affect how open 
individuals are to incoming information. Conceptual complexity and self-confidence can both 
have independent effects on the way that leaders process incoming contextual information. Self-
confident leaders have a strong belief that they are able to navigate most political situations and 
overcome any obstacles they may experience (Hermann 2003, 194). Therefore, more self-
confident leaders are likely to discount or downplay the effects of military defeats, external 
sanctions, or military interventions. Additionally, the high self-confidence leader should also be 
more likely to discount signs that there is growing political discord among key supporters. 
Similarly, leaders who score lower on conceptual complexity should be closed to incoming 
information. These leaders tend to think in zero-sum terms and be more rigid in their 
interpretations of events (Hermann 2003, 195). Therefore, while information generated by the 
ongoing war may signal that defeat is imminent or stalemate is politically costly, the less 
conceptually complex leader is likely to discount this information because he or she likely has a 
pre-existing opinion about the nature of the conflict. Moreover, these types of leaders are more 
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likely to discount information generated by external intervention. With these effects in mind, the 
first two hypotheses become clear. 
 H1: Self-confidence will be positively related to civil war duration. 
 H2: Conceptual complexity will negatively related to civil war duration. 
Additionally, a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events should affect the way 
he or she processes the incoming information from the conflict or external intervention33. 
Leaders who believe that they can control political events are more likely to discount incoming 
information because they are more likely to believe that they can shape the events in their favor. 
This should be the case when the civil conflict is trapped in a costly and politically unpopular 
stalemate or when it appears that the rebels have the upper-hand. All things equal, these leaders 
are likely to believe that they can shape the political environment to be more favorable to them 
regardless of information generated by the ongoing conflict. Therefore, they are likely to believe 
that they can survive negative events generated by an ongoing civil war and will be more likely 
to continue fighting regardless of incoming information that suggests the contrary. 
H3: Belief in ability to control events will be positively related to civil war duration. 
Another way that individual personality characteristics and beliefs can affect the duration 
of civil wars is the way that actors perceive the potential costs of continued fighting versus 
negotiation. The first factor that can affect the perception of what constitutes an unacceptable 
cost is a leader’s need for power. Leaders who are motivated by power and influence tend to be 
                                                 
33 As with previous chapters, I will discuss belief in ability to control events and a leader’s belief about his or her 
ability to affect historical outcomes (P-4) in the same way. 
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those who utilize violence in the domestic and international context and also tend to pursue 
positions of authority (Hermann 2003). For leaders motivated by a desire for power and 
influence, the principal and unacceptable cost would be losing their position of power and 
influence. Moreover, external economic or military interventions are more likely to be seen as an 
affront to the authority of the power-motivated leader. A leader with a high need for power is 
more likely to perceive both negotiation and military defeat as a potential threat to his or her 
position of authority. This should cause these leaders to choose continuing the fight against rebel 
groups. 
 H4: Need for power will be positively related to civil war duration. 
 Two personality characters that can have a key influence on what constitutes a “cost” in 
the context of a civil conflict are distrust and in-group bias. Both of these characteristics make 
fighting appear less costly than reaching negotiated settlements because the process of 
negotiation is perceived as far riskier and uncertain than continued fighting. More distrustful 
leaders are wary because they fear being taken advantage of by the other actor or they generally 
believe that the other actor is not negotiating in good faith and, therefore, is simply trying to 
manipulate them (Hermann 2003). Additionally, distrustful leaders are likely to believe that the 
other actor is far more likely to renege on any agreement. This results in the distrustful leader 
believing that he or she is taking a bigger risk by negotiating than continuing to fight, thus 
lengthening the civil war. In-group bias has a similar effect on the perception of costs. Leaders 
who have a higher in-group bias can perceive negotiation as more costly because they may come 
to believe that any negotiated settlement may include provisions that weaken or threaten their 
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ethnic group. In both cases, the uncertainty of the negotiation process may make negotiation 
more costly than continued conflict. 
 H5: Distrust will be positively related to civil war duration. 
 H6: In-group bias will be positively related to civil war duration. 
 A final contribution of this chapter is the inclusion of a leader’s perception of the efficacy 
of negotiation. As discussed previously, operational code analysis provides variables that capture 
a leader’s belief about the nature of the political universe and about which strategies they should 
pursue to achieve political goals. If a leader believes that the political universe is fundamentally 
conflictual (P-1), he or she is less likely to perceive negotiation as a reasonable approach to 
ending the civil conflict. Additionally, if a leader believes that the most effective tactic for 
achieving political goals is to use conflict, he or she is less likely to perceive negotiation as a 
plausible approach to ending conflict. In the former case, the leader believes that conflict is a 
natural occurrence in the political universe. In the latter, the leader believes that he or she 
achieves more with conflictual tactics than with cooperative ones (Walker, Schafer, and Young 
2003). These beliefs generate the final two hypotheses. 
 H7: P-1 will be negatively related to civil war duration. 
 H8: I-1 will be negatively related to civil war duration. 
Research Design 
 To quantitatively test my expected relationships, I construct a data set that uses the 
conflict country-month as the unit of analysis and excludes all cases where the UCDP/ACD data 
codes coups d’état as civil conflicts (see Thyne 2017). A civil war is considered to be ongoing so 
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long as the conflict involves at least one internal actor and the government of a state and 
continues to generate at least 25 battle-related fatalities in a given year (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
Conflict termination data come from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010). 
Civil wars can end in a variety of ways. They can end by negotiated settlement, the total military 
defeat of one of the principal actors, the dissolution of one of the actors, or there can be a lull in 
the conflict of more than one calendar year (Kreutz 2010). Therefore, my dependent variable – 
civil war duration – is operationalized as the number of months from the conflict’s beginning to 
the point where one of the above conditions is met. The month in which one of the above events 
occurred is coded as the end of the civil war. A conflict is coded as a new civil war if there is a 
lull in fighting of at least one year (Thyne 2017). I begin by utilizing the replication data set of 
Thyne (2017) as my base population of cases. I then add the key psychological variables 
discussed above. It merits repeating that the availability of speech texts is central to generating 
scores for these psychological characteristics, resulting in my sample differing from Thyne’s 
(2017)34. My final sample-size is 1,649 civil conflict-months35. 
 Once more, since I have described the coding procedures for my psychological variables 
in earlier chapters, I will concentrate on describing the operationalization of my relevant control 
variables. The first control variable captures the effect of veto-players. Many scholars argue that 
democratic regime types have a larger number of potential veto players (e.g. Cunningham 2006; 
Thyne 2012, 2017; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Therefore, I utilize the Polity IV score for the 
state experiencing a civil conflict to generate a binary indicator of democracy as a proxy for a 
                                                 
34 For a detailed discussion of the missing data issue, I refer the reader back to Chapter 2.  
35 This sample differs from a potential population of 17,319 civil conflict months. This difference is, as in previous 
chapters, the availability of digitally archived speech materials needed to generate psychological variables.  
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high number of veto players. A state is coded as being a democracy if the Polity score is six or 
higher (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). All other states are coded as non-democratic. I expect 
democratic states to have a more difficult time resolving a civil conflict than non-democratic 
states because an increased number of potential veto players may serve to worsen the 
information and commitment problems associated with negotiations. Additionally, I control for 
economic development using a logged measure of per capita GDP provided by the World Bank. I 
expect conflicts in states with a lower GDP per capita will last longer because poverty is often 
associated with longer civil wars (e.g. Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbam 2004). 
 Additionally, aspects of the conflict itself can affect the duration of a civil conflict. Thyne 
argues that government facing multiple armed opposition groups are going to find it more 
difficult to resolve conflicts (2017, 12). Therefore, I utilize his measure of a “parallel conflict,” 
which is measured as the number of ongoing conflicts in a state at time t (Thyne 2017, 12). 
Additionally, the severity of the conflict can greatly influence the duration of the conflict. For 
some, a more intense civil conflict can signal that the fighting is becoming costlier and 
encourage actors to pursue a negotiated settlement (Zartman 1989). Alternatively, conflict 
severity may also signal resolve and encourage actors to continue fighting. Therefore, I utilize a 
binary indicator of civil war intensity that is coded as a one when the conflict passes the 1,000 
battle-death threshold and zero if otherwise (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Fearon 2004; 
Regan 2002; Thyne 2017). Finally, following Thyne (2017), I control for the effect of coups on 
the duration of civil war. A coup is coded as successful if the plotters are able to maintain power 
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for at least 7 days (Powell and Thyne 2011; Thyne 2017)36. Recent research demonstrates that 
successful coups during a civil conflict can shorten a civil war (Thyne 2017). 
 Because the dependent variable of interest is the duration of civil conflicts, the most 
appropriate method for testing my hypotheses is some variant of survival analysis. The Cox 
(1972) proportional hazard is ideal for this sort of research because the model does not require 
strict assumptions about the existence of an underlying hazard function37. It is also important to 
choose a method to control for potential ties (i.e. events with the exact same survival time) 
among my observations. Survival models that have multiple observations with the exact same 
failure time can bias the results. Therefore, I utilize the Efron (1977) method to control for 
potential ties38. Finally, rather than presenting hazard ratios in my tables, I present simple 
coefficients. A negative coefficient indicates that the covariate results in a longer civil conflict by 
decreasing the hazard of failure, while a positive coefficient indicates that a covariate is 
associated with a shorter civil conflict. 
Findings  
 Table three presents two quantitative models used to test my hypothesized relationship39. 
Model one presents the effect of my psychological variables without controlling for economic or 
                                                 
36 Thyne excludes all non-military coups (2017, 11) because military coups are believed to generate the most clear 
and easily interpreted information. 
37 For example, the oft-used Weibull distribution model assumes that the hazard rate increases or decreases 
monotonically for each unit over time. 
38 This method is preferable to the default Breslow (1975) approximation, based on the smaller AIC/BIC statistics 
that capture the goodness of fit. Moreover, past research has shown that the Efron method for tied survival data are 
both more efficient and better at reducing bias in simulation studies (Hertz-Picciotto and Rockhill 2005).  
39 Appendix E presents the pairwise correlation tests for the variables tested in Table 3. The appendix shows that 
there is minimal collinearity among the independent and control variables. 
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political variables. The initial results from model one do not look promising. First, only one 
psychological variable approaches statistical significance: conceptual complexity. However, 
conceptual complexity’s effect on civil conflict duration mirrors its effect on civil conflict 
severity. More conceptually complex leaders are likely to preside over longer civil conflicts than 
their less complex counterparts. However, many of my hypotheses fail to achieve support in 
model one. Distrust, belief in ability to control events, in-group bias, need for power, self-
confidence, I-1, P-1, and P-4 fail to approach or achieve statistical significance in model one.  
 Model two presents the findings for the effect of leader psychology on civil war duration 
while controlling for the political and economic control variables discussed above. Once 
economic and political variables are included, three key psychological characteristics are related 
to civil conflict duration. First, a leader’s level of in-group bias is significantly related to longer 
civil conflicts. This is consistent with my hypothesized relationships. A leader who has a higher 
level of in-group bias is more likely to perceive any negotiated settlement as representing a threat 
to the leader’s in-group and, therefore, be more likely to carry on a conflict regardless of the 
potential costs associated with ongoing civil conflict. 
 Additionally, we see that self-confident leaders tend to preside over longer civil conflicts 
than their less confident counterparts. This finding is consistent with the hypothesized 
relationship. It appears that there is credible evidence that, as leaders become more self-
confident, they tend to be more willing to discount incoming information about the likelihood of 
success or failure. Moreover, it appears that they are more likely to believe that they can 
overcome any present situation that would possibly make the pursuit of a negotiated settlement 
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preferable to continued conflict. This finding provides additional evidence in favor of the idea 
that different individuals process incoming information differently. 
 Another psychological characteristic that appears to be significantly related to the 
duration of civil conflicts is a leader’s conceptual complexity. However, the relationship runs 
contrary to my hypothesized direction. Rather than making leaders more open to incoming 
information about the likelihood of success or failure and shortening the conflict, conceptual 
complexity is associated with a longer internal armed conflict. Leaders who are more complex in 
their thinking are likely to experience longer civil conflicts than their less complex counterparts. 
This may be driven, in part, by the types of information that the complex leader is focusing on. 
While information about the likelihood of victory or defeat is indeed generated by the ongoing 
conflict, it is also possible that the complex leader may see beyond the conflict and see 
information about what happens after the conflict. Information about the likelihood of the 
leader’s survival (be it political or literal) could influence the leaders willingness to pursue 
negotiated settlements. Moreover, the more complex leader may also be better at perceiving 
information generated about the resolve, capabilities, and/or support available to the armed 
opposition. This may lead the complex head of state to perceive negotiated settlement as 
uncertain and impractical given this kind of information. Despite the fact that more of the 
psychological variables achieve statistical significance in the fully-specified model, many of my 
hypotheses continue to fail to find support. Distrust, belief in ability to control events, need for 
power, I-1, P-1, and P-4 appear statistically unrelated to the duration of civil conflicts.  
 Among the control variables, two are significantly related to civil war duration. The first, 
a successful coup, significantly decreases the duration of a civil conflict. This reinforces the 
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findings presented by Thyne (2017) that coups d’état can help to resolve the commitment 
problem associated with negotiating an end to an internal armed conflict. Additionally, GDP per 
capita approaches significance and makes civil conflicts shorter. Put more plainly, the more 
economically developed a state is, the more quickly a civil conflict comes to an end. This is 
likely driven by increased counter-insurgency capacity and, therefore, a decreased need to settle 
a conflict. What is most notable about the inclusion of psychological characteristics in models of 
civil conflict duration is the effect it has on the quality of model. 
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Table 3 - Civil Conflict Duration 
Civil Conflict Duration   
 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Distrust 1.837 11.62  
 (4.328) (8.489)  
Belief in Ability to Control Events  5.328 -18.87  
 (4.662) (14.82)  
In-Group Bias -1.593 -46.57*  
 (6.081) (19.76)  
Need for Power -10.71 5.177  
 (7.453) (12.09)  
Self-Confidence -4.989 -15.67***  
 (3.911) (4.302)  
Conceptual Complexity -13.11+ -32.10*  
 (6.830) (16.26)  
I-1 -0.900 -6.005  
 (2.526) (5.244)  
P-1 1.599 3.030  
 (2.336) (2.313)  
P-4 -5.463 -3.656  
 (5.605) (11.08)  
Successful coup  22.84* 3.13* 
  (11.30) (1.54) 
Fight for government  0.636 -0.56 
  (0.695) (0.68) 
Democracy  -5.776 -1.39+ 
  (3.881) (0.83) 
GDP per capita  2.195+ 0.89** 
  (1.244) (0.32) 
Parallel war  0.930 0.41+ 
  (0.768) (0.21) 
Intensity  -0.677 -0.32 
  (1.001) (0.78) 
    
Observations 1,649 1,649 1,649 
 
AIC: 80.67434 
BIC:129.3457 
AIC: 70.83648 
BIC: 135.7316 
AIC: 74.47033 
BIC: 106.9179 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10   
 There are a variety of ways to test for the quality of model fit when working with 
observational data. One approach is to compare the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria 
(AIC and BIC statistics). At the most basic-level, these approaches to goodness of fit tell the 
researcher the probability that his or her model closely reflects the underlying data generating 
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processes (for a detailed explanation of the method and its assumptions, see Kuha 2004). The 
interpretation of these goodness of fit statistics (presented in table three) is quite simple; the 
closer to negative infinity either or both statistics are, the more the model reflects genuine data 
generating process. To describe how adding the psychological characteristics of world leaders to 
models of civil war duration can generate more reflective models, I begin by utilizing Thyne’s 
(2017) replication data and re-running his models with my sample. The AIC and BIC statistics 
for the structural controls are smaller than the psychology-only models, but larger than the fully-
specified model (AIC: 74.47; BIC: 106.9179)40. This initially demonstrates that, in my sample, 
the model that tests only the effects of political and economic variables performs slightly better 
than the model that tests only the effects of psychological variables. However, I have argued that 
neither category of variables can adequately explain civil conflict duration by itself. Rather, a 
combination may generate a model that is a better fit. This idea is supported by the AIC and BIC 
statistics at the bottom of model two. Compared to the other two models, a model that includes a 
combination of both psychological characteristics and political and economic variables is the 
better fit and should be utilized when trying to investigate the factors that influence civil conflict 
duration.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This chapter started by asking how the personalities and beliefs of state leaders can 
influence the duration of civil conflicts. After exploring and discussing the way that previous 
                                                 
40 Interestingly, Thyne’s (2017) full data set – which is not presented here - generates AIC and BIC scores that are 
vastly larger indicating that there is likely significant deviation from the data generating process (AIC: 2,611.214; 
BIC: 2,657.772).  
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scholars have investigated civil conflict duration, I generated a theory that argued that, while 
civil conflicts do generate important information about the costs of continued fighting or the 
likelihood of success or failure, it was highly unlikely that any two leaders processed such 
information in similar or even efficient ways. I tested a series of hypothesized relationships 
utilizing survival models to determine which key variables had an effect on the number of 
months a civil war lasted. The findings presented above provide support for two of my 
hypothesized relationships and are especially strong when controlling for relevant political and 
economic variables. Moreover, a comparison of the AIC and BIC statistics associated with each 
model indicates that the fully-specified model is a better fit than either the model with only 
situational variables or the model with only psychological variables.  
 Three key psychological characteristics are statistically linked to longer civil conflicts: 
in-group bias, self-confidence, and conceptual complexity. Leaders who emphasize the 
importance of advancement for their group or protection of their groups’ interests often face 
longer civil conflicts. The reason for this appears rather intuitive; the costs of pursuing a 
negotiated settlement are likely perceived by these types of leaders as being existential. More 
precisely, while the costs of conflict may be high, the risk to one’s group may be worsened by 
choosing a negotiated settlement instead of continued fighting. This represents a case where a 
leader’s personality characteristics can affect which possible facts are perceived as being more 
costly. 
 Additionally, self-confident leaders are likely to experience longer civil wars than their 
less self-confident counterparts. Rather than influencing how a head of state perceives potential 
costs associated with fighting, self-confidence affects the way the head of state processes 
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incoming information. A central theoretical process in the civil conflict duration literature asserts 
that information generated by ongoing conflict – be it information about the cost of continued 
fighting or information about the likelihood of victory or defeat – can alter an actor’s expectation 
and make him or her more likely to choose negotiation over continued fighting. While I do not 
dispute the fact that ongoing conflicts generate these kinds of information, it is unreasonable to 
assume that leaders act in the same efficient manner when processing the information. I 
theorized that self-confident leaders are far more likely to discount incoming information that 
indicates that they are either going to lose the war or that the costs of continued fighting is high. 
This affects the ability of the leader to “rationally” calculate the costs and benefits of continued 
fighting. This effect appears to play out in the quantitative tests above. Self-confident leaders 
face longer civil conflicts than leaders who are less self-confident. 
 Finally, I theorized that leaders who were more conceptually complex should experience 
shorter civil wars because they tend to be more open to incoming information, and therefore are 
better able to process information and accurately determine when it is most prudent to pursue a 
negotiated settlement. While the findings in both models indicate that conceptually complexity is 
related to civil conflict duration, the direction of the relationship runs contrary to my hypothesis. 
However, this contrary finding is consistent with the findings observed in the civil war severity 
chapter. Conceptually complex leaders tend to process a great deal of information about the 
world around them and they tend to perceive themselves as having many potential options at 
their disposal for achieving their goals. Conflict generates a great deal of information about the 
other actor. The conflict can send signals about an opponent’s resolve and/or capabilities. One 
would imagine that a conceptually complex leader would be more apt to better determine the 
 97  
 
likelihood of victory or defeat because he or she takes in more information. However, the 
information about the resolve and/or capabilities of the other actor appears to actually cause the 
head of state to continue fighting rather than pursuing a negotiated settlement. For example, 
when the conceptually complex leader receives information from the ongoing conflict that the 
rebel leader is resolved to continue fighting to pursue and/or achieve his or her political goals, 
the conceptually complex leader will choose to forego negotiation and continue fighting. 
 Finally, utilizing Thyne’s (2017) replication data, I compare my two empirical models to 
a model that uses purely political and economic variables to explain civil conflict duration. The 
comparison indicates that including variables that capture the psychological characteristics of 
world leaders along with the oft-used economic and political control variables generate models 
that are a better fit than models that look at either psychology or structure alone. To this point, I 
have presented the findings of three empirical studies that show that world leaders and their 
individual personality characteristics and beliefs are consistently related to different facets of 
civil war behaviors. What is clear from this chapter is that leaders matter when trying to explain 
intrastate conflict duration. Therefore, the effect of leaders and their psychological characteristics 
should be an integral part of future studies of civil conflict.  
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CHAPTER 5:  THE EFFECT OF CIVIL WARS ON LEADER 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Introduction 
 Do the events that take place during a civil war affect the personality characteristics of 
leaders? Recently, there has been a growing interest in studying the ways that key life 
experiences can shape world leaders. For example, Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015) constructed 
the Leader Experience and Attribute Dataset (LEAD) with the goal of investigating how the life 
experiences of world leaders shape their risk profiles. The LEAD project identifies the way that 
past life experiences influence a leader’s willingness to accept risks. Though the LEAD project 
presents theories that are informed by theories in social psychology, that is where LEAD’s 
application of psychology ends. LEAD assumes that life experiences have a static long-run effect 
on a leader’s risk-acceptance41. However, including individual psychological characteristics 
allows scholars to examine how the characteristics change over time. This is particularly 
important because leaders’ personalities can – and often do – change over time or in response to 
events. Heads of state are often deeply affected by shocking political events42. 
 Armed internal conflicts present a good opportunity to investigate how world leaders are 
affected by the varying levels of violence associated with such conflicts. Moreover, they 
represent an opportunity to investigate this possible relationship utilizing time series methods 
                                                 
41 Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015) treat risk in their models slightly differently than prospect theorists. Horowitz 
and colleagues conceptualize risk from a psychological (i.e. individuals being more willing to make choices with 
high costs) rather than from an economic (i.e. where risk refers to an individual’s preference for the outcome of a 
gamble) perspective. 
42 For example, Barack Obama was deeply troubled by the mass shooting at Newtown Elementary School and 
Donald Trump actually changed his position regarding the use of military force in Syria after the Syrian government 
used chemical weapons against its own civilian population. 
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that make it possible to determine if changes occur and, more importantly, if these changes are 
lasting. The importance of exploring this relationship is made even more evident given the 
findings presented in the three preceding chapters. If the psychological characteristics of world 
leaders can affect civil war onset, severity, and duration, it is imperative to determine if these 
same psychological characteristics can be shaped by an ongoing civil conflict. 
 To investigate this relationship, I examine the time serial properties of the psychological 
characteristics of United Kingdom (U.K.) Prime Ministers during the period of armed conflict in 
Northern Ireland known as “The Troubles.” In the next section, I explore what the existing 
literature says about the effect that experiences can have on preferences for risk and beliefs about 
the nature of the political universe. I follow this section with the construction of a theory based 
on the expected effect of certain shocking events on certain personality characteristics and 
beliefs. I then move into a discussion of the methods I utilize to diagnose and test the long- and 
short-run relationships between the severity of the conflict in Ireland and the characteristics of 
prime ministers. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings and the implications of 
these findings for the application of at-a-distance methods to the study of civil violence and our 
broader understanding of the stability of personalities and beliefs. 
Literature Review – Leaders and Their Responses to Events 
 Political psychologists have long been interested in the origins of personalities and beliefs 
of world leaders. Many early attempts to explain how leaders developed individual personality 
characteristics relied on the psychobiographical approach. The quintessential example of this 
approach is Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study by Alexander and Juliet 
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George (1956). While the overall goal of this psychobiography was to explain why Woodrow 
Wilson was so intransigent during the negotiations with the U.S. Senate over the Treaty of 
Versailles, the role of Wilson’s childhood was foundational for explaining the development of 
his personality and the resulting behavior (George and George 1956). The Georges argued that 
Wilson’s overbearing and impossible-to-please father instilled in Wilson a higher than average 
need for achievement, which made him less likely to compromise when debating proposed 
policies (1956). Jerrold Post points out that this work still serves as an example of a rigorous 
psychobiography. However, this approach to explaining the origins of the personalities and 
beliefs of world leaders has largely fallen out of favor because of the inherent subjectivity and 
limited generalizability of this approach (Post 2013, 466). 
 More recently, scholars exploring the origins of leaders’ preferences have emphasized the 
role of a wide variety of life experiences. The Leader Experiences and Attributes Dataset 
(LEAD) is a broad database of key life experiences of world leaders (Ellis, Horowitz, and Stam 
2015; Horowitz, Ellis, and Stam 2015). The authors of this dataset argue that the experiences and 
attributes of leaders should be play a pivotal role in explaining the risk-taking behaviors of 
leaders once in office (Horowitz and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). For example, 
they find that military service – without the experience of frontline combat – should lead 
individuals to believe that military force is an effective tool for achieving foreign policy goals 
because they are not directly exposed to the human costs of military force (Horowitz and Stam 
2014; Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). However, individuals who experience frontline combat 
should be less likely to believe that military force is an effective policy tool because they have 
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seen the human costs of military combat first-hand (Ellis and Stam 2014; Horowitz, Stam, and 
Ellis 2015). 
 Additionally, leaders who have a history of service in rebel groups should be generally 
more risk-acceptant than individuals who do not have these experiences. Arguably, because 
service in a rebel group is an inherently risky choice, these individuals should carry this risk-
acceptant behavior with them into positions of power (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). 
Empirical analysis of the effect of prior rebel group membership has explored how it can 
influence the likelihood that a leader will try to acquire nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann and 
Horowitz (2014) argue that leaders who have served in rebel groups are more willing to accept 
the risks associated with pursuing nuclear weapons. While the pursuit of nuclear weapons 
represents a rare event in international relations, the authors find that leaders who have a history 
of rebel group membership are significantly more likely to try to acquire nuclear weapons 
(Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2014). 
 While the life experiences discussed above tend to take place during young adulthood, 
the dataset also captures the importance of childhood trauma. For example, the authors include 
measures of early life experiences like growing up in poverty. The authors argue that leaders 
who grew up poor should tend to be more risk-acceptant, because poverty has a fundamental 
effect on the psychological development of children. More precisely, individuals who grow up 
poor tend to engage in more short-term thinking than individuals who grow up in homes that are 
economically stable (Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015). However, the findings in this area are 
mixed. While the LEAD dataset represents a broad and useful inclusion of key leadership 
variables, it does have some limitations that leave some key questions unanswered. 
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 The key limitation is that these variables are time-invariant for individual leaders. For 
example, these factors assume that a leader’s past military service has a constant effect on the 
individual leader’s risk preferences during his or her time in office. More precisely, the 
underlying assumption of this dataset is that leaders cease to learn from experiences once they 
enter office. This assumption is not only logically questionable, there are several empirical 
studies that provide evidence to the contrary. 
 Several at-a-distance studies of world leaders indicate that the operational codes of world 
leaders can – and often do – shift during a leader’s tenure. For example, Crichlow (1998) 
demonstrates that the operational codes of both Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin shift 
significantly from greater pessimism about achieving political goals, to greater optimism (P-2) 
between the periods of the 1970s and 1990s. Additionally, Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) 
provide evidence that shows Jimmy Carter’s operational code shifted significantly after the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. They find that, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
Carter’s normally cooperative beliefs about the nature of the political universe (P-1) and his 
optimism about the likelihood of achieving his political goals (P-2) shifted markedly in the 
negative direction (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 185-186). Another analysis of the 
operational code of a U.S. president demonstrated that Lyndon Johnson’s political beliefs shifted 
during the planning process of the Vietnam War (Walker and Schafer 2000). The evidence 
suggests that Johnson believed he had less control over historical events (P-4), attributed a 
greater role to chance (P-5), and was more averse to taking risks (I-3) (Walker and Schafer 2000, 
537).  
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 Broadly construed, the findings discussed above provide support for the idea that the 
belief systems of world leaders can change over time in response to shocks (i.e. Feng 2005; 
Walker, Schafer, Young 1998) and as a function of learning as they are in office (i.e. Crichlow 
1998; Walker and Schafer 2000). However, Jonathan Renshon (2008) sought to investigate both 
of these processes at work during the Bush administration. Renshon argued that the belief 
systems of George W. Bush should be affected by the changing of roles from candidate to 
president, in response to the shocks of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and as a function of learning the 
longer he was in office (2008, 828). Generally, George W. Bush’s positive beliefs about the 
nature of the political universe were reinforced during his transition from candidate to president. 
In contrast, the period following 9/11 showed a significant negative – conflictual - shift in Bush’s 
belief system. Finally, Bush’s final year in office showed that he came to believe that he had less 
of an effect on the shaping of historical political events (Renshon 2008, 835-837). 
 All of the studies discussed above demonstrate that there is a broader interest in 
understanding how the personality characteristics and beliefs of world leaders are shaped. 
Additionally, there is an interest in determining what factors cause these characteristics to 
change. Beyond demonstrating an interest in the origins and changes of leader beliefs and 
personalities, this brief literature review demonstrates the problems associated with the different 
approaches. While scholars interested in the shifts in operational codes demonstrate that there 
can be meaningful changes between time periods or resulting from shocks, the research in this 
area lacks cross-sectional variation. More precisely, the vast majority investigate the changes of 
individual leaders, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings. Additionally, given the 
advances in the application of time series methods in political science, the past methods utilized 
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to test the changes in beliefs and characteristics of world leaders do not effectively capture the 
effect that time has on the changes in these variables. Finally, the effects of internal armed 
conflict on the psychological characteristics of world leaders have not yet been studied. 
Conversely, the large-n LEAD data project is broad in its cross-sectional and temporal 
scope and includes a large number of potential important life experience and attribute variables 
that can – in fact – affect conflict preferences and/or risk-acceptance. This dataset allows 
scholars to explore how life experiences can explain differences in risk-acceptance between 
leaders. Unfortunately, the dataset does not allow scholars to measure how the effect of these life 
experiences wax and/or wane over time within individual leaders. Therefore, there is a need to 
examine time-variant measures of leaders’ beliefs and characteristics and how they can change in 
response to outside shocks or learning over time. To address these issues, I utilize time-series 
methods to investigate the variance in beliefs and personality characteristics of U.K. Prime 
Ministers during an internal armed conflict. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 The key building block of this theoretical argument is that leaders not only shape events 
but can also be shaped by events. Certain personality characteristics and beliefs of world leaders 
can change in response to both short-term shocking events and long-term political changes (i.e. 
through the learning process). An additional assumption is that personalities and beliefs should 
change to reflect the realities of a given situation. At its heart, this assumption implies that there 
is some sort of long-run relationship between a leader’s beliefs and personality and the reality of 
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political situation. Therefore, all individual hypotheses in this section seek to explain how shifts 
in the reality of the “Troubles” affect different personality characteristics and beliefs.  
 The first personality characteristic that can be influenced by a civil conflict is a leader’s 
need for power. Recall that need for power refers to a leader’s motivation to influence the 
behaviors and goals of others (Hermann 2003; Winter 1993). Leaders who score highly on this 
trait tend to not only be more aggressive in their policy conducted (Hermann 2003; Winter 1993, 
2004), they also tend to be adept politicians who are often effective at achieving their political 
goals (Hermann 2003). Moreover, Winter (1993) notes that this motive profile can change as 
conflict dynamics change43. As civil conflicts become more severe, leaders should be motivated 
more by a need to exert authority over the rebels and motivated more by the desire to end the 
conflict. Increasing conflict severity demonstrates to these leaders that an aggressive approach is 
not achieving its desired goal. 
 H1: Need for power will show a long-run increase as a conflict becomes more severe.  
 Another characteristic that may be sensitive to the severity of a civil conflict is a leader’s 
distrust. Distrustful leaders tend to view other actors’ motivations with wariness (Hermann 
2003). As a civil conflict becomes more violent, it is likely that the leader will trust the 
opposition less and less because the opposition has demonstrated a desire to continue utilizing 
violence to achieve its goals. More precisely, as a conflict becomes more severe, a leader’s belief 
                                                 
43 For example, Winter’s (1993) article shows evidence that the need for power of all participants in World War I 
decreased as the war neared its end, while their scores for need for affiliation increased.  
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about other actors should shift to more accurately reflect the potential reliability of the opposition 
to negotiate in good faith because of the opposition’s continued reliance on violent methods.  
 H2: Distrust will show a long-run increase as a conflict becomes more severe.  
 A third psychological characteristic that can be influenced by the severity of a civil 
conflict is a leader’s conceptual complexity. Conceptual complexity reflects the leader’s ability 
to see the world in zero-sum “black and white” terms or in shades of gray (Hermann 2003). 
Conceptual complexity also relates to the strategies leaders perceive as available to them (Foster 
and Keller 2014). A leader’s ability to perceive situations and strategies with degrees of 
differentiation can also be affected by changes in the environment. As civil conflicts continue to 
rage, a leader is likely to harden his or her beliefs about the appropriate strategies for mitigating 
the conflict. This hardening of beliefs should be related to lower conceptual complexity in a 
leader.  
H3: Conceptual complexity will show a long-run decrease as a conflict becomes more 
severe.  
 A fourth psychological characteristic that may be affected by conflict severity is a 
leader’s self-confidence. Self-confidence refers to an individual’s belief that he or she can 
overcome or adeptly navigate various political obstacles (Hermann 2003). The relationship 
between conflict severity and a prime minister’s self-confidence is rather intuitive. As the 
conflict becomes more severe, the individual responsible for providing security within the state 
may become less and less confident that he or she can provide security or navigate the fraught 
political situation. The relationship between self-confidence and conflict severity should reflect a 
leader’s beliefs about himself or herself matching the reality of the situation.  
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 H4: Self-confidence will show a long-run decrease as conflict severity increases.  
 Another variable of interest is a leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events. A 
leader’s belief in ability to control events refers to how much a leader perceives himself or 
herself as being able to shape certain historical outcomes or manipulate the current political 
situation (Hermann 2003). I expect that information generated by the ongoing conflict should 
affect just how much control a leader believes he or she has over a political situation. As the 
conflict becomes more severe, a leader should believe that he or she has less control over the 
political situation. This could be the result of increased battle-deaths experienced by the state’s 
military forces or by the general instability created by ongoing civil violence.  
H5: Belief in ability to control events will show a long-run negative shift as the conflict 
becomes more severe44. 
 Another psychological characteristic that could be sensitive to conflict severity is a 
leader’s in-group bias. Leaders who score high on this characteristic are likely to pursue policies 
that enhance the standing of their in-group, sometimes at the expense of the outgroup (Hermann 
2003). As conflicts become more severe, leaders are likely to view the opposition more as an 
outgroup than an in-group (i.e. individuals with a shared national or group identity). This is 
driven by the internalization of losses associated with more severe civil conflict. It is likely that 
as the casualty numbers increase, the prime ministers serving during the troubles may rely more 
on in-group versus outgroup heuristics when considering strategies.  
                                                 
44 There is another variable that is conceptually similar to belief in ability to control events. P-4 refers a leader’s 
belief about the ability of individuals to shape historical outcomes (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). This variable 
is coded differently, but the hypothesized relationship and process mirrors that of belief in ability to control events. 
Therefore, as with previous chapters, I do not present a formal hypothesis for P-4 in the text.  
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H6: In-group bias will show a long-run positive shift as the conflict becomes more 
severe.  
 Finally, there are two operational code beliefs that could be sensitive to the severity of 
civil conflicts. The first is a leader’s belief about the fundamental nature of the political universe 
(P-1). A leader can believe that the political universe is inherently conflictual or cooperative 
(Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). The relationship between P-1 and conflict severity is rather 
intuitive. As the severity of the civil conflict increases, leaders are more likely to believe that the 
political universe is more conflictual. Additionally, a leader’s belief about the most appropriate 
strategy for achieving his or her goals (I-1) should be affected by conflict severity. A leader can 
believe that his or her most appropriate strategy for achieving political goals can be conflictual or 
cooperative (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003). As conflict becomes more severe, the prime 
ministers may begin to lose faith in cooperative strategies. As the opposition continues to rely 
more on violence to achieve its political goals, prime ministers are likely to believe in doing the 
same. 
 H7: P-1 will show a long-run negative shift in response to increased conflict severity.  
 H8: I-1 will show a long-run negative shift in response to increased conflict severity.  
Research Design 
Background – The Troubles  
 The Troubles in Northern Ireland can be traced back to the partition of Ireland in 1921. 
This partition of Ireland divided it between the independent Republic of Ireland in the south and 
Northern Ireland – which remained a member of the United Kingdom with limited forms of self-
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government. This partition left Northern Ireland divided by those who sought to unify Ireland 
under the banner of an independent Ireland (referred to as Republicans) and those who wished to 
protect the union between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom (referred to as Unionists). 
In addition to differing political goals, these two groups were largely divided along religious 
lines, with Protestants making up the majority of Unionists and Catholics making up the majority 
of Republicans.  
 Over time, successive Unionist governments began to politically and economically 
discriminate against the Catholic (Republican) minority. By 1969, many Republicans came to 
accept the idea of a separate Northern Ireland, so long as they were granted legal equality. Civil 
rights protests began in an effort to convince the Unionist government to end its discriminatory 
policies. The protests were widespread and eventually it became evident that the Unionist 
government could not maintain order. In 1972, the British government dissolved the government 
of Northern Ireland, assumed direct control over the country, and used the British military as an 
occupation force to restore order.  
 By the early 1970s, the dynamics of the civil conflict in Northern Ireland changed from 
conflicts between Republican and Unionist paramilitary groups, to a direct confrontation 
between the leading Republican paramilitary group – the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) – and the British military. The conflict between the groups raged from 1969 until the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which resulted in the restoration of the home 
rule in Northern Ireland but left the question of lasting status unanswered (Darby n.d.). While 
civil violence has largely subsided since 1998, there are still heightened tensions between 
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Republicans and Unionists (i.e. Catholics and Protestants) that continue to simmer beneath the 
surface. 
 The Troubles in Ireland represent a useful base to construct time series data for a variety 
of reasons. The first is the availability of speeches by British Prime Ministers throughout the 
duration of the entire conflict. Hansard and Prime Minister databases make it possible for me to 
present uninterrupted time series data from the beginning of the unrest in 1968, until the signing 
of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The second benefit of using the Troubles as a case stems 
from the detailed archives about the case. The Conflict Archives on the Internet (CAIN) – 
housed at Ulster University – provide a variety of detailed records about the politics of Northern 
Ireland and the Troubles. Detailed records are useful for identifying potentially shocking 
moments in the conflict that can be missed in large cross-sectional data sets. Finally, the 
Troubles makes a useful case for investigating how civil conflict severity affects the personalities 
and beliefs of world leaders because the prime ministers of the U.K. were directly responsible for 
any policies regarding Northern Ireland from 1972 until 1998. Additionally, it was the British 
military that bore the brunt of the casualties caused by the IRA. The time-series sample 
generated covers a total of 32 years from 1968 to 1999, which includes a total of 7 prime 
ministers. 
Variables and Sources 
 The coding procedures for the psychological variables have been discussed in detail in 
chapter 2, and for the sake of brevity will be omitted in this discussion. The key independent 
variable of interest is the number of deaths associated with the Troubles in a given year. These 
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data come from the Sutton Index of Deaths (1994)45. Malcolm Sutton maintains a detailed 
database of deaths associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland. These include assassinations, 
bombings, and armed conflict between militias on either side of the conflict. This measure is 
preferable to large cross-sectional data sets (i.e. ACD/PRIO) because it does not omit acts of 
terrorism or random murders associated with the conflict that send relevant information to prime 
ministers about the state of the intercommunal conflict. Therefore, the measure provides a more 
accurate reflection of the severity of the unrest in Northern Ireland over time. Moreover, it 
includes years where the death threshold falls below 25 (i.e. the threshold utilized by PRIO/ACD 
civil conflict data) but there was still active violence46. 
Vector Autoregression – Leaders’ Psychological Response to Violence 
 The vector autoregression (VAR) approach to time series analysis is widely used in 
economics and somewhat prevalent in political science. However, before discussing assumptions 
and modeling, it is necessary to discuss the concept of autoregression and its implication in data 
analysis. The most basic description of an autoregressive (AR) process is a process by which a 
behavior at time t is significantly explained by the behavior at time t-1. This process is typically 
referred to as an AR(1) process. Clearly, there is the inherent implication there can be longer-run 
autoregressive processes in economic and political data (i.e. AR(2), AR(3), etc.). If time series 
                                                 
45 Though the initial database was published in 1994, Sutton continued to update the database through 2001. For 
details, see http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/. 
46 This is particularly important because time series analysis methods often cannot be utilized when there are time 
gaps. Therefore, this alternative measure of conflict severity allows me to prevent treating years where the conflict 
falls below the ACD/PRIO minimum battle-deaths as missing data, while also capturing some of the unique 
dynamics of the Troubles.  
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data contain one of these AR processes and the analyst fails to include such processes in his or 
her model, then he or she runs the strong risk of having biased results.  
 Another important concept that VAR was originally designed to investigate is the 
possibility of causal feedback between independent and dependent variables. Traditional models 
present hypotheses that assert that Xt has some causal effect on Yt. However, single equation 
models that test such hypotheses are not equipped to handle the possibility that Yt can have its 
own effect on Xt. Many responses to this particular problem have been approached using 
simultaneous equation (SEQ) models (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 97-106). Unfortunately, 
this approach to exploring the potential endogenous relationships between Xt and Yt relies on 
very strict modeling restrictions.  
VAR models address the restrictive nature of SEQ models by allowing analysts to 
eschew the use of theoretical assumptions about endogeneity and exogeneity when modeling the 
relations between variables and establishing model restrictions. Instead VAR utilizes information 
from the data to statistically justify certain modeling restrictions (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 
107). In this case, there may indeed be reason to believe that personality characteristics and 
beliefs about the political universe may be sensitive to the severity of a civil conflict. 
Additionally, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, the psychology of leaders can affect the onset 
and severity of civil conflicts as well. Therefore, there is the distinct possibility of a feedback 
loop between these two variables. What is not clear from this theoretical justification is just how 
long such feedbacks may last. More precisely, it is possible that there may be a weak and short-
run feedback relationship or a strong long-run feedback relationship. The VAR model is 
constructed to base model structure decisions (i.e. inclusions of appropriate lag lengths) on the 
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data, rather than potentially weak theoretical assumptions, making it particularly useful for the 
analysis of the relationship between conflict severity and leader psychology. 
The first step to modeling a VAR model involves determining the appropriate lag-length 
to control for. Once the lag-lengths are specified, the VAR process models the separate equations 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the inclusion of the appropriate lags of each 
variable. If the chosen lag-length is the correct specification, the OLS model will be efficient 
since the error term for each equation will be serially uncorrelated. Finally, the VAR model 
allows the analysts to specify a variety of visual impulse response functions that demonstrate 
whether or not certain events result in long-term shift in the mean of a leader’s various 
psychological characteristics, or if the leaders return to a steady average on these characteristics 
quickly or slowly. 
Limitations of the Data 
 Before discussing the findings of the statistical tests in the following section, it is prudent 
to discuss a prominent shortcoming of my data and, subsequently, modeling. My data are 
presented as being purely time series (i.e. looking at changes in the psychology of leaders year-
to-year). However, it is arguable that this approach assumes away the effect of psychological 
differences between prime ministers (i.e. unit heterogeneity). This modeling choice potentially 
introduces issues when trying to interpret the estimates of things like structural breaks. For 
example, if the estimates show the presence of a shock to a psychological characteristic, it is 
difficult to determine whether or not the “shock” was a result of something related to the civil 
conflict, or if the “shock” was simply a function of a new prime minister taking office. This 
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modeling choice is a strategic one, however. I have limited access to enough speech acts for a 
disaggregated time period (i.e. month) which would allow me to focus on one prime minister’s 
time in office during the Troubles with a sample-size large enough to support a multivariate test 
of the relationship between the conflict severity and the leader’s psychological characteristics.  
 The shortcomings of my current data set require the relaxation of assumptions about 
potential unit heterogeneity which may lead readers to be skeptical about the inferences drawn 
from the findings. The data set is well-suited for presenting descriptive information about the 
time-serial properties of psychological characteristics in the context of a civil conflict (see Stock 
and Watson 2001, 101-103). However, the data set is not well-suited to confidently draw 
inferences about the effect of “shocks” to conflict severity on psychological characteristics. 
Therefore, I am not interpreting these findings as definitive. Rather, I am treating these findings 
as suggestive of a possible long-run connection between these series, and we should be careful 
about what inferences are drawn from these results. 
Findings 
 The VAR model is a useful foundation for identifying long-run relationships between 
variables. But, the output of VAR models tends to be large and difficult to meaningfully 
interpret. Therefore, rather than presenting the VAR models in this section, I rely on interpreting 
two key post-estimation tests that provide more useful information about the relationship 
between conflict severity and the psychology of leaders47: Granger causality tests and impulse 
response functions (IRF).  
                                                 
47 The VAR models can be found in Appendix F.  
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 Granger causality tests are often performed after running basic VAR models with the 
appropriate number of specified lags. Granger causality tests provide information about whether 
or not the relationship between two variables is simply an autoregressive process, whereby a 
variable at time t is best predicted by the variable at time t-1, or if the value of a variable is best 
predicted by controlling for the autoregressive process and another variable such as Xt. A 
variable can be said to “Granger-cause” another variable if, even including the lags of Yt, the lags 
of Xt are also statistically significant. Failure to achieve statistical significance indicates that the 
variables do not “Granger-cause” each other; rather, Yt is best explained by lagged values of 
itself.  
 Granger causality tests are useful for statistically identifying the presence of a potential 
relationship. However, the test is not useful for identifying the duration or direction of the 
relationship. Additionally, the test is not well-suited for explaining how long such an effect lasts. 
Therefore, there is not a discussion of direction or duration when discussing the Granger results 
below. Rather, the discussion of both the direction and duration of the relationship between 
conflict severity and psychological variables are reserved for the discussion on IRFs.  
 IRFs are graphical representations of both the direction of the potential relationship and 
the duration of that relationship. IRFs, like Granger-causality tests, are calculated after running 
the underlying VAR model. They are calculated by simulating the introduction of a one 
standard-deviation “shock” in Xt and examining whether the shock increases or decreases Yt. 
Additionally, IRFs show how the impulse at t affect Y at t+1 and beyond. Graphical 
representations help scholars to visualize the potential effects found in Granger-causality tests 
and give clearer information about whether or not these effects are short-lived or long-lasting.  
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Granger Causality Tests 
 In table 4, I present the Granger causality tests where conflict severity is Xt and each of 
the psychological characteristics of interest in this research serve as Yt. Most of the psychological 
variables do not have a meaningful feedback relationship with conflict severity. There are two 
interesting exceptions: distrust and P-4. Distrust is Granger-caused by the severity of the civil 
conflict. In this case, distrust is not simply explained by lagged values of itself, but also by 
lagged values of conflict severity. Therefore, there is preliminary evidence that distrust and 
conflict severity may be endogenous. P-4 also appears to be affected by conflict severity, though 
the p-value indicates that the evidence of a relationship is only suggestive..  
 117  
 
Table 4 - Granger Causality: Severity & Psychology. 
Equation Excluded Chi2 DF p-value 
nPower Deaths 0.95273 2 0.621 
BACE Deaths 2.8821 2 0.237 
Self-Confidence Deaths 2.6344 2 0.268 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
Deaths 0.23035 2 0.891 
Distrust Deaths 6.1833 2 0.045 
In-Group Bias Deaths 0.20569 2 0.902 
I-1  Deaths 0.1143 2 0.944 
P-1 Deaths 0.14341 2 0.931 
P-4 Deaths 4.9227 2 0.085 
 
 Table 5 presents the Granger-causality tests with results for how individual psychological 
characteristics affect conflict severity. Much like the findings in Table 4, most of the 
psychological characteristics of British Prime Ministers do not Granger-cause conflict severity. 
This indicates that the inclusion of lagged values of most of the psychological characteristics 
does not result in a model that performs better than a model that simply regresses battle-deaths 
on the variables’ own lagged values. The exception in this situation is conceptual complexity. 
Conceptual complexity does Granger-cause conflict severity. Granger-causality tests provide 
useful information about the presence or absence of endogeneity between two time series of 
interest; however, there is little useful information about the nature (i.e. direction) of such a 
relationship. Therefore, it is prudent to present visual illustrations of the nature of the 
relationship between variables that appear to be endogenous. The following section will utilize 
impulse response functions to illustrate these interesting dynamics.  
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Table 5 - Granger Causality: Psychology & Severity 
Equation Excluded Chi2 DF p-value 
Deaths nPower 1.351 2 0.509 
Deaths BACE 0.18385 2 0.912 
Deaths Self-Confidence 3.3157 2 0.191 
Deaths Conceptual 
Complexity 
6.9739 2 0.031 
Deaths Distrust 2.0868 2 0.352 
Deaths In-Group Bias 1.1652 2 0.558 
Deaths I-1 0.0119 2 0.994 
Deaths P-1 0.6567 2 0.720 
Deaths P-4 1.3065 2 0.520 
 
Impulse Response Functions – Visualizing the Relationships  
 Impulse response functions (IRF) give analysts a way to visualize the effect of a shock to 
an endogenous variable on itself and/or another endogenous variable. IRFs graph the effect of 
one-standard deviation “impulse” or shock to the dependent variable in question48. Figure 6 
presents the IRF exploring the relationship between conflict severity and a leader’s distrust. 
Above, the results indicate that conflict severity Granger-causes a leader’s distrust at time t. 
However, the results indicate that it is possible that the relationship is quite short-lived. Figure 6 
shows that a shock to conflict severity at t briefly increases the distrust of the leader; however, by 
time t+1 it is clear that distrust is beginning to return to its baseline and in-fact back to its 
baseline by time t+2. This sort of pattern persists through the forecasted period. However, any 
real inferences about the effect of conflict severity on distrust should be made cautiously, as the 
shock-responses are never truly statistically significant (i.e. the 95% confidence intervals 
                                                 
48 I only present IRFs for the relationships that showed Granger-causality between severity (Xt) and psychology (Yt).  
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continuously include zero, indicating that the relationship between the impulse and changes in 
distrust cannot safely be distinguished from zero).  
 
Figure 6: Impulse Response Function 
 Figure 7 illustrates the effect of shocks on a prime minister’s belief about his or her 
ability to control and shape historical events (P-4). The pattern is very similar to the pattern 
observed for distrust: the introduction of a shock to conflict severity has a minimal, and very 
short-lived effect on P-4. Therefore, despite evidence suggestive of Granger-causality presented 
above, it is not clear that the severity of the Troubles had a lasting effect on the psychological 
characteristics of British Prime Ministers. However, also like distrust, any inferences drawn 
about the potential impulse response of P-4 to shocks in conflict severity should be made 
carefully, as they never achieve statistical significance. The implications of these findings – or 
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lack thereof - are quite relevant to the study of leadership psychology and how it affects foreign 
and domestic policy behaviors, as I discuss in the next section.  
 
Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions - Severity and P-4 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This chapter opened by asking what effect, if any, variance in civil conflict severity had 
on the psychological characteristics of world leaders. In an earlier chapter, preliminary evidence 
indicated that contemporaneous measures of psychological characteristics could be useful for 
understanding conflict severity at time t. However, that chapter did not address just how leaders 
respond to surprises or shocks during the conflict, nor did it address the potential cyclical (i.e. 
endogenous) relationship between those characteristics and conflict severity. It has been 
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theoretically assumed that certain characteristics and beliefs of world leaders would be sensitive 
to surprise, but very few empirical studies have investigated the long-run relationship between 
these shocks and psychological characteristics.  
 This shortcoming in existing research was ripe for exploration and the application of time 
series analysis. Utilizing information about the Troubles in Northern Ireland, I was able to 
construct a time series data set that spanned from the beginning of the civil conflict with British 
Loyalist forces and Irish Republican forces and included measures of the psychological 
characteristics of prime ministers. Several interesting factors emerge from this chapter about the 
potential feedback relationship between conflict severity the psychological characteristics of 
British Prime Ministers. 
 The first interesting factor is that there is limited evidence that conflict severity has any 
lasting effect on the psychological characteristics of leaders. Only two psychological 
characteristics – distrust and P-4 – appear to be Granger-caused by conflict severity. Moreover, 
P-4 fails to achieve the standard level of statistical significance. This represents a case where 
failing to reject the null hypothesis may be more interesting than rejecting it. There are, indeed, 
good theoretical reasons to think that the all too often horrific nature of civil conflicts could have 
pronounced and lasting effects on a leader’s beliefs and broader personality characteristics. 
However, the statistical analysis finds that such an effect is unlikely. Even the characteristics that 
appear to be Granger-caused by conflict severity produce impulse response functions that 
indicate that shocks to conflict severity produce only small, short-lived, and statistically 
insignificant shifts in a prime minister’s distrust and belief in ability to control historical 
outcomes. 
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 This finding is well-illustrated by examination of the time series graph in figure 8 below. 
This graph displays shifts in distrust, P-4, and a standardized measure of conflict severity. The 
graph shows that personality characteristics do shift over time, but the shifts are independent of 
the severity of the conflict in Northern Ireland. So, this finding has implications for how political 
psychologists think about their research designs (i.e. dealing with potential endogeneity) and it 
establishes a justification for future research questions. If conflict severity does not affect 
personality characteristics and beliefs, then what events do? Would the relationship be different 
if scholars choose to observe cases where the opposition is demanding control of the central 
government (i.e. threatening the leader’s position and personal security) instead of engaging in a 
secessionist conflict? Would examining the types of conflict-related deaths separately yield 
different results (i.e. treating acts of terrorism, assassinations, attacks on British military forces, 
and inter-militia violence as different types of severity)? These questions have become easier to 
answer with advances in statistical methods and a better understanding of the effect that time can 
have on changes to social sciences variables. This research may not completely reject the 
possibility that there may be an endogenous relationship between leader psychology and conflict 
severity, but it does provide evidence that we scholars can begin to rethink the relationship 
between these two variables in future research. 
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Figure 8: Time Series Line 
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION: LEADERS MATTER 
What Have We Learned? 
 This dissertation project opened by asking how political leaders can affect civil conflicts 
within their countries. Chapter 2 paid particular attention to how leaders can influence the 
likelihood of civil conflict onset. It can sometimes be difficult to link the outbreak of civil 
conflict directly to the behaviors of political leaders. This is because scholars tend to assume that 
there are institutional and political constraints that make it easier to separate individual political 
leaders from responsibility for starting civil conflicts. However, I argued that these political 
leaders often served as the chief policy-makers and chief negotiators with political opponents. I 
make this argument because chief executives often act as the last veto power for any potential 
agreement that could avoid the onset of a conflict. It would be difficult, for example, to avoid 
arguing that J. R. Jayewardene was not responsible for the failure of negotiations with the 
initially peaceful Tamil political leaders.  
  The findings indicate that there are indeed identifiable relationships between the 
psychology of chief executives and the onset of civil conflict. When examining all armed 
conflict onsets (i.e. any armed conflict that starts in a given year and has a battle-death threshold 
of greater than 25), many psychological variables stand out as important. A leader’s belief in his 
or her ability to control events, in-group bias, and belief about the fundamental nature of the 
political universe (P-1) all increase the likelihood of armed conflict onset. Conversely, need for 
power, self-confidence, a belief that a cooperative strategy is the best way to pursue one’s 
political goals (I-1), and a belief that he or she can shape or affect historical outcomes (P-4) 
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decrease the likelihood of armed conflict onset in a given year. These findings are generally 
replicated when looking only at the onset of high-intensity conflicts (i.e. those with more than 
1,000 battle-deaths in a given year). Belief in ability to control events and in-group bias make the 
onset of these types of conflicts more likely, whereas a more positive I-1 score makes these types 
of conflicts less likely. Interestingly, however, distrust is significant and negatively related to the 
likelihood of a high-intensity civil war onset. 
 The connection between the psychology of leaders and civil war behavior becomes more 
direct when investigating the severity and duration of civil conflicts. The underlying assumption 
of Chapter 3, which investigates how leaders affect civil war severity, is that the chief executive 
is heavily involved in shaping strategic goals and informing broader tactics. The link between the 
psychology of the chief executive and the severity of civil conflict is supported in the statistical 
analysis. Leaders who are more distrustful and have a stronger belief in their ability to shape 
historical outcomes (P-4) often preside over civil conflicts that are more severe. Alternatively, 
leaders who are more self-confident and believe that their best strategy for achieving political 
goals is cooperation are likely to preside over less severe civil conflicts.  
 In chapter 4, I asked how the psychological characteristics of chief executives affected 
civil conflict duration. The key theoretical assumption of this section was that these political 
leaders often acted as the final veto player when deciding to settle a conflict with an armed 
opposition group. Therefore, their personalities and beliefs should play an important role in 
explaining why some civil conflicts are longer or shorter than others. Once again, the statistical 
analysis supported this theoretical assumption. Leaders with higher scores for self-confidence, 
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conceptual complexity, and in-group bias presided over longer civil conflicts than leaders who 
had lower scores on these characteristics.  
 Finally, in chapter 5, I investigated the effect that civil conflict severity could have on the 
psychological characteristics of world leaders. By examining time series data about the severity 
of the conflict in Northern Ireland as well as the time serial properties of the psychology of 
British Prime Ministers, I sought to identify which psychological variables may be more or less 
sensitive to civil conflict severity. After running VAR models to test the possible relationship, I 
presented the findings of the more easily interpreted post-estimation tests for Granger causality 
and impulse response functions. The findings were interesting to say the least. The Granger-
causality tests indicated that conflict severity did appear to Granger-cause distrust and P-4. 
However, the impulse response functions illustrated that the effects were weak, short-lived, and 
largely insignificant. Broadly, these findings indicate that scholars should continue to investigate 
just how certain events can shape the psychological characteristics of chief executives.  
 All of the findings presented above (with the exception of those in chapter 5) 
demonstrated that – even when controlling for key structural and situational variables – 
leadership matters. More importantly, the psychological characteristics of those individuals in 
leadership matter. In all instances, leaders affected the likelihood of civil conflict onset, the 
severity of civil conflicts, and the duration of civil conflicts. These findings have meaningful 
implications for both the study of civil war and for the broader field of political psychology.  
 A common theme throughout each chapter of this project has been that the overwhelming 
reliance on both the rational actor model of decision-making and situational and/or structural 
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variables has resulted in a body of civil war literature that is missing the major pieces of political 
leaders. It bears repeating that no political psychologist would ever argue that those situational 
and structural factors do not matter; rather, they argue that those factors and their effects are 
filtered through the personalities and belief systems of decision-makers. Therefore, the leader in 
question decides how important an indicator is, it is the leader who determines whether potential 
constraints are minor obstacles or genuinely binding checks on their individual powers, and it is 
the leader who prioritizes certain policy outcomes over another when dealing with politically 
contentious situations. Therefore, the argument promoted here is that scholars of civil conflicts 
need to consider how leaders can exert independent influence on civil wars when controlling for 
structural or situational variables. Political psychology, particularly as it relates to the study of 
political executives and world leaders, emphasizes how these characteristics and beliefs relate to 
foreign policy outcomes and management style. However, this research demonstrates that these 
at-a-distance measures of psychological characteristics and beliefs have a place in the study of 
domestic conflict. This analysis further indicates that we can continue to expand at-a-distance 
research methods to address a broader array of questions relating to political behavior.  
Where do We Go from Here?  
 While these findings, taken together, represent useful contributions to both the study of 
civil conflicts and the study of leaders, there is still room to expand and improve both of these 
research agendas. Each chapter in this work not only answered interesting and relevant 
questions, they each also raised more questions for future study. The remainder of this section 
will be dedicated to discussing some of the shortcomings of each section and additional 
questions that, being beyond the scope of this work, remain unanswered.  
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Civil War Onset – The Issue of Sample and Data Availability 
 As discussed above, this chapter provides a more direct link between the psychological 
characteristics and beliefs of world leaders and the likelihood of civil conflict. However, there 
remain some shortcomings and unanswered questions that should be addressed in future 
research. The most prominent shortcoming in this section is the issue of sample selection. While 
the majority of the civil conflict onset research is able to generate samples that generally reflect 
the broader global population of states, there are many countries in my data set that are missing. 
Recall from the discussion of coding in chapter 2, that generating a score for these psychological 
characteristics requires a minimum of 5,000 spoken words in a given year. Finding enough 
speech material for leaders in developing countries obviously presents a unique challenge. This 
challenge is particularly acute when relying on the availability of digitally-available archives.  
 The availability of speech materials (or lack thereof) often creates samples that are 
limited in both their cross-sectional and temporal scope. Many developing countries that do have 
these kinds of archives are largely limited to speeches made in the last decade. Therefore, my 
sample tends to slightly over-represent well-developed countries and countries in the last ten to 
twenty years. Obviously, this means that my sample may not be as representative as those that 
are able to include most states in most years. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 2, my sample 
manages to be relatively representative with only slight over-representation of developed states. 
Additionally, my sample does not over- or under-represent civil conflict onsets relative to the full 
population. Nevertheless, it would be folly for me to argue that any missingness in my data is 
non-random. It would be more prudent for me to point out that such a non-random process is 
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beyond the ability of most researchers to control until such time as a broader array of countries 
emphasize the expansion and maintenance of speech archives for world leaders.  
 In addition to the potential sampling issue, there is a subject worthy of future attention 
that highlights both problems of data availability and an interesting question for future research. 
What role do opposition leaders – who may eventually become armed rebel leaders – play in the 
success or failure of bargaining with the state? More precisely, who is responsible for the failure 
of bargaining and the initiation of armed violence? Bargaining breakdown need not result in 
internal armed conflict. Instead, opposition groups may continue to pursue other forms of 
political protest. However, if civil conflict does start, one side has to fire the first shot. It is 
uncontroversial to argue that, in many cases, the first shot is not fired by the government. 
Therefore, the psychology of these opposition leaders is just as potentially interesting as the 
psychology of the chief executives of the state.  
 However, gathering at-a-distance data for these leaders runs into challenges that may be 
even greater than gathering data for heads of state. In many cases, opposition groups – 
particularly those that take up arms against the government – lack the developed resources 
needed to maintain reliable archives of speeches by their leaders. Moreover, in many cases, 
governments facing armed opposition have a strategic incentive to censor any meaningful 
attempts by the group to get their general message out to the public, lest the group appear to be 
fighting in good faith for perfectly reasonable demands. Some notable exceptions to this case 
may be the leaders who succeed in coming to power (i.e. Mao Zedong, Lenin, etc.). In this 
situation, the rebel turned state leader may attempt to enshrine all speeches and writing from the 
time of the civil conflict. These challenges would make it quite difficult to ensure that a 
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representative number of potential rebel leaders are available for coding and inclusion and a 
dyadic data set. These issues may become easier to circumvent in the future, however, as the 
internet has begun to give many typically marginalized groups a means to get their message to 
the masses. 
Civil War Severity – The Issue of Rare Events 
 Once civil wars begin, it is important to know what factors make these conflicts more or 
less severe. As discussed above, there is some evidence that links civil conflict severity to 
individual leaders. However, there is the issue of the rather small sample of civil conflict-years 
available in my models. This represents an issue where the previously discussed difficulty with 
access to speech data is exacerbated by the rare nature of civil conflicts. Because civil conflicts 
are rare, the population of potential civil conflict-years is smaller than the population of all 
possible state-years. Additionally, states that are experiencing civil conflicts are inherently 
unstable. Such instability can conceivably result in a diversion of resources from something as 
trivial as archiving leader speeches in order to provide more funding for the security apparatus.  
 Similar to the discussion of civil conflict onset, there would ideally be a way to 
investigate the psychological characteristics of rebel leaders. Such an approach would allow 
scholars to identify not only which actor – the rebels or the government – are inflicting more 
casualties from year to year, but also open the door to associating psychological characteristics 
of each actor with strategic choices. For example, is one leader more likely to pursue policies of 
more indiscriminate violence or policies of winning “hearts and minds” than another? Are these 
policy approaches informed by economic, political, or military situations? Or are they driven by 
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an individual’s broad psychology? The issue with these questions, as well as those of civil 
conflict onset, is the issue of data. More and better data continue to be needed to address these 
open questions and solve these research design issues.  
Civil War Duration – Disaggregating how they End 
 The matter of civil war duration remains one of particular concern for policymakers and 
scholars. The findings here indicate that we learn more about when civil conflicts end by 
including the psychological characteristics of leaders. However, some questions still remain that 
are worth exploring. The first among these is the issue of how civil wars end. As discussed in 
chapter 4, civil conflicts can end through total victory, negotiated settlement, or a stalemate 
where the conflict ceases to reach the minimum number of required battle-deaths. There is a 
strong theoretical reason to believe that the effect of personalities and beliefs may have a greater 
effect on the likelihood of reaching a negotiated settlement. In this case, leaders are particularly 
important as they tend to serve as the ultimate veto player in accepting or rejecting a negotiated 
settlement with rebels. It is far easier to credit circumstance with the conflict fizzling out than the 
choice to pursue negotiation. Additionally, it is somewhat easier to assign more credit to military 
leaders and/or capabilities when focusing only on total victory by either side. Conflating how 
civil conflicts end limits the insights that we can generate from models of civil conflict duration.  
Leaders’ Responses to Civil War Severity – Operationalizing Severity 
 The findings in chapter 5 provide useful insights into designing at-a-distance research 
studies. While the preliminary findings indicate that leader psychology may well not be sensitive 
to general conflict severity, they present additional questions for future research. Does the type 
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of attack actually affect the psychological characteristics of leaders in a lasting way? In chapter 
5, I aggregate all types of deaths associated with the Irish Troubles into an annual measure of the 
total number of conflict related deaths. On one hand, this is prudent because the aggregated 
number captures the general severity of the unrest and conflict in the region. On the other, it is 
distinctly possible that prime ministers may be more sensitive to the type of attack. The measure 
used in chapter 5 includes deaths caused by fighting between paramilitary groups, terrorist 
attacks (both against the government and against domestic opponents), fighting with British 
government forces, and assassinations of leaders of militias and/or British political figures. 
 However, this highlights an issue inherent in aggregation in general. Operationalizing 
severity as the aggregate number of deaths associated with the conflict tends to wipe away the 
real possibility that some conflict related deaths are simply more “shocking” than others. It is 
distinctly possible that prime ministers in the U.K. would be more deeply affected by the 
assassination of political leaders than they would be hearing about non-government armed 
groups killing one another. Therefore, subsequent research may wish to explore just how 
different prime ministers respond to different shocks in the context of the Troubles.  
 In addition to disaggregating the categories of battle-deaths, it may also be prudent to 
disaggregate the data temporally as well. Perhaps looking at the severity and psychological 
characteristics month-to-month, rather than year-to-year, may paint a more discrete feature of the 
effect of conflict severity. It is possible that a particularly severe month does cause a shock to 
certain characteristics, but that shocked characteristic may return to the leader’s mean before the 
end of the year. This may indeed paint a clearer picture of the short- or long-run relationship 
between conflict severity and leadership psychology.  
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Conclusion: The Takeaway  
 What does all of this mean for scholars of conflict studies and political psychology? 
There are some broad takeaways for those interested in these types of questions. First, we need 
more and better data for world leaders. So long as we lack access to enough speech data to 
generate a truly representative sample, at-a-distance political psychologists will be vulnerable to 
accusations of selection bias in their research. Progress continues to be made in gaining access to 
these useful resources, but we still have work to do in this area.  
 The second, and most important, takeaway from this research project is one that bears 
repeating over and over again: leaders matter. Chief executives play a pivotal role in shaping the 
pre-war bargaining range and, therefore, affect how likely negotiations are to succeed in 
avoiding civil conflict. If bargaining fails and civil conflict breaks out, these political leaders 
play an even greater role in shaping strategic and tactical styles and priorities. In most cases, 
these leaders are the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. This leaves the responsibility for 
processing information about the conflict (i.e. costs and benefits of continued fighting, likelihood 
of victory, etc.) to individuals. More importantly, the responsibility for processing information 
and calculating the right strategic and tactical choices falls to individuals who are not rational 
actors. Rather, political leaders tend to not only be fallible, but prone to hubris and 
miscalculation.  
 Finally, leaders matter when it comes time to bring an end to civil conflict. Chief 
executives often act as the last veto player to any potential negotiated settlement. The same 
fallible individuals must weigh complex information generated by the political environment, the 
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international community, and the war itself and make a decision to carry on the war or bring it to 
an end. All of these processes vary from person-to-person and leader-to-leader. If one chooses to 
construct a model or theory that excludes the important role leaders play in every stage of a civil 
conflict, one is choosing to construct a model or theory that not only has flawed assumptions, but 
does not represent reality.  
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APPENDIX A: ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
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Table 6 - Armed Conflict (Ongoing=0) 
Armed Conflict Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -0.843 -1.795* -1.838*   
 (0.827) (0.747) (0.764)   
BACE(t-1) 3.019** 3.011** 2.178* 2.450* 1.769+ 
 (1.023) (1.030) (0.992) (1.004) (0.967) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) -0.652  -2.093+  -1.602 
 (1.340)  (1.266)  (1.248) 
nPower(t-1) -2.850* -2.946**  -2.530*  
 (1.191) (1.116)  (1.115)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.799 0.586 0.304 1.131 0.941 
 (1.086) (1.063) (1.106) (1.051) (1.082) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) 0.438 0.452 0.427 0.183 0.174 
 (0.448) (0.456) (0.461) (0.454) (0.458) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.251 0.394 0.0351 0.0162 -0.243 
 (0.748) (0.713) (0.743) (0.743) (0.766) 
I-1(t-1) -0.891** -0.666* -0.620+   
 (0.319) (0.315) (0.317)   
P-4(t-1) -2.346* -1.703+ -1.486   
 (0.965) (0.948) (0.958)   
P-1(t-1) 1.392**   0.990* 0.971* 
 (0.483)   (0.407) (0.411) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1) -0.0526 -0.0627+ -0.0563 -0.0584+ -0.0515 
 (0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0327) (0.0331) 
Population(log t-1) 0.0323 0.0395+ 0.0318 0.0337 0.0268 
 (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0212) (0.0215) 
Personalist Regime -0.551 -0.535 -0.511 -0.744+ -0.706+ 
 (0.384) (0.390) (0.395) (0.388) (0.391) 
Party Regime -1.127* -1.337** -1.369** -1.169* -1.195** 
 (0.453) (0.455) (0.460) (0.461) (0.466) 
Military Regime -2.013** -2.240** -2.338*** -2.010** -2.087** 
 (0.686) (0.694) (0.700) (0.691) (0.696) 
Anocracy  0.114 0.176 0.173 0.147 0.142 
 (0.205) (0.208) (0.210) (0.208) (0.210) 
Constant -2.326* -2.248* -2.014* -3.492*** -3.331** 
 (0.970) (0.878) (0.986) (0.803) (0.893) 
      
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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Table 7 - Armed Conflict (Ongoing Missing) 
Armed Conflict Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -1.093 -1.467* -1.298+   
 (0.700) (0.668) (0.698)   
BACE(t-1) 2.571** 2.530** 2.069* 2.190* 1.757* 
 (0.887) (0.889) (0.882) (0.901) (0.883) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 1.934+  0.526  1.185 
 (1.173)  (1.064)  (1.044) 
nPower(t-1) -2.808** -2.038*  -1.740+  
 (1.054) (0.941)  (0.960)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 1.153 0.587 1.059 1.005 1.545 
 (0.997) (0.950) (1.008) (0.975) (1.012) 
Self-Confidence(t-1)  -1.132** -1.083** -1.214** -1.211** -1.347*** 
 (0.384) (0.386) (0.393) (0.395) (0.397) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.360 -0.649 -0.580 -0.417 -0.276 
 (0.667) (0.603) (0.643) (0.644) (0.668) 
I-1(t-1) -0.584* -0.615* -0.531*   
 (0.270) (0.260) (0.267)   
P-4(t-1) -0.412 -0.236 -0.413   
 (0.861) (0.789) (0.799)   
P-1(t-1) 0.216   0.135 0.0970 
 (0.446)   (0.384) (0.387) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1) -0.0910** -0.0876** -0.0866** -0.0613* -0.0677* 
 (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0298) (0.0264) (0.0271) 
Logged Population(log t-1) 0.0459* 0.0429* 0.0398* 0.0287+ 0.0298+ 
 (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0168) (0.0171) 
Personalist Regime 3.883*** 3.639*** 4.193*** 3.708*** 4.356*** 
 (1.089) (1.054) (1.088) (1.105) (1.128) 
Party Regime 0.0248 -0.124 -0.0628 0.0433 0.126 
 (0.691) (0.690) (0.706) (0.707) (0.715) 
Anocracy -0.409 -0.408 -0.490+ -0.537+ -0.602* 
 (0.275) (0.273) (0.277) (0.280) (0.280) 
Constant -1.859* -1.154 -1.809* -2.067** -2.792*** 
 (0.810) (0.707) (0.829) (0.655) (0.735) 
      
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
Military Regime Excluded for Collinearity      
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Table 8 - High-Intensity Conflict (Ongoing = 0) 
Armed Conflict Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -2.020** -2.481*** -2.367***   
 (0.682) (0.607) (0.632)   
BACE(t-1) 2.319** 2.230** 1.339 1.743* 1.033 
 (0.846) (0.838) (0.823) (0.844) (0.822) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 0.719  -0.828  -0.0574 
 (1.107)  (1.049)  (1.061) 
nPower(t-1) -3.464*** -3.184***  -2.651**  
 (0.984) (0.908)  (0.937)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.268 -0.00513 0.00635 0.751 0.847 
 (0.897) (0.865) (0.916) (0.883) (0.919) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) 0.277 0.284 0.250 0.00366 -0.00151 
 (0.370) (0.371) (0.382) (0.382) (0.390) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.126 -0.0323 -0.212 -0.0538 -0.111 
 (0.618) (0.581) (0.616) (0.625) (0.652) 
I-1(t-1) -0.854** -0.784** -0.696**   
 (0.263) (0.256) (0.263)   
P-4(t-1) -1.248 -0.952 -0.776   
 (0.798) (0.772) (0.794)   
P-1(t-1) 0.529   0.599+ 0.565 
 (0.399)   (0.342) (0.349) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1)  -0.0517+ -0.0540+ -0.0494+ -0.0336 -0.0314 
 (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0284) (0.0274) (0.0281) 
Population(log t-1) 0.0414* 0.0423* 0.0363* 0.0307+ 0.0271 
 (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0182) 
Personalist Regime -0.380 -0.393 -0.323 -0.614+ -0.516 
 (0.317) (0.317) (0.327) (0.326) (0.333) 
Party Regime -0.979** -1.076** -1.087** -0.947* -0.954* 
 (0.374) (0.369) (0.380) (0.387) (0.395) 
Military Regime -1.506** -1.601** -1.720** -1.258* -1.383* 
 (0.563) (0.561) (0.576) (0.577) (0.588) 
Anocracy  0.0198 0.0367 0.0458 -0.0208 -0.00493 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.174) (0.174) (0.178) 
Constant -1.727* -1.389+ -1.685* -2.862*** -3.228*** 
 (0.801) (0.715) (0.817) (0.674) (0.758) 
      
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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Table 9 - High-Intensity Armed Conflict Onset (Ongoing Missing) 
Armed Conflict Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -1.478* -1.608** -1.450*   
 (0.616) (0.594) (0.622)   
BACE(t-1) 1.846* 1.737* 1.295+ 1.616* 1.184 
 (0.754) (0.764) (0.760) (0.795) (0.776) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 1.991+  0.575  1.430 
 (1.017)  (0.932)  (0.930) 
nPower = L, -2.905** -2.049*  -1.635+  
 (0.930) (0.837)  (0.872)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.523 0.250 0.695 0.470 1.037 
 (0.857) (0.817) (0.870) (0.863) (0.895) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) -0.437 -0.408 -0.536 -0.553 -0.682+ 
 (0.332) (0.339) (0.343) (0.353) (0.352) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.270 -0.879+ -0.817 -0.341 -0.175 
 (0.573) (0.528) (0.562) (0.576) (0.594) 
I-1(t-1) -0.745** -0.896*** -0.813***   
 (0.235) (0.227) (0.233)   
P-4(t-1) 0.185 -0.222 -0.439   
 (0.758) (0.707) (0.718)   
P-1(t-1) -0.520   -0.515 -0.542 
 (0.377)   (0.334) (0.336) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1) -0.0272 -0.0238 -0.0197 0.00805 0.00466 
 (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0234) (0.0237) 
Population(log t-1) 0.0123 0.00839 0.00403 -0.00755 -0.00753 
 (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0155) 
Personalist Regime 3.648*** 3.073*** 3.524*** 3.496*** 4.062*** 
 (0.900) (0.887) (0.922) (0.940) (0.961) 
Party Regime  0.127 -0.0656 -0.0430 0.110 0.181 
 (0.599) (0.604) (0.620) (0.633) (0.638) 
Anocracy  -0.362 -0.292 -0.344 -0.525* -0.561* 
 (0.222) (0.224) (0.229) (0.230) (0.231) 
Constant -1.292+ -0.679 -1.326+ -1.658** -2.437*** 
 (0.692) (0.609) (0.715) (0.586) (0.656) 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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Table 10 - High-Intensity Onset (Ongoing = 0, Population) 
High-Intensity Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1)  -1.702* -2.180*** -2.103***   
 (0.662) (0.588) (0.614)   
BACE(t-1) 2.431** 2.355** 1.466+ 1.825* 1.113 
 (0.850) (0.842) (0.824) (0.843) (0.820) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 0.610  -0.908  -0.184 
 (1.113)  (1.054)  (1.056) 
nPower(t-1) -3.378*** -3.125***  -2.627**  
 (0.989) (0.914)  (0.939)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.141 -0.131 -0.130 0.598 0.681 
 (0.901) (0.869) (0.918) (0.875) (0.907) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) 0.293 0.301 0.267 0.0211 0.0143 
 (0.373) (0.374) (0.384) (0.383) (0.390) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) 0.0549 0.200 -0.00933 0.0869 0.00319 
 (0.615) (0.573) (0.609) (0.616) (0.645) 
I-1(t-1) -0.849** -0.767** -0.684**   
 (0.265) (0.258) (0.264)   
P-4(t-1) -1.454+ -1.144 -0.951   
 (0.796) (0.772) (0.793)   
P-1(t-1) 0.589   0.563+ 0.533 
 (0.401)   (0.342) (0.348) 
Population(log t-1) 0.0167 0.0168 0.0130 0.0148 0.0121 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0122) 
Personalist Regime -0.439 -0.452 -0.382 -0.650* -0.555+ 
 (0.318) (0.318) (0.327) (0.325) (0.331) 
Party Regime  -0.761* -0.853* -0.885* -0.805* -0.825* 
 (0.357) (0.354) (0.364) (0.370) (0.378) 
Military Regime -1.242* -1.331* -1.471** -1.109* -1.242* 
 (0.547) (0.546) (0.559) (0.564) (0.573) 
Anocracy  -0.00979 0.00886 0.0192 -0.0310 -0.0163 
 (0.170) (0.169) (0.174) (0.175) (0.178) 
Constant -1.877* -1.570* -1.810* -2.913*** -3.230*** 
 (0.803) (0.714) (0.819) (0.675) (0.759) 
      
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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Table 11 - High-Intensity (Ongoing = 0, GDP Per Cap) 
High-Intensity Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -1.710* -2.187*** -2.142***   
 (0.675) (0.600) (0.626)   
BACE(t-1) 2.294** 2.227** 1.374+ 1.760* 1.071 
 (0.857) (0.849) (0.830) (0.849) (0.825) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 0.447  -0.990  -0.242 
 (1.115)  (1.056)  (1.057) 
nPower(t-1) -3.218** -3.014**  -2.542**  
 (0.990) (0.917)  (0.941)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.350 0.117 0.0680 0.774 0.830 
 (0.908) (0.876) (0.924) (0.889) (0.923) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) 0.276 0.284 0.252 0.0122 0.00533 
 (0.375) (0.376) (0.385) (0.384) (0.391) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.0736 0.0960 -0.122 0.0153 -0.0730 
 (0.626) (0.586) (0.620) (0.628) (0.654) 
I-1(t-1) -0.858** -0.772** -0.694**   
 (0.267) (0.260) (0.265)   
P-4(t-1) -1.330+ -1.014 -0.830   
 (0.807) (0.782) (0.801)   
P-1(t-1) 0.605   0.581+ 0.553 
 (0.403)   (0.344) (0.350) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1) -0.00239 -0.00340 -0.00592 0.00162 -0.000193 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0188) 
Personalist Regime -0.453 -0.462 -0.393 -0.658* -0.566+ 
 (0.320) (0.320) (0.328) (0.327) (0.332) 
Party Regime -0.732* -0.824* -0.874* -0.762* -0.795* 
 (0.363) (0.359) (0.369) (0.375) (0.382) 
Military Regime -1.184* -1.274* -1.434* -1.039+ -1.184* 
 (0.551) (0.550) (0.561) (0.565) (0.573) 
Anocracy  -0.0389 -0.0191 -0.00461 -0.0549 -0.0379 
 (0.170) (0.169) (0.174) (0.174) (0.178) 
Constant -1.600* -1.329+ -1.545+ -2.732*** -3.039*** 
 (0.810) (0.724) (0.821) (0.674) (0.750) 
      
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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Table 12 - High-Intensity (Ongoing Missing, Population) 
High-Intensity Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -1.202* -1.357** -1.245*   
 (0.557) (0.524) (0.555)   
BACE(t-1) 1.945** 1.827* 1.380+ 1.574* 1.158 
 (0.749) (0.758) (0.751) (0.783) (0.761) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 1.920+  0.560  1.461 
 (1.015)  (0.930)  (0.916) 
nPower(t-1) -2.809** -1.992*  -1.650+  
 (0.926) (0.835)  (0.868)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.375 0.134 0.589 0.542 1.088 
 (0.846) (0.806) (0.856) (0.835) (0.856) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) -0.411 -0.386 -0.515 -0.563 -0.690* 
 (0.332) (0.337) (0.342) (0.351) (0.350) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.151 -0.762 -0.723 -0.384 -0.195 
 (0.562) (0.512) (0.546) (0.561) (0.583) 
I-1(t-1) -0.746** -0.895*** -0.815***   
 (0.235) (0.227) (0.233)   
P-4(t-1) 0.152 -0.250 -0.457   
 (0.758) (0.706) (0.716)   
P-1(t-1) -0.518   -0.493 -0.531 
 (0.377)   (0.327) (0.329) 
Population(log t-1) -0.00189 -0.00395 -0.00614 -0.00351 -0.00520 
 (0.00940) (0.00952) (0.00964) (0.00996) (0.00993) 
Personalist Regime 3.562*** 3.011*** 3.463*** 3.521*** 4.088*** 
 (0.897) (0.884) (0.917) (0.936) (0.953) 
Party Regime 0.140 -0.0486 -0.0289 0.102 0.180 
 (0.600) (0.603) (0.618) (0.631) (0.636) 
Military Regime - - - - - 
      
Anocracy  -0.433* -0.355+ -0.396+ -0.509* -0.554* 
 (0.213) (0.214) (0.219) (0.224) (0.225) 
Constant -1.363* -0.762 -1.378+ -1.658** -2.449*** 
 (0.689) (0.601) (0.711) (0.585) (0.652) 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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Table 13 - High-Intensity (Ongoing Missing, GDP Per Cap) 
High-Intensity Models      
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Distrust(t-1) -1.307* -1.485** -1.393*   
 (0.570) (0.539) (0.570)   
BACE(t-1) 1.866* 1.753* 1.308+ 1.593* 1.148 
 (0.752) (0.761) (0.756) (0.792) (0.771) 
In-Group Bias(t-1) 1.918+  0.570  1.493 
 (1.010)  (0.928)  (0.919) 
nPower(t-1) -2.800** -1.998*  -1.682+  
 (0.918) (0.830)  (0.864)  
Conceptual Complexity(t-1) 0.511 0.252 0.692 0.488 1.077 
 (0.856) (0.815) (0.867) (0.861) (0.890) 
Self-Confidence(t-1) -0.422 -0.399 -0.531 -0.563 -0.696* 
 (0.331) (0.337) (0.341) (0.352) (0.350) 
Task-Orientation(t-1) -0.253 -0.855 -0.807 -0.353 -0.179 
 (0.572) (0.525) (0.559) (0.574) (0.592) 
I-1(t-1) -0.751** -0.898*** -0.816***   
 (0.234) (0.227) (0.232)   
P-4(t-1) 0.183 -0.219 -0.435   
 (0.757) (0.706) (0.715)   
P-1(t-1) -0.511   -0.495 -0.524 
 (0.376)   (0.331) (0.333) 
GDP Per Capita(log t-1) -0.0117 -0.0132 -0.0146 -0.000730 -0.00424 
 (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0152) 
Personalist Regime 3.619*** 3.067*** 3.517*** 3.503*** 4.092*** 
 (0.898) (0.884) (0.919) (0.938) (0.958) 
Party Regime 0.146 -0.0470 -0.0333 0.0893 0.165 
 (0.598) (0.602) (0.617) (0.630) (0.636) 
Military Regime - - - - - 
      
Anocracy -0.415* -0.330 -0.363+ -0.499* -0.536* 
 (0.212) (0.212) (0.217) (0.223) (0.224) 
Constant -1.273+ -0.682 -1.319+ -1.697** -2.505*** 
 (0.691) (0.607) (0.712) (0.580) (0.640) 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10      
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APPENDIX B: ONSET TESTS 
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Table 14 - Onset Correlation Matrix 
 Dis BACE Bias nPwr CC SC  Task P-1  I-1 P-4 GDP Pop Pers Part Mil An 
Dis ----                
BACE .165* ----               
Bias -.04 -.02 ----              
nPwr -.01 .18* .539* -----             
CC -.14* .11 -.40* -.37* ----            
SC -.12* .11* -.24* -.27* .39* ----           
Task .07 -.05 -.25* -.09 .26* .05 ----          
P-1 -.61* -.15* -.10 -.08 .05 .15* .05 ----         
I-1 -.37* -.14* -.04 -.095 -.002 -.03 -.05 .48* ---        
P-4 -.36* .05 -.02 -.04 .07 .17* -.196* .45* .15* ---       
GDP PC -.33* -.08 -.09 -.19* .23* .34* -.25* .23* .05 .37* ----      
Population -.09 .05 -.09 -.10 .24* .23* -.01 .09 -.10 .23* .73* ----     
Personal .01 -.11 .009 -.07 .009 .009 .03 .11* .11* .06 .04* .16* ----    
Party .34* .21* .028 .09 -.082 
-
.14* .24* 
-
.27* 
-
.27* 
-
.36* .07* .18* 
-
.13* ----   
Military .08 .004 .04 .16* -.042 
-
.16* .13* -.03 .17* 
-
.14* .05* .14* 
-
.06* 
-
.09* ---  
Anocracy -.02 -.09 .08 .17* -.21* 
-
.16* -.15* .16* .16* .07 
-
.395* 
-
.40* 
-
.06* 
-
.23* 
-
.06* --- 
Democracy -.33* -.09 -.11 -.197* .24* .21* -.15* .23* .10 .36* .37* .05 
-
.28* 
-
.28* 
-
.15* 
-
.02* 
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APPENDIX C: CIVIL WAR SEVERITY TESTS  
 147  
 
 
Table 15 - Summary Stats. Battle-Deaths 
Variable  Obs Mean Std Dev. Variance  Skewness Min Max 
Battle-Deaths  30 1211.933 1342.757 1802996 0.9293624 26 4755 
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Table 16 - Pairwise Correlation Matrix (Severity) 
 DIS BACE BIAS PWR SC CC I-1 P-1 P-4 DEM POP GDP 
DIS -----            
BACE .1761* -----           
BIAS -.0559 -.0413 -----          
PWR  -.0173 .1641* .5420* -----         
SC -.0984+ .0785 -.2259* -.2537* -----        
CC -.1269* .1175* -.3893* -.3747* .3901* -----       
I-1 -.3559* -.1581* -.0383 -.0810 -.0194 -.0060 -----      
P-1 -.5737* -.1396* -.1126+ -.0668 .1841* .0645 .4824* -----     
P-4 -.3879* .0533 -.0493 -.0670 .1909* .0844 .1806* .4762* -----    
DEM -.0632 -.1494 -.2957* -.1749 .2935* .3467* .0032 .0577 .0067 -----   
POP -.3867* -.0614 -.0474 -.0878 .1292 .0419 .0720 .2183+ .2931* .0087 -----  
GDP -.2000 .0218 -.1054 -.1495 .3574* -.1981 -.0977 .1616 .3622* .0982* .5629* ----- 
FUEL -.1788 .0057 .0967 -.2056 .1470 -.1074 .1698 .0954 .2496* .0939* .1672 .1850* 
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APPENDIX D: ALTERNATIVE SEVERITY MODELS  
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Table 17 - Alternative Model Specifications 
Civil Conflict Severity    
ARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
Distrust 1.110   
 (2.431)   
BACE 4.808 0.715 -0.256 
 (5.294) (2.849) (1.258) 
In-group Bias 6.183 -5.045 -4.307*** 
 (7.430) (3.201) (1.056) 
nPower -2.951 5.353* -2.504+ 
 (7.612) (2.087) (1.325) 
Self-Confidence 4.743** -9.252*** -10.87*** 
 (1.619) (2.228) (1.036) 
Concept. Complex. 7.800+ 4.180+ 9.270*** 
 (4.353) (2.499) (1.099) 
I-1  -1.509+  
  (0.812)  
P-1   -2.717*** 
   (0.555) 
P-4  8.252*  
  (3.770)  
Democracy -0.707* 0.0879 -0.463** 
 (0.346) (0.226) (0.164) 
Population(log) -3.353** 0.363 3.257*** 
 (1.220) (0.892) (0.660) 
GDP Per Cap(log) 2.493* 0.851 0.184 
 (1.016) (0.812) (0.552) 
Fuel Export 0.0436** 0.0501*** 0.0664*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0107) (0.00551) 
Constant 35.77* -14.05 -52.83*** 
 (14.68) (13.33) (9.282) 
    
Observations 28 28 28 
Number of ccode 6 6 6 
AIC  333.0985 346.3418 318.0588 
BIC  347.7527 342.3283 332.713 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10   
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APPENDIX E: DURATION DATA TESTS
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Table 18 - Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 Dis BACE Bias nPwr SC CC I-1 P-1 P-4 Coup Gov Dem GDP Par. 
Dis - - - - - - - - -      
BACE .20* - - - - - - - -      
Bias -.15* -.08* - - - - - - -      
nPwr  .11* .38* .26* - - - - - -      
SC .09* .04* -.30* -.16* - - - - -      
CC -.19* -.07* -.19* -.20* .02 - - - -      
I-1 -.40* -.39* .12* -.21* -.07* .06* - - -      
P-1 -.55* -.39* .09* -.15* -.03 -.06* .54* - -      
P-4 .05* .17* .07* .03 .02 -.20* -.17* .05* -      
Coup  -.08* .17* .37* .05* -.04 -.12* .05* -.09* -.02 -     
Gov -.19* -.12* .06* -.21* .13* .04 .007 .007 -.007 -.03*     
Dem -.19* -.17* .15* -.34* .07* -.06* .099* .14* .05* -.03* .26*    
GDP .09* .02 .09* -.06* .32* -.50* -.11* .02 .25* -.11* .03* .25*   
Par -.33* -.27* .17* -.20* -.47* .35* .22* .35* -.09* .0002 -.34* .21* -.36*  
Int. .03 .02 .15* .15* -.21* .03 -.07* -.11* .09* .02* -.20* -.23* -.14* -.09* 
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VARIABLES 
Model 1 
nPower 
Model 2  
BACE 
Model 3 
CC 
Model 4 
SC 
Model 5  
Distrust 
Model 6 
IGB 
Model 7 
I-1 
Model 8 
P-1 
Model 9 
P-4 
Model 10 
Deaths 
nPwr(t-1) 0.163 0.160 0.266 -1.016 1.454* -0.142 3.018 1.260 -0.0885 -11.76 
 (0.260) (0.521) (0.472) (0.840) (0.705) (0.303) (3.692) (1.664) (0.642) (10.14) 
nPwr(t-2) -0.0809 -0.115 0.264 0.0486 0.508 -0.436 1.470 1.344 0.418 -1.763 
 (0.230) (0.461) (0.418) (0.743) (0.624) (0.268) (3.268) (1.473) (0.568) (8.977) 
BACE(t-1) 0.0929 0.670 0.0984 0.240 -0.134 -0.124 -0.0687 -0.737 -0.108 -3.835 
 (0.231) (0.462) (0.419) (0.745) (0.625) (0.269) (3.274) (1.476) (0.569) (8.995) 
BACE(t-2) 0.0640 0.165 -0.415 -0.168 -0.322 0.413+ -1.804 -0.502 -0.546 -0.0113 
 (0.204) (0.408) (0.370) (0.658) (0.552) (0.237) (2.891) (1.303) (0.503) (7.944) 
CC(t-1) 0.0496 -0.549 0.154 -1.149 0.178 0.337 1.754 -1.288 1.099* -21.95** 
 (0.218) (0.436) (0.395) (0.704) (0.591) (0.254) (3.094) (1.394) (0.538) (8.500) 
CC(t-2)  0.307 0.425 0.341 -1.644+ 0.154 -0.156 0.898 -1.407 0.350 -13.57 
 (0.275) (0.549) (0.498) (0.886) (0.744) (0.320) (3.898) (1.757) (0.678) (10.71) 
SC(t-1) -0.0699 -0.00417 0.145 0.179 -0.678** -0.120 -0.314 0.0185 -0.0530 4.048 
 (0.0917) (0.183) (0.166) (0.296) (0.248) (0.107) (1.301) (0.586) (0.226) (3.574) 
SC(t-2) 0.0141 0.155 -0.115 0.234 -0.236 0.0166 -1.457 -0.393 -0.229 6.048 
 (0.121) (0.243) (0.220) (0.392) (0.329) (0.141) (1.723) (0.776) (0.300) (4.733) 
Distrust(t-1) 0.129 0.453 -0.0520 0.539 -0.117 -0.0363 -3.333 -1.802+ -0.392 8.200 
 (0.149) (0.299) (0.271) (0.482) (0.404) (0.174) (2.118) (0.954) (0.368) (5.818) 
Distrust(t-2) -0.0260 0.0138 -0.156 0.105 0.356 -0.0543 -1.113 -0.829 -0.524+ 3.319 
 (0.110) (0.220) (0.199) (0.354) (0.297) (0.128) (1.558) (0.702) (0.271) (4.279) 
IGB(t-1)  -0.672* 0.0560 -0.0252 1.605+ -0.895 0.175 -2.548 -0.578 -0.0324 -4.376 
 (0.263) (0.527) (0.478) (0.850) (0.714) (0.307) (3.739) (1.685) (0.650) (10.27) 
IGB(t-2) 0.511 0.903 -0.119 -0.947 1.679+ 0.144 -1.597 -2.092 -0.845 -14.89 
 (0.363) (0.727) (0.659) (1.173) (0.985) (0.423) (5.157) (2.324) (0.897) (14.17) 
I-1(t-1) 0.0343 0.209* -0.0196 0.227 -0.0615 0.0143 -0.541 -0.00903 -0.131 0.191 
 (0.0520) (0.104) (0.0943) (0.168) (0.141) (0.0605) (0.738) (0.332) (0.128) (2.027) 
I-1(t-2) 0.0581 0.0974 -0.0538 0.151 0.0568 0.0900 -0.388 -0.143 -0.148 -0.0155 
 (0.0588) (0.118) (0.107) (0.190) (0.159) (0.0684) (0.834) (0.376) (0.145) (2.291) 
P-1(t-1) 0.0379 -0.122 0.120 -0.422+ 0.111 -0.116 0.427 -0.459 0.152 -1.909 
 (0.0710) (0.142) (0.129) (0.229) (0.192) (0.0827) (1.007) (0.454) (0.175) (2.768) 
P-1(t-2) -0.238** -0.0523 -0.0217 -0.0812 -0.199 -0.143 0.326 0.0565 0.159 1.244 
 (0.0749) (0.150) (0.136) (0.242) (0.203) (0.0873) (1.064) (0.479) (0.185) (2.922) 
P-4(t-1) 0.235+ 0.369 -0.0534 0.295 0.460 -0.143 -0.653 -0.459 -0.00669 -0.874 
 (0.133) (0.265) (0.241) (0.428) (0.359) (0.154) (1.882) (0.848) (0.327) (5.171) 
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P-4(t-2) 0.168 -0.0789 -0.213 -0.00208 0.147 0.179 0.216 0.942 0.184 -4.310 
 (0.116) (0.231) (0.210) (0.373) (0.313) (0.135) (1.641) (0.740) (0.285) (4.509) 
Deaths(t-1) 0.00326 0.0456+ 0.0117 -0.00690 0.00655 0.00514 -0.0206 -0.0117 0.0311 -0.328 
 (0.0134) (0.0269) (0.0244) (0.0434) (0.0364) (0.0157) (0.191) (0.0859) (0.0332) (0.524) 
Deaths(t-2) 0.00616 -0.0159 -0.00472 0.0430 0.0498* -0.00469 -0.0278 0.0218 -0.0498* 0.339 
 (0.00917) (0.0183) (0.0166) (0.0296) (0.0248) (0.0107) (0.130) (0.0586) (0.0226) (0.357) 
Constant -0.0555 -0.328 0.340 1.710+ -0.379 0.132 0.660 2.503 -0.0349 23.93+ 
 (0.316) (0.631) (0.573) (1.019) (0.855) (0.368) (4.479) (2.019) (0.779) (12.31) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10         
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